Volume 121 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—■ heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John G. Rogers, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Gr. Rogers, Judge, presiding.</p>

Gwynn Garnett, Judge, presiding. One Charles Dunn died intestate, in Cook county, in 1869, seized in fee of the premises in controversy. He left a widow, Bridget Dunn, but no child or children, or descendants of child or children, surviving him. His next of kin, under our statute, were his brothers, George Dunn, James Dunn and Bobert C. Dunn, and his nephew, Bobert John Speck, the son and only child of his sister, Ellen Speck.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Stephenson county; the Hon. William Brown, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Livingston county; the Hon. Franklin Blades, Judge,, presiding. The original bill was filed by plaintiff in error on June 7, 1876, to effect a settlement of the co-partnership of Blake, Huston & Co., a firm composed of True Blake, John Huston and James Sweeting.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lorin C. Collins, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wbit of possession—in favor of a purchaser under decree. To authorize the award of a writ of possession in favor of a purchaser under a decree, against one in possession of the land, it must be clearly shown that the former was either a party to the suit in which the writ is asked, or that he purchased pendente lite.</p> <p>2. Lis pendens—as against a purchaser under execution. The pend-ency of a bill by a member of a corporation against the corporation and its board of directors, to compel the latter to discharge their duties, will not affect the right of a judgment creditor of the corporation to collect Ms judgment by sale of the lands of the corporation; and when a sale is made of its land under such a judgment, pending such bill, neither the corporation, nor one claiming under it, though through a sale under a decree rendered in the chancery suit, can invoke the doctrine of lis pendens to affect the purchaser-under the judgment at law. That doctrine has no application to such a case.</p> <p>3. In such case, the fact that there may be other and superior liens upon the property in favor of other parties, is of no concern of the corporation or its members.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Gf. Rogers, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Bollin S. Williamson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John G. Rogers, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John C. Bagby, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>®PE0IAI‘ assessment—wmii of title in municipality, to the ground sought to he improved for a street, as an objection to confirmation. The owner of property specially assessed for the purpose of grading and paving a street of an incorporated village, can not interpose the objection, to the confirmation of the assessment, that the village has not acquired title to the soil to be graded and paved.</p> <p>2. The corporate authorities of cities and villages may levy special assessments for the improvement of a proposed street before acquiring the soil, ky condemnation or otherwise, and afterward take the necessary steps to condemn, and have the compensation and damages to be paid, assessed.</p> <p>3. A special assessment for the improvement of a proposed public street before acquiring the soil over which the street is to run, is not in violation of section 13, of article 2, of the constitution, which provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.</p> <p>4. Same—when proceeding may be enjoined. It may be, if it were made to appear there was probability that the village would not acquire the title to the street, and so the benefit of any improvement to be made by the aid of the special assessment would be lost to the public, that a court of equity would enjoin the proceeding until the title should be acquired.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook comity; the Hon. Oliver A. Harker, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Hemet M. Shepabd, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— •heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Oook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Limitation—eminent domain—damages to contiguous property, not taken. Upon the construction and putting into operation of a railroad, all damages to contiguous property along the line of the road, present and prospective, from the location and operation of the road, are immediately recoverable, and must, all be recovered in one action; and if an action is not brought until after the lapse of five years, the Statute of Limitations will bar a recovery for any sum.</p> <p>2. Same—as to injury from nuisances—those which are permanent in character, and those not permanent hut continued. Where the original nuisance to land is of a permanent character, so that the damages inflicted thereby are permanent, a recovery not only may, but must, be had for the entire damages, in one action; and such damages accrue from the time the nuisance is created, and from that time the Statute of Limitations begins to run.</p> <p>3. In the case of nuisances which are transient rather than permanent in their character, the continuance of the injurious acts is considered a new nuisance, for which a fresh action will lie; and although the original cause of action is barred, damages may be recovered for the continuance of the nuisance.</p>

