120 Wash. 2d
Volume 120 — Washington Reports, Second Series
48 opinions
- 120 Wash. 2d 1State v. Dodd (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 49Department of Labor & Industries v. Dirt & Aggregate, Inc. (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 57Hiatt v. Walker Chevrolet Co. (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 68Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641 (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 101National Federation of Retired Persons v. Insurance Commissioner (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 120Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 140Spokane County Health District v. Brockett (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 156State v. Coria (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 178Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Watson (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 196State v. Simon (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 200State v. Perry (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 203First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 246Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co. (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 304Zachman v. Whirlpool Acceptance Corp. (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 325State v. Ryland (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 327State v. Houf (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 334State v. McDougal (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 357Impecoven v. Department of Revenue (1992)
<bold>[1] Insurance — Brokers — Insurance Agent — Affiliation With</bold> <bold>Appointment Agent — Independent Contractor.</bold> Insurance agents who sell insurance as affiliates of other insurance agents who hold appointment contracts with insurance companies are independent contractors. <bold>[2] Insurance — Taxation — Business and Occupation Tax —</bold> <bold>Insurance Agents and Brokers — Affiliation With Appointment</bold> <bold>Agent — Separate Taxable Units.</bold> An affiliated insurance agent (<italic>i.e.</italic>, an agent who sells insurance as an affiliate of another insurance agent holding an appointment contract with an insurance company) and the appointment agent under whom the affiliated agent sells insurance do not together constitute a "group of individuals acting as a unit" under RCW <cross_reference>82.04.030</cross_reference>, which defines "person" and "company" for purposes of business and occupation taxation. <bold>[3] Statutes — Construction — Considered as a Whole — In</bold> <bold>General.</bold> A statute is read as a whole, with each provision read in relation to the other provisions. <bold>[4] Statutes — Construction — Administrative Construction —</bold> <bold>Deference to Agency — In General.</bold> In interpreting a statute, the courts grant judicial deference to the interpretation made by the agency charged with the statute's enforcement, although the courts retain the ultimate authority to determine the statute's purpose and effect. <bold>[5] Taxation — Business and Occupation Tax — Purpose.</bold> The Legislature's intent in enacting the business and occupation tax was to impose the tax upon virtually all business activity carried on within the state. <bold>[6] Taxation — Business and Occupation Tax — Application —</bold> <bold>Separate But Related Activity.</bold> Separate but related activities are subject to business and occupation taxation unless specifically exempted by statute. <bold>[7] Insurance — Taxation — Business and Occupation Tax —</bold> <bold>Insurance Agents and Brokers — Affiliation With Appointment</bold> <bold>Agent — Commissions — Taxability.</bold> The respective commissions received by an affiliated insurance agent (<italic>i.e.</italic>, an<page_number>Page 358</page_number> agent who sells insurance as an affiliate of another insurance agent holding an appointment contract with an insurance company) and the appointment agent under whom the affiliated agent sells insurance is each subject to business and occupation taxation under RCW <cross_reference>82.04.220</cross_reference>. <bold>[8] Appeal — Disposition of Cause — Remand — Summary Judgment.</bold> An appellate court may direct entry of a summary judgment if no facts are in dispute. GUY, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
- 120 Wash. 2d 365State v. Brand (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 371State v. Burden (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 378Matter of Recall of Hurley (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 382Nelson v. National Fund Raising Consultants, Inc. (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 394Shoreline Community College District No. 7 v. Employment Security Department (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 416Van Vonno v. Hertz Corporation (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 427Matter of Personal Restraint of Vandervlugt (1992)
- 120 Wash. 2d 439Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Franklin County (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 461Harris v. Department of Labor & Industries (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 490Estate of Jordan v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 512Xieng v. Peoples National Bank (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 538Baker v. Leonard (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 549State v. Rice (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 573Scott Galvanizing, Inc. v. Northwest EnviroServices, Inc. (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 585State v. Greenwood (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 616State v. Schaffer (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 631State v. Benn (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 712Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O.M. Scott & Sons (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 727Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc. (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 747Brown v. Snohomish County Physicians Corp. (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 761MATTER OF DISCIPLINE PROCEEDING AGAINST McLENDON (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 761In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against McLendon (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 782Dawson v. Daly (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 801State v. Summers (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 822State v. Blackwell (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 833In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 879State v. Cauthron (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 913State v. Hutsell (1993)
- 120 Wash. 2d 925State v. McNallie (1993)
<bold>[1] Criminal Law — Statutes — Construction — Meaning of Words —</bold> <bold>Context.</bold> Individual statutes defining crimes are considered in the context in which they appear in the criminal code. <bold>[2] Sexual Offenses — Communication With Minor for Immoral</bold> <bold>Purposes — Meaning of Words — "Immoral Purposes" — Limitation</bold> <bold>— Sexual Nature.</bold> In a prosecution for communication with a minor for immoral purposes (RCW <cross_reference>9.68A.090</cross_reference>), an instruction requiring the communication to have been for "immoral purposes of a sexual nature" is constitutionally adequate. The phrase "immoral purposes" of RCW <cross_reference>9.68A.090</cross_reference> is not limited to those acts of sexual misconduct specifically proscribed by RCW 9.68A. (<italic>State v. Danforth</italic>, <cross_reference>56 Wn. App. 133</cross_reference> is overruled insofar as it is inconsistent.) <bold>[3] Sexual Offenses — Communication With Minor for Immoral</bold> <bold>Purposes — Scope — Payment — Third Party.</bold> A person communicates with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of RCW <cross_reference>9.68A.090</cross_reference> by indicating to the minor a willingness to pay anyone for engaging in specific sexual conduct. The person need not make an express offer of payment to the minor in exchange for the minor's engaging in sexual conduct. <bold>[4] Criminal Law — Punishment — Sentence — Criminal History —</bold> <bold>Validity of Convictions — Plea of Guilty — Facial Invalidity</bold> <bold>— Waiver of Right To Remain Silent.</bold> The failure of a guilty plea form to show that the defendant was informed of the right to remain silent at trial does not render the plea facially invalid. <bold>[5] Criminal Law — Right To Remain Silent — Waiver — Validity —</bold> <bold>Test.</bold> A criminal defendant's waiver of the right to remain silent is valid if it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. MADSEN, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
- 120 Wash. 2d 935Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1993)