Volume 121 — United States Reports

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), was a United States Supreme Court case involving grand jury indictments.

Held: under the special circumstances of this case, to be reviewable by this court, under the appeal from the final decreed The result is, that they cannot be upheld. *27 The final dect'ee of the Circuit Court, a/nd the orders of Ma/rch 6, 1882, and October 9, 1882, are reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with a direction to dismiss the bill, with costs, but without prejudice to the power and right of the…

Held: and owned by them at the time the said bank suspended payment, in the manner as aforesaid, may be decreed to hold' the moneys, property and effects received by áiem for said stock, in the *33 manner as aforesaid, in trust for the creditors of the said bank, and, upon the respective amounts being ascertained, that they be decreed to pay the same to creditors thereof, or to such person or persons as your honors shall…

Held: that the court" below had power to make this decree; that it was a final decree from which an appeal could be taken -to this court; and that it was right. This was a motion to dismiss, united with a motion to affirm. The case is stated in the

This was an appeal from an order discharging a prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.,

Held: that the objection could not be sustained. The bill was not multifarious. The Special Term made a decree for the sale of the land, without hearing evidence on issues raised by the pleadings.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: a notification, either written or printed, specifying the objects for which -they are to be held, signed by the.-.seleetmeñ, or a majority of them, set upQn the sign post or sign posts in the towns, at leash five days inclusively before the meeting is to be held, shall be sufficient notice to the inhabitants to attend such meeting.”' Eev. Stats. 1866, tit. 7, §§ 19r 21; 1821, tit. 103, § 2.

Held: to the whole amount of the capital stock of said bank or banking association. Nothing herein contained shall be held or construed to exempt the real estate of banks or banking associations from either State, county or municipal taxes, but the same shall be subject to State, county, municipal and other taxation to the saíne extent and rate, and in the same manner according to its value, as other real estate is taxed.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE "UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>In equity. Decree below dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action at law to- recover on coupons attached to negotiable bonds issued by the. plaintiff in error. A jury was waived at the trial. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The ease is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an action at law to recover interest on municipal bonds. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA.</p> <p>This was an appeal from a decree overruling a motion to remand the cause to the state court from whence it had been removed, and -from the final decree in the cause. This court disposed of the case only on the first issue. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the court had jurisdiction, the suit being brought not simply to defeat B’s attachment, but to establish the assignment. and make it available for E’s benefit. Motion to dismiss. Tbe'case is stated in the

Held: they did not amount to a regulation of such commerce. (2) The counsel in claiming that the law in question is a regulation of commerce confounds two powers that in their nature and essence are distinctively different, viz: the control of commerce, and the control of corporations. The one is a transaction, the other the agency of the transaction.

Held: that the title of the corporation in the tract acquired by condemnation passed to the purchaser under the second 'sale as fully as if conveyed by the company by a deed under its corporate seal, and that, under the circumstances, the employment of the same counsel by the company and by C, was.not evidence of fraud.

Held: owned, or managed by the firm of A. & W. Sprague in any such corporation or corporations, to make, execute, seal, acknowledge, stamp, and deliver all and any such conveyance and conveyances to any such corporation or. corporations as shall be necessary to vest the right, title, and interest of the said minors in and to said property, or any portion thereof, in any such corporation or corporations; and'that any such…

The trustees in a mortgage of the Kentucky Central ■ Railroad filed their bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for Kentucky to foreclose the mortgage, and the court appointed a receiver.

Held: that the bank had only the rights of a general creditor in the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property. This was an appeal from a decree dismissing tbe petition of an intervening creditor in a foreclosure suit. The case is stated in the

<p>error to the circuit court of the united states for the EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Notice of a writ of error, given in open court at the same term the judgment is rendered, is not the equivalent of citation.</p>

Held: that the buyer might refuse to accept the iron shipped in 1881.

