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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11902
____________________
VERONICA BAXTER,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Angelo J. Crooms, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,
AL-QUAN PIERCE,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Sincere Pierce, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAFET SANTIAGO-MIRANDA,
individually and as an agent of
Brevard County Sheriff's Office,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
Defendant-Counter Claimant,
CARSON HENDREN,
individually and as an agent of
Brevard County Sheriff's Office,
SHERIFF, BREVARD COUNTY FLORIDA,
EVELYN MIRANDA,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Jafet Santiago-Miranda,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00718-CEM-LHP
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and HULL, Circuit
Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves a fatal shooting in which Deputy Jafet
Santiago-Miranda fired his weapon into a moving vehicle as it
accelerated toward him and tragically killed two young persons.
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Plaintiffs Veronica Baxter and Al-Quan Pierce sued as
personal representatives of the estates of the driver, Angelo
Crooms, and a passenger, Sincere Pierce, respectively. The
plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that Santiago-Miranda used excessive
force, failed to render medical aid, and was liable for state-law
battery. The plaintiffs’ complaint also raised claims against Deputy
Carson Hendren, who was the other deputy on the scene, and
Sheriff Wayne Ivey in his official capacity.
The three defendants filed a joint motion for summary
judgment on all claims. In their response, the plaintiffs opposed
summary judgment and further stated they had decided not to
pursue certain claims. In a single order, the district court dismissed
with prejudice all claims against defendant Hendren and granted
Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey’s motion for summary
judgment. The court concluded, among other things, that
defendant Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was constitutionally
permissible. The plaintiffs appeal only the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey.
After careful review of the record and briefs, and with the
benefit of oral argument, we affirm. We divide our discussion into
four parts. First, we examine our appellate jurisdiction because this
case was adjudicated in the district court through a voluntary
dismissal of defendant Hendren and a summary judgment grant as
to defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey. Second, satisfied
that we have jurisdiction, we determine whether
Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was excessive in violation of the
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Next, we review the plaintiffs’ state law battery claims and, finally,
their Monell claims against Sheriff Ivey. 1
I. BACKGROUND
We recount the evidence of the events in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. See Cantu v. City
of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2020). Some events were
captured on defendant Santiago-Miranda’s dashcam in his cruiser.2
A. The Stolen VW Passat
Around 10:15 a.m. on November 13, 2020, Deputy Ezra
Dominguez with the Brevard County Sheriff’s Department was
patrolling the parking lot of a hotel in Cocoa, Florida when he
observed a gray or silver Volkswagen Passat with illegal dark tint
on all windows. Dominguez noticed a man acting suspiciously
near the Passat. A few minutes later, the Passat pulled out of the
hotel parking lot, and Dominguez followed it.
Deputy Dominguez turned on his blue lights and attempted
to conduct a traffic stop on the Passat, but the vehicle did not stop
and drove away at an increasing rate of speed. Dominguez
1 Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 The dashcam video was enhanced by the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (“FDLE”) to more closely show the deputy and the moving
vehicle. On appeal, the plaintiffs do not challenge the admissibility of the
dashcam video. Deputy Hendren did not activate her dashcam.
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terminated the traffic stop and reported the Passat’s description
over the dispatch radio.
At about 10:30 a.m., a woman reported that her silver
Volkswagen Passat with license plate number NWEG22 was
stolen. The stolen Passat was registered to an address in Brevard
County. The dispatch radio reported Dominguez’s attempted
traffic stop and the stolen Passat.
B. Deputies Pursue a VW Passat
Deputies Jafet Santiago-Miranda and Carson Hendren, also
with the Brevard County Sheriff’s Department, received
information over the dispatch radio about the stolen Passat that
fled from Deputy Dominguez. After receiving Dominguez’s
description of the Passat, Santiago-Miranda and Hendren, in their
separate cruisers, met in a liquor store’s parking lot on the corner
of Clearlake Drive and Dixon Boulevard in Cocoa. Both deputies
were in full police uniform, and each drove a marked police cruiser.
At that juncture, approximately 15 minutes after hearing the
dispatch radio, Deputy Hendren, from the parking lot, observed a
gray Volkswagen Passat, which also had illegal dark tint on the
windows, turn quickly onto Dixon Boulevard and speed away. In
their separate cruisers, Santiago-Miranda and Hendren then
followed that Passat down Dixon Boulevard and into a residential
neighborhood. Hendren’s cruiser followed the Passat on one street
through the neighborhood. Santiago-Miranda’s cruiser went down
another street in the neighborhood. Neither deputy activated their
lights or sirens.
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Both deputies thought this Passat was the stolen Passat that
eluded Deputy Dominguez’s attempted stop about 15 minutes
earlier. In this Passat, 16-year-old A.J. Crooms was driving, and his
friend Jaquan Kimbrough-Rucker was in the front passenger seat.
Crooms stopped at Cynthia Green’s house on Exeter Street to pick
up Sincere Pierce, who was Green’s 14-year-old great-nephew.
Pierce entered the Passat and sat in the middle of the backseat
behind driver Crooms’s right shoulder.
When the Passat drove off, Green saw from her house a
sheriff’s deputy vehicle following the Passat. Green got in her car
and began to follow the deputy’s vehicle.
After picking up Pierce at Green’s house, Crooms in the
Passat turned left from Exeter Street onto Ivy Drive. Deputy
Hendren turned onto Ivy Drive a few seconds later, and Deputy
Santiago-Miranda accelerated to fall in behind Hendren’s cruiser.