<p>1. Tbust—equitable title in trustee—protected in equity. A title of a mere trustee, based. upon a deed executed for a valuable, consideration paid by the cestui que trust, under properly framed pleadings, will, in a court of equity, be protected for the benefit of the latter, to the same extent as if the deed had been made to him.</p> <p>2. Pleading and evidence—in chancery—as to the character in which a right is claimed, whether as an individual or as trustee. A party suing or defending in chancery, should disclose, by his pleadings, the right upon which he bases his claim. If he is suing in a representative capacity, it must be so stated or made to appear, otherwise he will be conclusively presumed to be acting in his own right.</p> <p>3. A party can not sue, in equity, in his individual character, and be permitted to recover as the trustee or representative of another, for that would be to permit him to sue for the invasion of one right and recover for the infraction of another.</p> <p>4. A bill for partition alleged that two of the defendants claimed to have some interest in the land under certain tax deeds and other instruments, which were alleged to be void as against the other parties. These two defendants answered separately, and the title set up by each was in his own right. The proof showed that the title set up by one of them was held in trust by him for the other, who was the equitable owner: Held, that such title could not be sustained, on account of the variance.</p> <p>5. But when the complainant averred that the title to the land was in him and one of the defendants, and charged that the title claimed by the other two defendants was void, and sought to have them set aside, and one of such defendants set up a title in himself, which the evidence showed he held in trust for the other, it was held, that evidence of such title might be considered as evidence supporting the general denial of the title claimed by the complainant and the other defendant.</p> <p>6. Notice—of unrecorded deed—as, in the case of a sheriff’s deed. To afford notice of an unrecorded deed by the public records, the information given must be of that character that a prudent person, by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary diligence, could, upon inquiry and investigation, arrive at the fact of the existence of the prior unrecorded deed.</p> <p>7. Where a purchaser of land, on examination of the public records, finds a judgment against his vendor, and a certificate of the purchase of the land showing its sale under the judgment, but the record fails to show whether any sheriff’s deed had been made, it will be incumbent on him to make inquiry and investigation of those likely to know the fact, to learn whether any sheriff’s deed has been made, and failing to do so, he will be chargeable with notice of the existence of such deed, although it may not have been recorded.</p> <p>8. In this case, the public records of Cook county showed that on July 1, 1868, six writs of attachment issued out of the Superior Court against the owner of lots in the city of Chicago, which were levied on the lots; that judgments were obtained in the suits, upon which executions were issued, and levied on the lots; that the sheriff, on July 15, 1869, sold the premises; the issue of certificates of purchase, and the placing of them on record, and the dates of these transactions, and other details, and the abstract of the title failed to show any redemption. A sheriff’s deed was made on August 25, 1873, which was not recorded until Hay 6, 1881. On July 17, 1875, the attachment debtor conveyed the lots by quitclaim deed, which was recorded July 22, 1875: Held, that these facts shown by the records and the abstract of title, were sufficient to put the purchaser from the attachment debtor upon inquiry, which would have apprised, him of the existence of the unrecorded sheriff’s deed, which therefore took precedence of the other deed.</p>

Thomas A. Moran, Judge, presiding. The Chicago, Danville and Vincennes Eailroad Company was incorporated by a special charter of the State of Illinois, February 16, 1865. (2 Laws of 1865, p. 140.) The company was, by its charter, authorized to construct a railroad from Vincennes, Indiana, with a single or double track, to and into the city of Chicago, and to locate said road through its whole length, with a width of one hundred feet, and to appropriate land for that purpose.

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding. This was a suit in chancery brought by Stevens, for the rescission of a contract of .purchase of a certain patent right, on the ground of false and fraudulent representations in respect thereto, made by Hicks, the vendor. In the trial court a decree was entered according to the prayer of the bill.