<p>ERROR .TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>This was an action at law, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ulinois, by the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, (Limited,) a Pennsylvania corporation, against Francis E. Hinckley, to recover damages for the breach by Hihckley of a written contract for the purchase by him from the company of 6000 tons of steel rails. The contract was as follows:</p> <p>“ Memorandum of Sale.</p> <p>“ The Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company (Limited) have sold and hereby agree to make and deliver to the order of F. E. Hinckley, Esq., 204 Dearborn St., Chicago, Ills., and the said Hinckley has purchased' and agrees to pay for, six thousand -gross tons of first-quality steel fails, to weigh fifty-two (52) pounds to the yard, and to be rolled true and smooth to the pattern to be' furnished by the said Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, (Limited,) pattern No. 5.</p> <p>“ Said rails are to be made of the best quality of Bessemer steel, and to be subject to inspection as made and shipped, and to be well straightened and free from flaws, and to be drilled as may be directed; at least ninety per cent, shall be in thirty (30) feet lengths, with not over ten (10) per Cent, of shorter lengths, diminishing by one foot differences, none to be less than twenty-four (24) feet.</p> <p>“ All second-quality rails or excess of shorts which may be made, not exceeding five (5) per cent, -of each month’s shipments, to be taken at the usual reduction of ten (10) per cent, in price, and to be piled and shipped separately, (painted white on both ends,) as may be ordered by the inspector.</p> <p>“Deliveries to begin in May, 1882, in-which month one thousand tons shall he' delivered, and to’ continue at the rate of twenty-five hundred tons per month after July l,1 1-882,’ uhtil finished, strikes and accid&ts beyond ordinary control of said steel company, and acts of Providence preventing Qr suspending deliveries, alone excepted, in which case deliveries are to be delayed for a corresponding length of time oniy. .</p> <p>“ Price to be fifty-eight dollars net, per ton of 2210 pounds of finished steel rails, ex. ship or f. o.. b. cars at Chicago, Ills., sellér’s option. •</p> <p>“ Terms of payment, cash on delivery of inspector’s certificate for each five, hundred tons as fast as delivered. If ship'.ment is delayed without fault of' said steel company,- payment is to be made -in cash upon completion and delivery of eách five hundred tons at Chicago and inspector’s certificate. . Rails tp ,be inspected at .mill as fast as .completed and ready for shipment.</p> <p>“ In witness wherqof, the said. Hinckley has hereto set his hand-and seal, and the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, (Limited,) by its duly authorized officers, hath signed and affixed its corporate seal, the day and year aforesaid.</p> <p>“It is further agreed, that the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company (Limited) are not to be responsible for delays result-1 ing from failure of railroads to furnish cars, proper efforts having been made to procure them, nor for detentions after shipment has been made.</p> <p>“ It is understood that the purchaser shall have the right to make one-half of the order fifty-six (56) pounds per yard, pattern No. 4 of said steel company, notice to be given thirty days before the túne for the delivery of the rails.</p> <p>“ Chicago, Ills., Reb. 18, 1882.</p> <p>“F. E. Hinckley.</p> <p>“ C. H. Odell, Broker.”</p> <p>One copy of the contract was signed by Hinckley, and a duplicate of it was signed by the company.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded the general issue, and the case was tried ,by the court on the due waiver of a jury. The court made the following special finding of facts:</p> <p>“ 1. That the written agreement set out end described In the declaration was duly executed by the plaintiff and defendant in said cause, as alleged in said declaration.</p> <p>“ 2. That immediately after the making'of said contract, and before the time to begin the execution thereof, the plaintiff purchased the requisite amount of material from which to manufacture the six thousand tons of steel rails called for by said contract, and that, after the purchase of said supplies by plaintiff, there was a decline in the value thereof, before the time for the delivery of any portion of said rails, and that lower prices for. such supplies ruled during the months of May; June, July, and August, 1882.</p> <p>“8. That it appears from the parol proof heard on said, trial, aside from the provision in said written contract in regard to drilling directions, that it was usual and customary for the purchaser of steel rails to give directions as to the drilling thereof, and that each railroad company has its own special rules for drilling, and the drilling of such rails is considered in the trade as a part of the work of manufacture, and a part of the duty of the manufacturer in order to fully ‘complete the rails for use.</p> <p>“ é. ■ That, -by letters dated April' 3, April' 20, April 26, and April 28, from' plaintiff’s agents to defendant, and which letters, were duly received by defendant before May, 1882, defendant was requested to furnish drilling directions for the rails to be delivered in May under said contract, and defendant not only neglected to comply with such request and furnish such directions, but defendant also notified plaintiff, in reply to such request, that he, defendant, was not then prepared to receive the rails which were to be delivered under said contract in the month of. May.