With both deputies’ cruisers now directly behind, Crooms drove
the Passat down Ivy Drive and turned left onto Stetson Drive.
After that left turn, Crooms immediately turned right into the
driveway of the first house on the right on Stetson Drive.
Deputy Hendren also turned left onto Stetson Drive but
stopped her cruiser in the middle of the street and got out of her
cruiser with her gun drawn. Hendren reported the Passat’s license
plate number—NWEG04 3—to dispatch, but received no response.
3 Since the stolen Passat’s number was NWEG22, the first four characters in
both license plate numbers—NWEG—were the same.
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Deputy Santiago-Miranda also turned left onto Stetson
Drive, pulled up his cruiser to the left of Hendren’s cruiser, and
stopped. Santiago-Miranda activated his cruiser’s overhead
emergency lights but did not activate the sirens. At this point, the
deputies’ two cruisers were parked side-by-side on Stetson Drive.
The photograph below shows the cruisers blocking the
entrance/exit of Stetson Drive with Santiago-Miranda’s cruiser on
the right.
At this time, the Passat is still in the driveway of the first house on
the right on Stetson Drive.
C. Santiago-Miranda Orders Driver to Stop
Santiago-Miranda’s dashcam captured the following events.
The dashcam shows the Passat backing out of the driveway of the
first house on the right of Stetson Drive.
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Backing out, the Passat did not turn its rear toward the cruisers
(which would allow it to continue down the open direction of
Stetson Drive). What happened next gives rise to the shooting.
As shown in the photograph below, Crooms backed out and
turned the front of the Passat directly facing the two deputies and
their cruisers.
With the Passat turned toward the deputies, Hendren raised
her gun and retreated behind her cruiser. Santiago-Miranda exited
his cruiser. Standing at the left side of his cruiser, Santiago-Miranda
issued a command for Crooms to “stop the vehicle!” The above
photograph depicts the scene at 1:06 on the dashcam.
At 1:08, the Passat started slowly moving forward.
Santiago-Miranda issued a second command for Crooms to “stop
the vehicle!” At 1:10, the Passat stopped moving. The Passat was
still facing both cruisers, but was now pointed more closely toward
Santiago-Miranda and his cruiser. Santiago-Miranda issued a third
command for Crooms to “stop the vehicle!” From 1:11 to 1:14, the
Passat did not move. Santiago-Miranda, with increasing volume
and intensity, issued a fourth command to “stop the vehicle!” and
a fifth command to “stop!”
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After the five commands to stop, however, Crooms at 1:15
started reversing the Passat again, now pointing the Passat’s front
directly toward Santiago-Miranda’s cruiser. Santiago-Miranda
announced code 1033 to the dispatch radio to signal an emergency
and request all radio traffic to cease. At 1:16, the Passat was still
reversing. Santiago-Miranda approached the Passat from the left
side of his cruiser with his gun pointed at the Passat.
Santiago-Miranda gave a sixth command to “stop the vehicle, god
damn it,” and took a slight step to his right, closer to his cruiser.
At 1:17, the Passat stopped reversing. The front of the Passat
was now pointed toward Santiago-Miranda and his cruiser. While
stopped, Crooms begins turning the Passat’s wheels slightly to his
right and more toward Santiago-Miranda. Santiago-Miranda
issued a seventh command to “stop!” The photograph below
shows the positioning of the Passat at this point at 1:17.
D. As Passat Accelerates, Santiago-Miranda Fires Weapon
At 1:18-1:19, these next events rapidly occurred in two
seconds. At 1:18, Crooms turned the Passat’s wheels further to his
right, in the direction where Santiago-Miranda was standing on the
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curb or near the curbside. Santiago-Miranda issued his eighth and
final command to “stop!” Instead of stopping, Crooms accelerated
the Passat forward directly toward Santiago-Miranda.
Simultaneously, Santiago-Miranda took a short step to his
left, and the Passat still accelerated forward toward
Santiago-Miranda. The photograph below depicts the scene at this
point with Santiago-Miranda about ten feet away from the front
bumper of the Passat with its wheels turned further to the right.
Then, at 1:19, the Passat was still accelerating at
Santiago-Miranda, who began to fire his gun at the Passat. Within
2.1 seconds, Santiago-Miranda rapidly fired 10 shots with each shot
fired at an average of only 0.236 seconds apart.
When Santiago-Miranda fired his first shot, the Passat had
closed to a distance of 9.05 feet away. Because of the Passat’s
acceleration, the Passat was 6.06 feet away at Santiago-Miranda’s
second shot and 5.74 feet away at his third shot. 4 At the time of
4 These undisputed distance figures were presented in the defendants’ expert
report, filed with their motion for summary judgment.
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this initial rapid firing, the Passat was directly headed toward
Santiago-Miranda as shown in the photograph below.
The entry place of the 10 shots within 2.1 seconds also
reflects the Passat’s acceleration. The first two shots entered into
the center of the front windshield and hit the hood of the Passat.
As the Passat accelerated forward, the next three shots struck the
windshield further to Santiago-Miranda’s right. The final five shots
entered into the driver’s side windows as the vehicle accelerated
over the curb and off of Stetson Drive onto a yard, passing
Santiago-Miranda on his left.
The Passat’s accelerator was completely depressed as it
accelerated forward, and from a full stop, the Passat reached a
maximum speed of 14 miles per hour before crashing into a house.
Deputy Hendren kept her firearm pointed at the Passat while using
both police cruisers as cover. Green parked her car behind the
cruisers, got out, and observed the shooting from about ten feet
behind and to the left of Santiago-Miranda.