<p>Appeal from, the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John G. Eogers, Judge, presiding. Bill of exceptions signed by Lorin C. Collins, by stipulation, owing to the death of the trial judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Washington county; the Hon. George W. Wall, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Descents—in the case of illegitimates. Our statute makes an illegitimate child capable of inheriting not only from its mother or other maternal ancestor, but also from any person from whom its mother might inherit, if living. The rule in this regard, as announced in Bales et al. v. Elder el al. 118 Ill. 436, is adhered to.</p>

C. W. Upton, Judge, presiding. The claim made by the bill, in brief, is, that the complainants are entitled to have a conveyance, in fee, of a certain 154-acre tract of land in Ogle county, and the payment of considerable sums of money, proceeds of sales of other, property, real and personal.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Amos Watts, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District:— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. W. R. Welch, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Wbit of Eeboe to the Circuit Court of Saline county; the Hon. David J. Babee, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Pleading—one good count in support of a general verdict. A judgment will not be arrested for defects in the declaration, if any one of the counts shows a good cause of action, and the verdict is upon the whole declaration.</p> <p>2. Same—plea not answering all it professes to answer. A plea which professes to. answer the whole cause of action or the whole declaration, but which, in fact, answers only the special count, leaving the common counts unanswered, is bad on- demurrer.</p> <p>3. Amendment of record—at a subsequent term—presumption in support of the action of the court. The circuit court can not make an original order in a case at a term subsequent to that at which final judgment is rendered, but it may, at any subsequent term, cause the clerk to enter upon the records of the court an order made at a previous term, provided, only, there shall be some minute or memorial paper from which it can be determined what such order was.</p> <p>4. Where the record in a cause is amended, by order of the court, at a term subsequent to that at which final judgment was rendered, in the absence of a bill of exceptions showing to the contrary, it will be presumed in favor of the judgment of the circuit court, that there was evidence before it by which'to make such amendment.</p> <p>5. Same—bill of exceptions to show ground of objection. A party wishing to assign for error the order of the circuit court amending its record of a cause at a subsequent term, by the entry of orders nunc pro tunc, claimed to have been made at a former term, on the ground there was nothing by which to amend, should tender a bill of exceptions reciting all the evidence on the question before the court.</p> <p>6. Notice—as shown by the record. Where the record of a circuit court allowing a motion to amend the record of a previous term in a cause, shows that the parties had notice of the motion, such notice can not be denied.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;— •heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston county; the Hon. Franklin Blades, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Washington county; the Hon. George Verner, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Dobkance Dibell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Elliott Anthony, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Amos Watts, Judge, presiding..

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Amos Watts, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Williamson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills—construction, aided by parol evidence—in the case of a latent ambiguity. While the general rule is, that the intention of the testator is to be gathered from an inspection and consideration of the will, and from no other source, yet,.in case of latent ambiguity, courts do and must listen to extrinsic evidence,—not for the purpose of contradicting or adding to the terms of the will, but for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of latent ambiguity, and to enable the court to look upon the will in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was made, whereby to determine the intention of the testator.</p> <p>2. Same—parol evidence to aid the description of land devised. A testator devised to his son “twenty acres off the west half of the north-east quarter of the north-east quarter of section 33, township 18 north, range 11 west, ” and the evidence showed that he never owned the north-east quarter of the north-east quarter of this section 33, or any part of it, but that he did own the north-west quarter of the north-east quarter of that section: Held, that there was a latent ambiguity in the devise, the descriptive words, of the subject of the devise being in part false, and that if, after striking out so much of the description as was false, enough remained in the will, interpreted in the light of surrounding circumstances when the will was made, to identify the premises, the devise would be good.</p> <p>3. By the admission of such extrinsic evidence, no words are inserted in the description which were left out by mistake, and nothing is added to the will, but only the false part of the description is rejected; and it being evident that the testator intended to devise land owned by him lying in the north-east quarter of section 33, township 18 north, range 11 west, and as he owned no land in that quarter except the north-west quarter thereof, it is clear that he intended to devise the twenty acres off the part of the quarter he owned. This case is to be distinguished from Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 111. 514, where the court was asked to insert or substitute words of description in place of those used, and where, after rejecting that part of the description which was false, there were no words used from which the land could be identified.</p> <p>4. Same—Bequest of “money”—what will pass thereby. The general rule is, that a simple bequest of money, in the absence of anything in the context to show that the word “money” is used out of its ordinary or popular signification, will not include personal estate in general, but will be confined to money strictly so called.</p> <p>5. Where the word "money” or “moneys” is used in a will in reference to the residuum of the personal estate after the payment of legacies, debts, etc., and where a contrary construction would leave a large part of the estate undisposed of by the will, these circumstances will incline the courts to hold that a bequest of money “remaining,” was used to signify the residue of the personal estate.</p> <p>6. Same—and herein, whether debts amd funeral expenses are made a charge upon realty to the exclusion of the personalty. A testator, after providing for the payment of his just debts and funeral expenses, devised all of his lands to his son and a grand-daughter and a grand-son, and then directed, “If there is any money remaining after my death, it shall be equally divided between” the grand-son and grand-daughter. The testator left in cash only $368, and some $7592, money loaned: Held, that the grandchildren, under the words, “any money remaining,” took the entire personal estate remaining after the payment of debts and funeral expenses, including the moneys loaned. The formula, “after the payment of funeral expenses and just debts, I give,” etc., preceding the subsequent dispositions of the testator’s real and personal property, indicated no purpose on his part to specially charge his realty with such debts and expenses, to the exclusion of the personal property, but left it for the law to determine which should be primarily liable.</p> <p>7. Same—after acquired property—whether it will pass. In the absence of anything showing a contrary intention, no reason is perceived why after acquired property will not pass under a residuary clause in a will, sufficiently general to embrace it, the same as if owned by the testator when he executed the same.</p>