</p> <p>“ Again, about the 15th of June, defendant informed plaintiff that he was becoming discouraged about being able to take the rails.</p> <p>“That, about June 23, plaintiff notified defendant that it was ready to commence rolling the rails for the July deliveries, as well as to cover the thousand tons specified in the contract for delivery in May, of which plaintiff had postponed delivery at defendant’s request, and asked for drilling directions from the defendant, but defendant wholly neglected to give such drilling directions.</p> <p>“ That about the 26th of July, defendant, in substance informed plaintiff’s agents, that his financial arrangements for money to pay for said rails, pursuant to said contract, had •failed, and that he could not take said rails unless plaintiff would sell them to him on six; and. twelve months’ credit, for which the notes of the railroad company for which defendant was acting would be .given, which defendant would indorse, and also further secure with first-mortgage bonds, as collateral, -at fifty cents on the dollar, but, unless he could secure the rails on such terms, he could not take them,, and that plaintiff declined to accept said proposition for the purchase of said rails on credit; and I further find, that, on the 30th of August, T882; plaintiff notified defendant that the time' for the completion of his contract for the purchase of said rails had expired-, and requested the defendant to advise it wnether .he would accept the rails or not. To. this request defendant made no reply.</p> <p>“ I further find, that, while plaintiff did not expressly agree with defendant to postpone the time for the delivery of the rails to be made and delivered under said contract, yet plaintiff did in fact delay the rolling and delivery of the rails to be delivered in May, and that, by reason of the repeated statements of defendant that he was not ready-to give drilling directions,' not ready to use said rails, and not ready to accept them, plaintiff did postpone rolling said rails, and in fact never rolled any raffs to be delivered on said- contract, but that plaintiff was at all times during the months of May, July, and August readjr and able, in all respects, to fulfil said contract and make said rails, and the same would -have been ready for delivery, as called for by said contract, if defendant had furnished drilling directions, and' had not stated to plaintiff’s agents that he was not ready to furnish said drill 'g directions and not ready to accept said rails’</p> <p>/ “ I further find, that, on or about the 15th day of September, 1882, defendant was formally requested to furnish drilling directions and to accept said rails,.and that he replied to such request that he should decline to take any rails under said contract, and1 that he had made arrangements to purchase rails of others at a good deal lower price.</p> <p>■ “ I therefore find, from the testimony in this case, that defendant, by requesting plaintiff to postpone the delivery of' said rails, and by notifying the plaintiff that he was not ready to accept and pay for said rails, excused the plaintiff from the actual manufacture of said rails and a tender thereof to defendant. •</p> <p>“ And I further find, that defendant’s statement to plaintiff, on the 26th of July, that he could not pay cash for said rails, as called for by the contract, and that he wished to buy. them on credit, was in fact a notice that he .would not be able to pay for said rails if rolled and tendered to him by plaintiff.</p> <p>“ I therefore conclude, and so find as a- matter of fact, from the evidence in the case, that said plaintiff in/apt time .requested defendant to furnish directions for the drilling of said tails, and that defendant neglected and refused to dp so, and that, although plaintiff was ready and able to fully per-' form said contract, and make and deliver said fails to defendant, as required by said, contract, defendant refused to accept and pay for said rails.</p> <p>“ 5. That plaintiff manufactured and sold to other persons' 4000 tons of steel rails, from the material^ so purchased with which to perform said contract with defendant, for-which said rails plaintiff received $54.60 per ton, delivered at a port! on Lake Huron, and that plaintiff.made a profit of $1.60 per ton on said 4000 tons; that, by reason of defendant’s refusal to accept said rails, the plaintiff had no employment for its mill for- a time, and was obliged to stop its mill for about three weeks, in the month of August, 1882.</p> <p>“ 6. That it' would have cost plaintiff $50 per ton to have manufactured and delivered the rails called for by said contract to defendant, according to the terms of said contract; so that' plaintiff’s profits, if it had not been prevented from fulfilling said contract'by the conduct'of defendant, would have been $8.00 per ton on each ton of rails called for by said contract.</p> <p>“And, because of said facts, I find that defendant was guilty of a breach of said contract, and that plaintiff hath sustained damage, by reason of such breach, in the sum of $42,400.”</p> <p>On these findings, a judgment was entered for the plaintiff for $42,400 damages, and for costs. 17 Fed. Rep. 584. To review that judgment the defendant brought this writ of error. After the record was filed in this court, it being discovered that there was an error in computation in entering the judgment for $42,400, instead of $41,600, the Circuit Court allowed the plaintiff to remit the difference, $800, and an order was entered accordingly, as of the date of the judgment.</p>