A forensic analysis revealed that Santiago-Miranda’s first
shot likely struck the middle of the Passat’s front windshield,
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deflected slightly downward, and struck Pierce, the backseat
passenger, in the chest. Santiago-Miranda’s seventh, eighth, and
ninth shots entered the driver’s side window and likely struck
Crooms in his head, shoulder, and back. Pierce and Crooms later
died from their gunshot wounds.5
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Complaint
The plaintiffs’ operative amended complaint contained ten
counts; specifically, each plaintiff asserted five of the ten counts.
Plaintiff Baxter asserted two counts against defendant
Santiago-Miranda6: Count One combined together excessive force
and failure to render emergency medical aid claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; and Count Two contained state-law battery claims.
Plaintiff Baxter asserted one count against defendant Hendren:
Count Three combined together failure to intervene and failure to
render emergency medical aid claims under § 1983.
Plaintiff Baxter also asserted two counts against defendant
Sheriff Ivey: Count Four for deliberate indifference in training and
Count Five for deliberate indifference in retention under Monell.
5 The accelerator data comes from FDLE’s investigative report. The speed
data and shot entries come from the plaintiffs’ expert report. This data is not
disputed.
6 During the course of the proceedings in the district court, Santiago-Miranda
died. Evelyn Miranda, the personal representative of Santiago-Miranda’s
estate, was substituted as a defendant.
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Plaintiff Pierce asserted separately the same claims against
the same two deputies and the Sheriff in Counts Six through Ten.
B. Summary Judgment Proceedings
The three defendants jointly moved for summary judgment
on all claims. The defendants asserted that (1) Santiago-Miranda’s
use of force was reasonable, (2) Santiago-Miranda and Hendren
rendered emergency medical aid, (3) Hendren had no meaningful
opportunity to intervene, (4) both deputies were entitled to
qualified immunity, and (5) the plaintiffs’ Monell claims against
Sheriff Ivey failed. The defendants requested that their joint
motion for summary judgment be granted as to all defendants on
all claims.
The plaintiffs’ summary judgment response not only
opposed summary judgment, but also stated the plaintiffs had
decided not to pursue certain claims. We discuss the plaintiffs’
response in more detail later.
Ultimately, in its summary judgment order, the district
court (1) dismissed with prejudice all claims against defendant
Hendren, and (2) granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The plaintiffs timely appealed only the summary
judgment grant in favor of defendants Santiago-Miranda and
Sheriff Ivey.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual
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inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Richmond v. Badia,
47 F.4th 1172, 1179 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).
We review our jurisdiction de novo. Allen v. AT&T Mobility Servs.,
104 F.4th 212, 215 (11th Cir. 2024).
IV. JURISDICTION
This case was adjudicated in the district court through a
voluntary dismissal as to defendant Hendren and a summary
judgment grant as to defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff
Ivey. How a party drops a claim or a defendant can trigger
appellate jurisdictional issues. So, as a threshold matter, we are
obligated to ensure we have jurisdiction. Id. We review the
relevant jurisdictional principles and apply them to this case.
A. Jurisdictional Principles
Generally, our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the
district courts.”7 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision is typically one
that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute its judgment.” Acheron Cap., Ltd. v.
Mukamal, 22 F.4th 979, 986 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks
omitted). An order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims
against all the parties to an action is typically not a final judgment
from which an appeal may be taken. Sargeant, 689 F.3d at 1246.
7 “There are exceptions to th[is] final judgment rule,” but none of the
exceptions apply here. Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244,
1245 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
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To explain the potential finality issue, we review Rules 41(a)
and 15, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that provide several
options for when parties want to dismiss claims or defendants.
Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff—without a court order—
may dismiss an “action” by filing “a notice of dismissal before the
opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary
judgment,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), or “a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared,” FED. R. CIV.
P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Alternatively, under Rule 41(a)(2), a plaintiff may
also seek dismissal of an “action” “by court order” on terms that
the court considers proper. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
Rule 41(a) applies to “actions,” not claims. See Esteva v. UBS
Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re Esteva), 60 F.4th 664, 675 (11th Cir. 2023).
“Rule 41(a)’s reference to the voluntary dismissal of ‘an action’
refers to ‘the whole case’ instead of particular claims.” Id.; see also
Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“There is no mention in the Rule of the option to stipulate
dismissal of a portion of a plaintiff’s lawsuit—e.g., a particular
claim—while leaving a different part of the lawsuit pending before
the trial court.”). Thus, under Rule 41(a), a plaintiff may dismiss
only an entire action. In re Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677.
Further, “in a multi-defendant lawsuit, an ‘action’ can refer
to all the claims against one party.” Rosell v. VMSB, 67 F.4th 1141,
1144 n.2 (11th Cir. 2023). Therefore, under Rule 41(a), a plaintiff
may dismiss an “action” against a single defendant—that is, all
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claims against that defendant. See id.; In re Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677;
Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004).
Now comes the pitfall. A plaintiff may not use Rule 41(a) to
dismiss a single or discrete claim against a single defendant or
against all defendants. In re Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677. Rule 41(a) “does
not permit plaintiffs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular
claims within an action.” Id.; see also Klay, 376 F.3d at 1106. “Our
precedent has been consistent on this point for almost two
decades.” Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144. This limitation applies to
dismissals under both Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule 41(a)(2). Id. As a
result, a Rule 41(a) dismissal of only one of the claims against a
defendant or defendants is ineffective and leaves that claim pending
in the district court, creating a lack of finality. See id.