<p>1. Agency—extent of powers conferred—appointment of agent by insolvent debtor to settle Ms affairs. Power given by an insolvent or failing debtor to an agent, coupled with a transfer of the debtor’s property, to settle up the business of the latter during his absence, will include the power of the agent to pay certain of his principal’s debts in preference to others, by a sale of property for that purpose.</p> <p>2. An insolvent debtor placed his brother in possession of his goods and personal property, to close the same out as best he could, and' to make certain preferences of creditors or sureties, and left his place of business, and failing to make any arrangement to get out of his financial troubles, sent his brother this writing: “This is to certify that my brother, J. P. E., has my consent, and is authorized, to transact all my business while I am away, and I shall be responsible for the same:” Held, that the writing, viewed in the light of the circumstances, clearly authorized the brother named therein, to pay the principal’s debts by a sale of property, and, as incident to this, to discriminate between creditors.</p> <p>3. Contracts—parol evidence in aid of construction. It is competent to prove, by parol evidence, the situation of the parties, and of the subject matter of a written contract, at the time it is made and the circumstances under which it was made, for the purpose of understanding the language employed and the sense in which it is employed, though not for the purpose of contradicting or enlarging its terms.</p> <p>4. Same—two papers construed together. Where, at the time a bill of sale for personal property is executed and delivered, the vendee executes and delivers to the vendor, or his agent, a writing, showing a receipt of the property and what the vendee is to do in consideration of the transfer, the two writings will be construed together, as affording evidence of the transaction.</p> <p>5. Sale—whether absolute or contingent. A debtor, through an agent, made a bill of sale of his goods and chattels to two of his sureties, who gave back a writing, to the effect that if the title to the property should remain in them, and not be replevied, attached or levied upon by other creditors of the vendor, or the sale declared void in a judicial proceeding, then the sureties should pay off certain debts, including those for which they were bound: Held, that the sale to the sureties was an absolute sale, and not dependent upon a failure of the other creditors to attack the same for fraud, and a levy on the property did not render the sale void.</p> <p>6. Fraudulent conveyances—preference of creditor by failing debtor. A debtor may prefer one creditor to another, or secure a surety who is liable for him, in preference to paying other creditors; and if he does so, in good faith, without any design to conceal property from his creditors, the law will protect Ms act.</p> <p>7. Same—presumption and burden of proof. Where a sale of property is made professedly for the purpose of securing a surety or paying a creditor, it will be presumed to be fair and honest, and the burden will rest upon the party charging fraud, to prove it.</p>

Geo. W. Wall, Judge, presiding. Assumpsit was brought in the circuit court of Randolph county, upon a policy of insurance issued by the Mutual Mill Insurance Company to James Gordon, and by him assigned to his son, Clarence Gordon. The facts are: On January 25, 188é, James Gordon, D. P. Barker and R. H. Roseborough were joint owners of the Union Mills, at Sparta, Randolph county, and of certain other real estate in that county.

