¶1ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
¶2In his petition for rehearing appellee says that deciding this case on the authority of International Shoe Company v. Lacy (1944), 114 Ind. App; 641, 53 N. E. 2d 636, we overlooked the very vital fact that the appellee herein gave valuable consideration for the contract or franchise.
¶3In the International Shoe Company case, supra, this court in its opinion pointed out that one of the contentions of appellee was:
“That appellant promised her exclusive representation in Indianapolis if she would acquire funds for the purpose from the disposition of other property, and open a store for the sale of Conformal shoes and purchase an order of shoes, and that she did so, thus performing her part of the bargain and rendering appellant’s promise obligatory, and avoiding any want of mutuality.”
¶4In answering that we said:
“However, appellee did not confine her proof of damages to the expense incurred in opening the store or to any loss in connection with the original purchase, but introduced evidence of the later loss of other profits, and it seems to us_ that neither party was interested in the mere opening of a store, and that they were not contracting with that in view as the end result to be accomplished, but on the contrary the object under consideration was a marketing agreement for the sale of shoes, and the promise of exclusive representation was.an inseparable element of the broader executory agreement which must fall for the lack of mutuality and of certainty.”
¶5*635In the case of Jordan v. Buick Motor Co. (1935), 75 F. 2d 447, the appellants had contributed $40,000 additional capital in order to secure an exclusive agency to sell and service Buick cars.
¶6In support of his contention appellee cites the cases of The Pennsylvania Company v. Dolan (1892), 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802; Cox v. The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co. (1913), 180 Ind. 495, 103 N. E. 337, and Toni v. Kingan & Co. (1938), 214 Ind. 611, 15 N. E. 2d 80. Those cases dealt with contracts for life-time jobs in exchange for the execution of a release for a personal injury claim. The agreement involved herein is in the nature of a sales agency agreement. For an interesting discussion of the differences in the two types of contract, see; E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co. (1933), 64 F. 2d 224; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Hall (1934), 68 F. 2d 533.
¶7We adhere to our original holding in this case.
¶8Petition for rehearing denied.
¶9Note. — Eeported in 97 N. E. 2d 871.