Plaintiffs who no longer wish to pursue a claim have other
avenues to drop or abandon that claim. For example, one
procedural option is Rule 15. A plaintiff may move to amend the
complaint to add or drop a discrete claim or a defendant under
Rule 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Perry, 891 F.3d at 958. Rule 15
is the “easiest and most obvious” way to “dismiss a single claim
without dismissing an entire action.” Perry, 891 F.3d at 958.
Rule 15 permits an amendment to the pleadings upon permission
from the opposing party or the court’s leave, and it states that “[t]he
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “A plaintiff wishing to eliminate particular claims
or issues from the action should amend the complaint under
Rule 15(a) rather than dismiss under Rule 41(a).” Klay, 376 F.3d at
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1106; see also Perry, 891 F.3d at 958 (“Rule 15 was designed for
situations like this.”). Of course, if a plaintiff chooses not to amend
his complaint, he may instead concede a claim in the district court.
Cf. Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001)
(deeming claim abandoned and affirming grant of summary
judgment as to claim presented in complaint but not raised in
plaintiff’s initial response to summary judgment motion); Rd.
Sprinkler Fitters Loc. Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d
1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the district court “could
properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but
not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”). Although
that route will result in the entry of judgment on that claim against
the plaintiff, this kind of concession, like a Rule 15 amendment,
avoids any finality problems.
When a party attempts to drop a claim or a defendant
without citing one of the rules, or when a party’s language is
ambiguous, our Court has construed a party’s attempt in
accordance with the appropriate rule. See, e.g., Lowery v. AmGuard
Ins. Co., 90 F.4th 1098, 1102–03 (11th Cir. 2024) (concluding
plaintiff’s “notice of intent to abandon” a count functioned as
proper Rule 15 motion); Mid City Mgmt. Corp. v. Loewi Realty Corp.,
643 F.2d 386, 388 n.2 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (holding no finality
problem resulted where “the defendant actually abandoned its
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counterclaim at trial in response to questioning by the trial
judge”).8
Similarly, when a district court interprets a party’s attempt
to drop or concede a claim, we construe that interpretation to align
with the law. “Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to
apply it in making their decisions.” Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Mil.
Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks
omitted). Where ambiguous or not fully explained, we construe
the district court’s words to support a lawful judgment. Id.
B. Analysis
We turn to what happened here. The plaintiffs’ summary
judgment response not only opposed summary judgment, but also
stated in Section V that the plaintiffs had decided not to pursue
certain claims. Here is the heading and entire text of Section V of
the plaintiffs’ summary judgment response:
V. Plaintiffs dismiss their claims for failure to
render medical aid against Deputy Santiago
and Hendren (part of Counts 1, 3, 6, and 8)
and failure to intervene against Deputy
Hendren (part of Counts 3 and 8)
Plaintiffs have decided not to pursue their claim based
on failure to render emergency medical aid. In
addition, Plaintiffs have decided not to pursue their
8 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed
down prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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claim for failure to intervene against Deputy Carson
Hendren, which results in a dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims against Deputy Hendren.
Section V’s heading referred to dismissal of the medical aid claims
against both named deputies, but the text’s dismissal request is for
“a dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Deputy Hendren.”
Section V did not cite Rule 41(a) or Rule 15. What’s more, the
plaintiffs did not file a separate motion to dismiss. What was thus
before the district court was (1) the defendants’ joint motion for
summary judgment, and (2) the plaintiffs’ summary judgment
response opposing summary judgment but also containing
Section V.
Here’s how the district court addressed the defendants’
motion and the plaintiffs’ response. Early in its summary judgment
order, the district court construed the plaintiffs’ request in
Section V as a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)
as follows:
In Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs state that they are no
longer pursuing their claims for failure to render
medical aid as to either of the deputies nor are they
pursuing any of their claims against Hendren. The
court construes this announcement as a Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(2), which will be granted.
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In the conclusion of that summary judgment order, the district
court then granted that construed Motion and “Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment” as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ construed Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal (Doc. 96 at 53) is GRANTED. The claims
against Defendant Carson Hendren are DISMISSED
with prejudice.
2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
62) is GRANTED.
The district court then directed the clerk to “enter judgment in
favor of [Sheriff Ivey] and [Deputy Santiago-Miranda].”
A potential finality issue arises because Rule 41(a)(2) allows
a party to voluntarily dismiss all claims against a defendant (such as
Hendren) but would not permit a party to dismiss, even
voluntarily, a single or discrete claim against a defendant (such as
the discrete medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda). See In re
Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677; Klay,
376 F.3d at 1106; Rosell,
67 F.4th at 1144
n.2. If the district court dismissed the medical aid claim against
Santiago-Miranda under Rule 41(a)(2), then that is not permissible
and that medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda remains
pending in the district court. See Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144. But if the
district court dismissed with prejudice all claims against Hendren
and granted summary judgment on all claims against
Santiago-Miranda, then no claims remain pending against
Santiago-Miranda and the judgment is final.
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Helpfully, the district court’s decretal language is divided
into two parts. The decretal language, reasonably read, makes
clear that the district court in the order’s Part (1) dismissed with
prejudice only the claims against defendant Hendren, and then in
Part (2) granted defendant Santiago-Miranda’s motion for
summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, Part (1)
does not mention defendant Santiago-Miranda but expressly refers
to dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims as to only defendant Hendren.
This is what Rule 41(a)(2) allows. As noted above, “[t]rial judges
are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their
decisions.” Burrell, 125 F.3d at 1395 (quotation marks omitted).