<p>1. Testamentary capacity— of the various tests and evidences in respect thereto. The fact that a man may become prejudiced against some of his children without sufficient cause, and may make unjust remarks against them not warranted by the facts, does not show that he has insane delusions, or is devoid of testamentary capacity.</p> <p>2. A person capable of transacting ordinary business, such as buying and, selling property, settling accounts, collecting and paying out money, or borrowing or loaning money, is also capable of making a valid will. If he is capable of acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life, so that he may comprehend what disposition he may wish to make of his property, and be able to select the objects of his bounty, he is capable of making a will.</p> <p>3. An owner of property who has capacity to attend to ordinary business, has the right to dispose of it by deed or will, as he may choose; and it requires no greater mental capacity to make a valid will than to make a valid deed.</p> <p>4. A testator has a right to leave his property to his children or other relatives in unequal proportions, and such disposition is valid, whether it be reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust; and the reasonableness or justice or propriety of his will are not questions for the jury to pass upon, except, perhaps, in so far as they may be considered as a circumstance in determining as to the testamentary capacity of the testator.</p> <p>5. On the contest of a will, where there is evidence before the jury that the testator was eccentric and peculiar, there is no error in instructing the jury that eccentricities or peculiarities will not necessarily render a man incapable of making a will.</p> <p>6. Evidence—opinion of witness as to sanity. After witnesses had testified in regard to a testator’s mind, and his capacity for transacting business, from their acquaintance and personal knowledge of him, they were asked, “Had he the mental capacity to dispose of his. property by will or deed?” Held, that the question should not have been allowed, but as the answer thereto added but little weight to the previous testimony of the witnesses, the error was not of such gravity as to require a reversal.</p> <p>7. On the trial of an issue as to the sanity of a testator, a medical expert having been called as a witness by the defendants, testified that he had heard all the evidence introduced by the contestants. He was then asked; “Having heard that evidence on the part of the contestants, state whether or not, in your opinion, from a medical standpoint, from that evidence, H. M. was of sound or unsound mind on” the date of the will: Held, that the question was admissible.</p>

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. Jesse J. Phillips, Judge, presiding. This was a hill filed by William F. Cartwright and others, the brothers, sisters and mother of Braxton B. Lewis, deceased, and the heirs of his deceased brothers and sisters, for the partition of certain lands of which the said Lewis died •seized. The bill is framed on the theory that the deceased left no lawful issue capable of taking from him by inheritance.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that cpurt on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tulet, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Bichard Pbendergast, Judge, presiding.</p>

John Y. Eustace, Judge, presiding. This was an action of ejectment, brought on the 3d day of December, 1884, in the circuit court of Stephenson county, by Hugh Bennehoff, against Solomon Fisher and William Fisher, to recover a strip of land described in the declaration as commencing at the point where the east and west fence, lately built by the defendant Solomon Fisher, intersects the east side of the public highway running north and south by the plaintiff’s dwelling house,…

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court ■of McLean county; the Hon. Owen T. Reeves, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Du Page county; the Hon. C. W. Upton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ford county; the Hon. Owen T. Beeves, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. C. B. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

James A. Cbeighton, Judge, presiding. The petition in this ease is for a mandamus, and was exhibited in the name of the People, on the relation of John S. Lyman, against the Ohio and Mississippi Bailway Company, to compel respondent to erect a fence on the south line of its right of way, through lands owned by relator, over and upon which its track is constructed.

