Hansen v. Ford Motor Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The question whether an agreement contains an ambiguity is a matter of law to be decided by the trial court. The court may consider collateral evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement in determining whether the language of the agreement is unclear. If the evidence presented is so plain that no reasonable person could hold any way but one, then the court may interpret the meaning as a matter of law. If the court determines that the contract is reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions, an ambiguity exists. At that point, if the proffered evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances is in dispute, turns on witness credibility, or is susceptible of conflicting inferences, the meaning must be resolved by the appropriate fact finder[.] Once the agreement is found to be ambiguous, the meaning to be assigned the unclear terms is a question of fact.... In order to determine the meaning of the ambiguous terms, the fact finder may consider extrinsic evidence of the language and conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the agreement, as well as oral evidence of the parties’ intent.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Concerned Residents of Santa Fe North, Inc. v. Santa Fe Estates, Inc. · J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad

2. ““Those courts adopting the flat bar rule hold that language such as ‘all other persons, firms or corporations liable’ is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C. App. 616 , 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613 , 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549 , 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties to a general release containing ‘all other persons’ language are deemed as a matter of law to have expressed their intent to discharge all potential tortfeasors. Flat bar courts thus look only to the four corners of the release document and do not allow consideration of extrinsic evidence. “Jurisdictions adopting the intent rule have developed two formulations with similar purposes. Some jurisdictions hold that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in an action by a party to a release and a stranger to that agreement. See, e.g., Neves, 769 P.2d at 1054; Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401 , 623 A.2d 995, 1003 (1993). Under this formulation of the intent rule, parol evidence of the parties’ intentions is admissible even when the terms of the release are facially unambiguous. See, e.g., Sims, 623 A.2d at 1004 n.12. Other jurisdictions hold that extrinsic evidence of the parties[’] intent is admissible only when the court determines as a matter of law that the terms of the release agreement are ambiguous. See, e.g., Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 11 , 530 N.Y.S.2d 517”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Luther v. Danner

3. “release agreements are most often drafted by the party seeking to be released, the attorneys who draft these agreements and the insurance companies they represent are laboring under the influence of a bygone era, and the victim’s interest in obtaining recompense frequently overshadows concerns with boilerplate language that is often introduced for the first time in a release prepared after the specific parties have agreed to settle.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taylor v. Mooney Aircraft Corp.