We presume the district court knew that it was not permitted to
dismiss a single claim, such as the plaintiffs’ medical aid claim
against Santiago-Miranda, under Rule 41(a)(2). We decline to read
into Part (1) a dismissal of the medical aid claim against
Santiago-Miranda, who is not mentioned in the decretal language
in Part (1).
Rather, it is Part (2) of the decretal language that adjudicates
the plaintiffs’ claims against Santiago-Miranda. In Part (2), the
district court grants the defendant Santiago-Miranda’s motion for
summary judgment without limitation. That motion sought
summary judgment on all the plaintiffs’ claims, including the
medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda. The plaintiffs’
decision not to pursue their medical aid claim against
Santiago-Miranda was tantamount to abandonment of that claim,
entitling the district court to grant Santiago-Miranda summary
judgment on the claim. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1322. The
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22 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
district court accepted the plaintiffs’ abandonment and adjudicated
all claims against Santiago-Miranda when it entered summary
judgment for him.9 Given the purely summary judgment posture
of the case, the district court’s order evinces an intent to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims against only Hendren and enter judgment on the
plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff
Ivey.
In so ruling, we recognize that the district court’s order
(1) first construes the plaintiffs’ Section V announcement as a
Motion for Voluntary Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) and (2) then,
in the first sentence of Part (1)’s decretal language, states that the
plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal is granted. But, as the
parties’ appellate briefs point out, the text of the plaintiffs’
Section V distinguished between their decision “not to pursue” the
medical aid claims and their request for “dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims against Deputy Hendren.” Plus, the language in the second
sentence of Part (1) actually “dismissed” only “the claims against
Defendant Carson Hendren,” consistent with that distinction.
At bottom, the two sentences in Part (1) must be read
together and not separately—especially since Part (1) nowhere
names defendant Santiago-Miranda, much less the medical aid
9 Both the plaintiffs and the defendants submit jurisdiction exists. Plaintiffs’
appellate brief asks us to read their Section V as a concession that summary
judgment should be granted on their medical aid claim against
Santiago-Miranda, not an attempted Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal as to only the
medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda. The defendants agree.
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 23
claim against him. We should not ignore the intent of the district
court or the parties.
In sum, reasonably read, the district court’s order entered a
final judgment in this action by (1) dismissing with prejudice the
plaintiffs’ claims against only defendant Hendren, and (2) entering
summary judgment for defendants Santiago-Miranda and Ivey.
We have appellate jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
V. EXCESSIVE FORCE
Satisfied that we have appellate jurisdiction, we turn to
whether Deputy Santiago-Miranda used excessive force in
violation of Crooms’s and Pierce’s Fourth Amendment rights.
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
When raising a qualified immunity defense, officers have
“the burden to establish that they were acting within their
discretionary authority.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2022). If the officers satisfy that burden, then the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to establish that (1) “the defendant violated a
constitutional right,” and (2) “the violation was clearly
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24 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
established.” Christmas v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 1348, 1354 (11th
Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment provides a “right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from
unreasonable seizures includes the right to be free from excessive
force. Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009).
“In excessive force cases, the first qualified immunity
inquiry—i.e., whether a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated—is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s objective
reasonableness standard.” Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268,
1279 (11th Cir. 2023). In analyzing reasonableness, “we look at the
fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts,
and balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the
gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” McCullough v.
Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009).
“Although we construe the facts in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs, we determine reasonableness from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the events
unfolded.” Tillis ex rel Wuenschel v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Our inquiry
does not employ the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)
(providing that reasonableness “must be judged from the
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 25
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight”).
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. It is “reasonable, and
therefore constitutionally permissible, for an officer to use deadly
force when he has ‘probable cause to believe that his own life is in
peril.’” Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.
2005)).
B. Vehicle as Deadly Force
Under the Tennessee v. Garner factors, deadly force is
reasonable when an officer (1) has probable cause to believe that a
suspected felon poses a threat of serious physical harm to the
officer or others; (2) reasonably believes that the deadly force was
necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning about
the possible use of deadly force, if feasible. 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985).
This rule covers situations in which (1) an officer believed his life
was in danger because a suspect used a vehicle as a weapon against
the officer or (2) the suspect’s use of the vehicle otherwise
presented an immediate threat of serious physical harm. See
McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207–08.
Consistently, this Court has upheld an officer’s use of deadly
force in cases where the officer reasonably believed his life was
endangered by a suspect who used or threatened to use his car as a
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26 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
weapon or where the officer reasonably believed the use of a
vehicle presented an immediate threat of serious physical harm.
See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002);
Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1255–56; McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207–08;
Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1182–83; Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299; Davis v.
Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022).
In Robinson, this Court held that an officer’s use of force was
reasonable where the officer shot a suspect who was slowly driving
a car toward him from a close distance. 415 F.3d at 1256. The
suspect was accelerating at only one to two miles per hour, but the
officer was standing just two to four feet away in a narrow space
between the suspect’s car and another car. Id. at 1254, 1256. The
officer had only 2.72 seconds to react because of the close distance.
Id. at 1256. We concluded that a reasonable officer could have
perceived the car as a deadly weapon, so the officer had probable
cause to believe the suspect posed a threat of serious physical harm
by using his car as a deadly weapon. Id.
Similarly, in Singletary, this Court held that an officer
reasonably used deadly force when he shot at a vehicle accelerating
toward him. 804 F.3d at 1178, 1183. Surveillance video showed
that the officer stood directly in the path of the vehicle and that the
vehicle caused the officer to fall to the ground. Id. at 1178. Even
though the driver applied the brakes at the same moment the
officer fired the shots, there was no “issue of fact as to whether any
danger had dissipated in the split-second immediately preceding
[the officer’s] decision to use deadly force.” Id. at 1183. We also
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 27
held that the location of the bullet holes in the side of the car, rather
than the front, did not establish that the officer was not in danger
of being hit by the car because surveillance video showed that the
officer was in the path of the car when it accelerated. Id. at 1183–
84.
