State v. Cooper

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided July 5, 1922

Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1922-07-05

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently October 1968

1 federal appellate ·

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1922-07-05

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Mr. Justice Fraser

¶1 (dissenting) : I think the first and third exceptions should be sustained. I think the first exception should be sustained because the date alleged in the indictment was misleading. I think the third exception should be sustained because the testimony affected the bias of the witness and was competent.

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Case posture

Posture: Before ANSEL, J., County Court, Greenville, January, 1922. Affirmed.Fannie Cooper upon conviction for slander appeals. Following are the exceptions of the defendant: (1) That his Honor erred in permitting testimony as to alleged slanderous statement made in July, 1920. Specification of error: The indictment charged that the slander occurred in July, 1921, and it was improper to permit the State to then offer evidence that the offense occurred in 1920, and to prove statements made a year earlier than the date fixed in the indictment; that there was a very material difference in time, and therefore his Honor erred in permitting testimony as to what was said and done in July, 1920. (2) That his Honor erred in permitting the State to offer testimony in contradiction of the defendant by Mrs. Adeline Smith. The Solicitor had, on cross-examination, finally forced the defendant to state the source of her information, and on cross-examination she said that Mrs. Smith had given her the information upon which she founded her statement. The solicitor put up Mrs. Smith to contradict this statement. Specification of error: (a) The matter brought out on cross-examination was collateral, and it was improper to contradict the defendant on a collateral statement adduced on cross-examination. (b) One party is not permitted to ask question on collateral matter on cross-examination for the purpose of putting up witness later to contradict the witness. (3) That his Honor erred in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine Mrs. Adeline Smith as to her bias against the defendant, in that the defendant's counsel asked the witness if her brother had not been put on the chain gang for two years for assault and battery upon the father of the defendant. Specification of error: It was proper to prove bad feeling between the family of the defendant and Mrs. Smith to show bias, and said question and answer was proper and admissible, and his Honor erred in overruling the objection. (4) That his Honor erred in not charging the third request of the defendant, as follows: Malice indicates a wicked heart and an ill will towards another, and the jury cannot find the defendant guilty unless it appears from the evidence that the words uttered by her were with malicious intent at the time, and were not done in hot anger or heat of passion. Specification of error: It being respectfully submitted that if a statement was made in heat and passion, without malice it could not be a criminal slander under the law of South Carolina. (5) That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the sixth request of the defendant, as follows: The jury is charged that, if the parties to this transaction within a few days thereafter reached an amicable and peaceful adjustment of their trouble and agreed that the signing of the contract was to end the matter, then the jury is charged that, unless the slander was repeated after the agreement was signed, there can be no conviction in this case. Specification of error: It being respectfully submitted that the said request was sound and proper and should have been charged. (6) That his Honor erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial upon the grounds set forth in the record; it being respectfully submitted that the defendant was entitled to a new trial for the errors specified. Upon these grounds, we will ask the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment below.

Source: CourtListener

Court

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Parallel citations

113 S.E 132