Olin v. Henderson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is urged that plaintiffs showed no title in fee, and therefore could not recover; the precise claim being that the contract under which plaintiff claims title does not convey the fee, and that having claimed title in fee, they have failed to make their case. To support this proposition counsel cites Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145 ; Gamble v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315 , and several other authorities. We cannot take the time to analyze those cases. An examination will show that they do not apply to this case. The contract contemplated and permitted possession by the. vendees. The trial was evidently conducted upon the understanding that the plaintiffs were in possession under the contract, which evidently gave them the right of possession. Ejectment is a possessory action, and a vendee in such contract, in possession under it, is entitled to maintain ejectment against one who has ousted him from the land. Covert v. Morrison, 49 Mich. 135 . A vendor in a land contract giving the vendee right of possession cannot maintain ejectment until he has in some manner terminated the .contract relation. Michigan Land & Iron Co. v. Thoney, 89 Mich. 226 . * * * “Section 7790 [2 How. Stat. (1st Ed.)] provides that in order to recover the plaintiff must show ‘a valid subsisting interest in the premises claimed, and a right to recover the possession thereof, or of some share, interest or portion thereof.’ While it is. true that the plaintiffs had not the legal title, and therefore did not show title”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kingsnorth v. Baker

2. ““ Defendant was asked to testify to a conversation between him and Mr. Campau, deceased, in 1878, in regard to the building of this fence. This was excluded, under 3 How. Stat. § 7545, as amended by Act No. 121, Pub. Acts 1895. Counsel sought to defend the admission of this testimony upon the ground that the plaintiffs are not the assignees of Mr. Campau, but are grantees of his heirs several times removed, and that the statute only applies to a case where the property or right was transferred by the deceased in his lifetime. We think the statute is broad enough to include this case within the beneficent prohibition. This statute was held in Lloyd v. Hollenback, 98 Mich. 203 [ 57 N. W. 110 ], to include the heir. If it includes the heir, for the same reason it should include the grantee or assignee of the heir. It was also held in Ripley v. Seligman, 88 Mich. 189 [ 50 N. W. 143 ], that the assigns of a deceased person include the grantee of the grantee of the deceased person. The testimony was properly excluded. ”-”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Molby v. Murray