¶1concurring.
¶229. I join in Judge Bosson’s opinion. In my view, our rejection of issue preclusion in this case is consistent with general preclusion doctrine. A finding in one proceeding cannot be the predicate for issue preclusion in a later proceeding unless the finding is essential to the judgment in the first proceeding. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). One could say that the finding regarding Wife’s earning capacity was not essential to the original judgment awarding spousal support. After all, the same support could have been awarded even if the district court had determined that Wife had a significantly higher earning capacity. The award of spousal support is based on weighing a number of factors, some arguing for more support and some arguing for less. No one factor is dispositive. As a consequence, the court may not concentrate as carefully on its findings regarding each individual factor in the balance, so long as it is confident about the final award. Similar considerations have led to adoption of the rule that issue preclusion cannot be predicated on a finding that is one of two or more alternative findings, any of which would support the judgment. See id. cmt. i. These considerations, together with recognition of “the important goal of minimizing future contact and conflict between divorcing spouses,” Ruggles v. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 52, 62, 860 P.2d 182, 192 (1993), convince me that we should not recognize the offensive use of issue preclusion in support of a motion to modify a support award.