Writ op Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the-Hon. George Gardner, Judge, presiding. John Arndt,, claiming to be the owner in fee and in the-actual possession of sub-lot 11, in the subdivision of lots 11, 12, 13 and 14, in block 56, in canal trustees’ subdivision of blocks in the north-west quarter of section 21, township 39, north of range 14, east of the third principal meridian, in.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. James E. Hughes, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. H. M. Shepard, Judge, presiding. Plaintiff in error is a corporation organized under the laws of this State, for the purpose of Buying and selling grain, provisions and stocks on commission in Chicago, with a capital stock of $300,000, divided into three thousand shares. Its personal property was assessed by the assessor of the town of South Chicago, for 1885, at $10,000, and it was so notified by the assessor.

James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding- The appellees, Edward McGuire and Samuel T. Brush,, recovered a judgment of $1500 in the circuit court of Sangamon county, against the appellant, Lewis E. Montgomery,, in an action of trover,' for the alleged conversion of one hundred and thirty-one head of cattle belonging to the plaintiffs. This judgment, on the appeal of Montgomery, was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Third District, and the defendant again appealed.

<p>Writ of Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. H. M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Henry M. Shepard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Whit of Ebbob to the.Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. Geobge W. Hebdman, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. T. M. Shaw, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the-Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. G. B. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>!• Hew trial—on verdict of jury in contested will case—rule as in suit ai iaW' The verdict of a jury in a contested will case stands upon the same footing as a verdict in a common law case, when it is sought to impeach or set it aside on the ground it is not sustained by the evidence.</p> <p>2. Same—on the evidence. A verdict will not be set aside when there is a contrarietv of evidence, and the facts and circumstances, by a fair and reasonable intendment, will authorize the verdict returned, notwithstanding it may appear to be against the strength and weight of the evidence; nor when the evidence of the successful party, when considered by itself, is clearly sufficient to sustain the finding.</p> <p>3. Where the evidence as to the mental capacity of a testator to make a ^11 is hopelessly conflicting, many of the witnesses and acquaintances of deceased testifying that he was not competent, and an equal or greater number testifying that he was competent, and the trial court sanctions a verdict finding the testator incompetent, by refusing a new trial, this court will not have the power to reverse on the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.</p> <p>4. Evidence—weight and credit, how determined. In the case of a conflict in the testimony of witnesses as to a fact in issue depending on their judgment, based on knowledge and circumstances, the weight of the evideuce will not depend upon the number of the witnesses. The testimony A A v a sinSl®i honest, intelligent witness, respecting a matter of judgment, is entitled to more weight and credit than the testimony of many ignorant and unscrupulous witnesses.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit ■Court of La Salle county; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Plaintiff in error made and delivered to Meeker & Co. its three promissory notes, which the payees assigned to defendant in error, who brought suit thereon.

Writ oe Ebbor to the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court-of Fulton county; the Hon. John C. Bagby, Judge, presiding.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. 0. T. Beeves, Judge, presiding. On the 15th day of September, A. D. 1877, John M. Major filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas A. Moran, Judge, presiding.</p>

James F. Hughes, Judge, presiding. This was a petition by the commissioners of highways of Decatur township, against the board of supervisors of Macon county, for a mandamus, to compel said board to appropriate one-half of the cost necessary to the repair of a bridge, and to construct approaches thereto.

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren county; the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge,' presiding. Plaintiff in error was, at the September term, 1885, of the Warren circuit court, indicted for nuisance. At the January term, 1886, a motion to quash the indictment was overruled, and a trial had, resulting in a verdict of guilty.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court oh appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon'. Geobge W. Hebdman, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Do web—as to property held in trust. Where a person holds land in trust for another, the husband or wife of such trustee is not entitled to dower in the same.</p> <p>2. Statute oe Fbauds—to whom availing—as to cm executed trust. The Statute of Frauds is a defence personal to one making a verbal promise to convey land, and where a mother purchased land with, the money of her children, a conveyance of the land by her to her children, in execution of the trust imposed by law upon her, will be binding upon her husband, and he can not avoid the same.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court, of McLean county; the Hon. 0. T. Beeves, Judge, presiding,

Writ- of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Owen T. Beeves, Judge, presiding.