In Tillis, after a high-speed chase and a crash of the suspect’s
vehicle, an officer stepped out of his cruiser to make an arrest.
12 F.4th at 1295. As the officer approached the suspect’s vehicle,
the vehicle’s reverse lights turned on. Id. The vehicle suddenly
went into reverse and started backing up toward the officer. Id.
The officer began firing at the vehicle and fired 11 shots through
the back windshield and side passenger windows as the car passed
him. Id. After the chambered round, the officer fired a 10-round
magazine and later another 10 rounds. Id. This Court concluded
that the officer reasonably perceived a lethal threat when the
vehicle shifted into reverse. Id. at 1299. We explained that “[w]hen
an officer is on foot and standing in close proximity to a . . . moving
vehicle, [the officer] need not be directly in the vehicle’s path to
fear reasonably for his life,” as the driver could quickly turn the
steering wheel toward the officer. Id. We emphasized that the
officer had no way of knowing whether the vehicle would continue
in a straight line or swerve toward him, and the officer “certainly
did not have time to calculate angles and trajectories to determine
whether he was a few feet outside of harm’s way.” Id.
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28 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
C. Analysis
Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly force was reasonable
because he had probable cause to believe the Passat’s close position
and acceleration posed a threat of serious physical harm to him.
See Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1184. Although mistaken,
Santiago-Miranda and Hendren reasonably believed the
Crooms-driven Passat was the same stolen Passat that evaded
Deputy Dominguez’s traffic stop at a high rate of speed just 15
minutes earlier. The deputies saw the Passat enter a driveway but
then back out, turning to face the deputies and their cruisers head
on—as opposed to stopping in the driveway or backing out in the
other direction. Crooms then did not comply with
Santiago-Miranda’s eight commands to stop the Passat.
Rather, after reversing, Crooms accelerated the Passat
toward Santiago-Miranda, who was standing only ten feet away.
Santiago-Miranda, on foot, had only a second or two to react.
Santiago-Miranda fired all ten shots within 2.1 seconds as the Passat
moved within 5.74 feet of him. Under these particular
circumstances, Santiago-Miranda had to make a split-second
judgment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. It was not unreasonable
for Santiago-Miranda to perceive at the time he fired that the Passat
was accelerating at him and posed a threat of serious physical harm.
Contra Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1329–32 (11th
Cir. 2021) (explaining that the vehicle was merely idling, officers
thought the car was going to stop, officers were safely on the side
of the car but continued walking to the front of the car and stopped
in front of the car).
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 29
This case is similar to Robinson, Singletary, and Tillis. The
Passat was accelerating directly toward Santiago-Miranda from a
close distance. See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1254; Singletary,
804 F.3d
at 1183. Santiago-Miranda was standing on foot only ten feet away
from the Passat, and thus, he was in a vulnerable position and had
only a second or two to react. See Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1295. Even
from a full stop, the Passat had accelerated to 14 miles per hour and
had closed the distance from 10 to 5.74 feet within 1 second. See id.
Santiago-Miranda “did not have time to calculate angles and
trajectories to determine whether he was a few feet outside of
harm’s way.” Id. at 1299. Accordingly, Santiago-Miranda’s use of
force was objectively reasonable because a reasonable officer
would have perceived the Passat accelerating directly toward him
as a lethal threat.
The plaintiffs resist this conclusion. They argue that
Crooms backed up and slowly turned the Passat’s wheels to the
right in order to go around Santiago-Miranda by going off the street
and into the yard of a home. Yet without the benefit of hindsight,
nothing indicated that Crooms was positioning the Passat merely
to go around Santiago-Miranda and into that yard. Instead,
Crooms positioned the Passat to face the deputies, did not obey the
eight commands to stop, and accelerated directly toward
Santiago-Miranda. In these circumstances, when the Passat
accelerated, Santiago-Miranda reasonably perceived the Passat to
be driving at him and not around him. Notably, the Passat could
have stayed stopped and did not have to accelerate at all.
Santiago-Miranda had no reason to expect that the Passat was
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30 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
accelerating to go around him. Santiago-Miranda had only a
second or two to react to the Passat’s movements, and he was not
required to wait and “hope[] for the best.” See Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007).
The plaintiffs also assert that Santiago-Miranda was never in
the Passat’s path, but the dashcam video establishes otherwise.
Moreover, “the relevant question is whether it was reasonable for
[Santiago-Miranda] to fear” being hit by the Passat when it started
accelerating at him at the close distance shown in the video. See
Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299. The dashcam video establishes that it was
reasonable for Santiago-Miranda to perceive that the vehicle’s
acceleration toward him presented an immediate threat of serious
physical harm. See Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1183.
The plaintiffs point to eyewitness testimony from Green,
Kimbrough-Rucker, and Deputy Hendren that, they assert,
establishes that because the Passat was trying to go off the street
and around Santiago-Miranda, Santiago-Miranda had room to
move further to the right away from the Passat rather than
stepping to the left toward its path. Even assuming
Santiago-Miranda had room to move further to the right,
Santiago-Miranda had no reason to expect the accelerating Passat
was trying to go around him. Room to move to the right does not
establish that no reasonable officer could have believed he was in
danger of serious physical harm. “The only perspective that counts
is that of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the events
unfolded.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1166 (11th Cir.
