121 So. 3d 128 - State v. Lewis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Inherent in the right of police to conduct a brief investigatory detention is also the right to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. State v. Morton, 08-164, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/29/08), 993 So.2d 651, 657 . There is no question that the use of handcuffs incrementally increases the degree of force that is used in detaining an individual. Morton , 08-164 at 7-8, 993 So.2d at 657 . However, arrest-like features such as the use of drawn weapons and handcuffs may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de facto arrest. Id. Therefore, when the State seeks to prove that an investigatory detention involving the use of handcuffs did not exceed the limits of a Terry stop, the State must show some specific fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purpose of the stop without exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm. Morton , 08-164 at 8, 993 So.2d at 657 . Since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of a Terry stop. Id. “[A]n officer’s handcuffing a suspect is a reasonable method of ensuring officer safety.” State v. Jones, 11-8, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 78 So.3d 274, 282 , writ denied, 11-2781 (La.4/13/12), 85 So.3d 1246”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 209 So. 3d 150 - State v. Flournoy

2. “On May 11, 2012, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with possession of cocaine in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(C). Defendant was arraigned on June 14, 2012, and pled not guilty. On August 20, 2012, his motion to suppress evidence was denied. Also on that date, defendant proceeded to trial, and a six- person jury found him guilty as charged. On August 24, 2012, defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor. Also on that date, defendant filed a timely motion for appeal that was granted. 1 Ummediately after sentencing, the State filed a multiple offender bill of information in open court alleging that defendant was a second felony offender, and defendant denied those allegations. On October 25, 2012, defendant stipulated that he was a second felony offender. The trial judge then sentenced him under the multiple bill statute to eight years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. 2”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 169 So. 3d 685 - State v. Lewis

3. “On April 23, 2012, Corporal Joseph Amadeo and Sergeant Roy Jacob of the Causeway Police Department stopped defendant, Arthur C. Lewis, after observing him commit numerous traffic violations. The officers attempted to handcuff defendant for safety reasons in order to question him; however, he physically and verbally resisted them and was arrested. A search of defendant’s person yielded a small clear plastic cellophane bag containing crack cocaine.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 169 So. 3d 685 - State v. Lewis