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 31
2009). Green, Kimbrough-Rucker, and Hendren each had a
different perspective than Santiago-Miranda; none were faced with
a vehicle accelerating toward them from ten feet away.
The plaintiffs emphasize that (1) Hendren did not fire her
weapon, and (2) their expert testified that no reasonable officer
would have perceived an immediate threat justifying lethal use of
force. The fact that Hendren did not fire her weapon does not
establish that it was unreasonable for Santiago-Miranda to fire his.
See Davis, 44 F.4th at 1318 (“More than one course of action can be
reasonable – the other officers’ decision not to shoot does not
render [an officer’s] choice unreasonable.”). This is especially true
here given the dissimilar locations of the two deputies when the
Passat accelerated. The expert’s analysis of the situation is the
exact kind of 20/20 hindsight analysis we do not engage in. See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
The plaintiffs argue that Tillis and Singletary are
distinguishable because both cases involved other dangerous
conduct—one a high-speed chase and one a drug bust. However,
the discrete decision to fire in both cases occurred when the vehicle
accelerated toward the officer at a close distance. See Tillis, 12 F.4th
at 1295; Singletary,
804 F.3d at 1178, 1183. The same is true here.
Lastly, the plaintiffs suggest that Deputy Santiago-Miranda’s
continued shooting into the driver’s side window of the Passat as it
passed him constituted an independent violation of Crooms’s
Fourth Amendment rights. This Court has rejected a request to
“sequentially sever” two rounds of shots. See Davis, 44 F.4th at
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32 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
1317–18. Santiago-Miranda’s shots into the Passat’s driver’s side
window are inseparable from his shots into the front windshield.
Santiago-Miranda fired all 10 shots within 2.1 seconds.
Santiago-Miranda had no realistic opportunity within those brief
two seconds to react to the Passat’s continued acceleration and to
stop shooting.
Even if we could distinguish between Santiago-Miranda’s
initial shots through the Passat’s windshield and his later shots
through the side of the Passat, the later shots did not violate
Crooms’s constitutional rights. The location of the bullet holes in
the side of the Passat does not establish that Santiago-Miranda was
no longer in danger of being hit by the Passat. See Singletary,
804 F.3d at 1183–84. Santiago-Miranda was on foot only a few feet
away from the Passat by then, and he could not have known
whether the Passat was going to continue on that trajectory or
swerve toward him. See Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299. In this kind of
“tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstance, “[w]e are
loath to second-guess the decisions made by” Santiago-Miranda.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Vaughan v. Cox,
343 F.3d 1323, 1331
(11th Cir. 2003).
Because Deputy Santiago-Miranda did not violate the
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, we need not consider the second
prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We affirm the district
court’s grant of qualified immunity to Santiago-Miranda on the
plaintiffs’ excessive force claims.
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 33
VI. BATTERY CLAIMS
The plaintiffs also assert that their state law battery claims
should be revived for the same reasons that Deputy
Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was excessive. Since
Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was not excessive, the plaintiffs’
battery claims fail as well.
Under Florida law,
A law enforcement officer . . . need not retreat or
desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of
resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The
officer is justified in the use of any force . . . [w]hich he
or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend
himself or herself or another from bodily harm while
making the arrest.
FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1) (emphasis added). “Police officers receive a
presumption of good faith . . . as to the use of force applied during
a lawful arrest.” Kimbrel v. Clark, 385 So. 3d 1124, 1128 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2024).
Battery claims for excessive force under Florida law are
“analyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of force used was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). This Court has applied the same Fourth Amendment
excessive force analysis to a battery claim against an officer under
Florida law. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir. 2006)
(finding triable issue of fact on Florida battery claim for same
reasons as Fourth Amendment excessive force claim).
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34 Opinion of the Court 23-11902
As we explained above, Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly
force was reasonable because the Passat’s close position and
acceleration posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to
him. For those same reasons, the district court correctly found that
Santiago-Miranda is entitled to summary judgment on the
plaintiffs’ battery claims. See FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1); Kimbrel,
385 So. 3d at 1128.
VII. MONELL CLAIMS
We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Sheriff Ivey on the plaintiffs’ Monell claims for
deliberate indifference in training and retention. See Monell,
436 U.S. at 692.
To seek damages from Sheriff Ivey in his official capacity,
the plaintiffs had to show, inter alia, “that [their] constitutional
rights were violated.” Land v. Sheriff of Jackson Cnty., 85 F.4th 1121,
1129 (11th Cir. 2023). “A Monell claim is derivative of—and so
requires—an actual constitutional violation by an officer.” Id.
The plaintiffs’ Monell claims fail because, as explained above,
Deputy Santiago-Miranda did not violate their constitutional
rights. Without an underlying constitutional violation, Sheriff Ivey
cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference in training and
retention. 10 See id.
10 We note that the plaintiffs may have abandoned any objection to the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Sheriff Ivey. In their brief, the plaintiffs
mention their Monell claims only once in describing the operative complaint
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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 35
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal. Because Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly force did not
violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to (1) Santiago-Miranda on the
plaintiffs’ excessive force and battery claims, and to (2) Sheriff Ivey
on the plaintiffs’ Monell claims.
AFFIRMED.
and once in the concluding sentence. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “an appellant abandons a
claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a
perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority”). Even
affording the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they adequately presented
this issue to us, the Monell claims fail because Santiago-Miranda did not violate
the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
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23-11902 LUCK, J., Dissenting 1
LUCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I completely agree that Deputy Jafet Santiago-Miranda did
not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, he
did not commit a state law battery, and the sheriff was not liable
under Monell. In other words, I agree with the bulk of the thoughtful and well written majority opinion. But I must respectfully dissent because I don’t think the district court’s summary judgment
order was final, which means we do not have jurisdiction over this
appeal. The district court’s order was not final because it did not
resolve all of the claims against Deputy Santiago-Miranda. See
Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777
(11th Cir. 2007) (“Ordinarily . . . an order adjudicating fewer than
all the claims in a suit . . . is not a final judgment from which an
appeal may be taken.”).
The plaintiffs alleged three claims against Deputy Santiago-Miranda: a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 excessive force claim; a section
1983 failure-to-render-aid claim; and a state law battery claim. The
district court construed the plaintiffs’ summary judgment response
as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss voluntarily their failure-to-render-aid claim against Deputy Santiago-Miranda, granted the voluntary dismissal motion, and granted
summary judgment for Deputy Santiago-Miranda on the plaintiffs’
excessive force and state law battery claims.
The problem is that a rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal “can
only be for an entire action, and not an individual claim.” Rosell v.
VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2023). Rule 41(a)(2) does
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2 LUCK, J., Dissenting 23-11902
not allow plaintiffs and district courts to “pick and choose, dismissing only particular claims within an action.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Our ‘cases make clear that a voluntary dismissal purporting
to dismiss a single claim is invalid, even if all other claims in the
action have already been resolved.’” Id. (quoting In re Esteva,
60
F.4th 664, 677–78 (11th Cir. 2023)). Because the district court “attempted to dismiss one [claim] rather than the entire action, no
part of [r]ule 41(a) authorized the dismissal. And because the dismissal was ineffective,” the failure-to-render-aid claim “is still pending before the district court.” See id. “That means we have no final
decision to review.” Id. (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1291)
That should be the end of it. The summary judgment order
was not final since the failure-to-render-aid claim was still pending.
And because the summary judgment order was not final, we do not
have jurisdiction to review it.
The plaintiffs offer two responses. First, they argue that they
abandoned their failure-to-render-aid claim, and the judgment was
properly entered on the abandoned claim. But the plaintiffs didn’t
abandon the claim; they sought to dismiss it. In their summary
judgment response, the plaintiffs wrote (in bold) that they “dismiss
their claims for failure to render medical aid against Deputy Santiago[-Miranda] and [Deputy] Hendren.” And the district court
treated the plaintiffs’ summary judgment response not as an abandonment, but “as a [m]otion for [v]oluntary [d]ismissal.” Like the
district court, I read the plaintiffs’ statement that they “dismiss their
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23-11902 LUCK, J., Dissenting 3
claims for failure to render medical aid against Deputy Santiago[-
Miranda] and [Deputy] Hendren” as what it is—a dismissal.
Second, the plaintiffs contend that the district court’s order
was ambiguous about how it resolved the failure-to-render-aid
claim. Because there was an ambiguity, the argument goes, we
should presume the district court knew and applied the law and
entered a lawful judgment. But there was no ambiguity in the district court’s order. The district court handled the plaintiffs’ dismissal of the failure-to-render-aid claim against Deputy Santiago-Miranda in five clear steps.
Step one. The district court explained the plaintiffs’
announcement to dismiss their failure-to-render-aid
claim against Deputy Santiago-Miranda: “In
[p]laintiffs’ [r]esponse to [d]efendants’ [m]otion for
[s]ummary [j]udgment, [p]laintiffs state that they are
no longer pursuing their claims for failure to render
medical aid as to either of the deputies nor are they
pursuing any of their claims against [Deputy] Hendren.”
Step two. The district court construed the announcement as a voluntary dismissal motion under rule
41(a)(2) and declared that it would grant the motion:
“The [c]ourt construes this announcement as a
[m]otion for [v]oluntary [d]ismissal pursuant to [rule]
41(a)(2), which will be granted.”
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4 LUCK, J., Dissenting 23-11902
Step three. The district court spelled out the claims
that were left over after the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal: “The following counts in [p]laintiffs’
[a]mended [c]omplaint remain, with the claims duplicated and alleged separately for each [p]laintiff:
Counts 1 and 6—Fourth Amendment violations
against [Deputy Santiago-]Miranda, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. [section] 1983; Counts 2 and 7—common law
battery against [Deputy Santiago-]Miranda; Counts 4
and 9—deliberate indifference in training against
[Sheriff] Ivey, pursuant to [section] 1983; and Counts
5 and 10—deliberate indifference in retention against
[Sheriff] Ivey, pursuant to [section] 1983.” The failure- to-render-aid claim was not mentioned.
Step four. In the decretal language at the end of the
order, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ construed voluntary dismissal motion: “Plaintiffs’ construed [m]otion for [v]oluntary [d]ismissal (Doc. 96 at
53) is GRANTED.” Helpfully, the district court’s internal record cite was to the plaintiffs’ announcement
in the summary judgment response that they were
dismissing the failure-to-render-aid claim against
Deputy Santiago-Miranda.
Step five. Finally, the district court granted summary
judgment on the left over claims: “Defendants’
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23-11902 LUCK, J., Dissenting 5
[m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment ... is
GRANTED.”
Reading the steps together, the district court told us what it
was going to do (construe the plaintiffs’ announcement that they
were dismissing the failure-to-render-aid claim against Deputy Santiago-Miranda as a motion to dismiss voluntarily under rule
41(a)(2)), and did it (granted the voluntary dismissal motion).
There was nothing ambiguous about what the district court did.
For that reason, I would dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