<p>Thu reservation of the Red Lake and Pembina Indians, in Polk County, Minnesota, is Indian country, within the meaning of § 2139 Rev. Stat.</p> <p>Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 IT. S. 556, affirmed to the point that § 1 of the act of June 30, 1834, though repealed, may be referred to for the purpose of determining what is meant by the term “ Indian country.” when found in sections of the Revised Statutes which are reenactments of other sections of that act. .</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION OF OPINION FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>EEEOE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>This was a motion to dismiss, to which was united a motion to affirm. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO AND APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>This was a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Bill in equity to restrain infringements of letters-patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court..

Held: that, subject to the right and interest of the plaintiffs as thus defined, Canfield was in equity the owner of the whole 800 shares of said stock.

Held: that this was error, because H. was not a party to the proceedings on the plea in abatement. One partner may, with the consent of his copartner, apply the partnership property to the payment of his individual debt, as against a creditor of the partnership, who has acquired no lien on the property.

Held: That actual knowledge that a guest has in his possession merchandise for sale, or the consent of the innkeeper to the guest’s use of one of his rooms for such a purpose, does not fix upon the innkeeper full responsibility for the safety of such merchandise: such responsibility arises only upon written notice being given as required by the statute. This was an action at law. Judgment for' defendants.

SUPREME COURT ÓF THE 'STATE .OF PENNSYLVANIA, Bile in. equity in. a state court of Pennsylvania .to enjoin the municipal authorities of Easton, Pennsylvania, from conStructing water works. Decree dismissing the, bill, which ’was ■affirmed by .the Supreme Qourt of the state. • The plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The Federal question is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That M. was sufficiently made party to the case by the proceedings and the amendment filed, an<j that he must be presumed to have adopted the answer of his codefendants. Where an objection to the admission of evidence is so general as not to, indicate the specific grounds upon which it is made, it is unavailing on appeal unless it bé of such a character that it could not have been obviated at the trial.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED' STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>In equity to foreclose a mortgage. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that she was es-topped from setting up the parol trust, and that' no ground was shown for setting aside the lease. In equity. Decree dismissing the bill, from which the complainants appealed. The case is stated in the

Held: or an authority exercised under, the United States.” Cases, therefore, relating to the jurisdiction of this court for review are not necessarily controlling in reference to removals.

Held: as matter of law deduced from the facts found, that the garnishees were not in possession of the Milwaukee and Northern railway under the terms of the lease to the Wisconsin Central Railroad’Company, and for the value of its use and occupation were not bound to account to Hoyt. There was neither privity of contract nor privity t of estate between Hoyt and them.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA;</p> <p>In equity. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants .appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that an agent of a corporation, to whom, “ as executive agent of the company,” a promise'is made to pay money, is “ a person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit of another,” and may therefore sue in his own name on the promise. Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 389 .

OF ILLINOIS. In the year 1865 Ball, the defendant in error, and one Griffin, since deceased, recovered a judgment against Boynton, the plaintiff in error, for $6223.99.

Held: that this was error; that if the term was a term of art, it should have been found by the court; and that if there was no passage known as “northern,” the vessel was bound to take the one which would carry it in a northerly direction through the coolest waters into the . coolest temperature, and the court should have ascertained from the proof what passages between Gibraltar and Boston vessels were accustomed to…

This was an action at law against the defendant in error for the ejection of the plaintiff in error from its cars by its servants. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Bill in equity to restrain alleged infringements of ■ letters-patent. Decree for complainants. Respondents appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. The following are the figures referred to in the opinion. Mff, 1. Fig. 2.

Held: ón a general demurrer, to be in proper form; and the requisites of such a bill considered. Bill in equity for the infringement of letters-patent. The bilL was dismissed on general demurrer. The case is stated in the

Held: and placed its decision upon the ground, that, because the Commissioner of the General Land Office had not certified the lands in controversy to the State as swamp and overflowed, when this action was commenced in 1870, there was no title in the state by the grant of 1850 which could be enforced, thus making the investiture of title depend upon the act of the Commissioner instead of the act of Congress; whereas the…

The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, a citizen of California, brought suit against other citizens of the same state, to recover possession of lands in Los Angeles County, California, alleging that the action arose “ under the laws of the United ■ States and the treaty known as the treaty- of Guadelupe-IIidalgo.” After answers were filed the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error to review that judgment.

This case, so far as is material to the understanding of the appeal, was a bill in equity - by Martin Spitley, a citizen of Illinois, against George W. Frost and wife, citizens of Nebraska, Thomas ■ O. Durant, a citizen of New York, .and The-Credit ÍVÍobilier o'f America, a corporation of Pennsylvania, alleging that the'plaintiff was entitled to'two 'lots-of-land’in the city of Omaha, county of Douglas, and State'of- 'Nebraska, under a sale on- execution against Frost to one…

This ivas an action at law, brought by the defendant in error, in the Supreme Court in the District of Columbia, against the plaintiff in error, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s servants in the management of its cars while runr ning upon a street railroad in the city of Washington.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>This was an action at law to recover damages for non-performance of a contract. Verdict for the plaintiff and judgment on the verdict. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: “that, in order to render the shells subject to duty as ‘manufactures of shells’ something more must be done than simply to remove the outer surface either by acids or mechanical means, and that, while the shells retained their special form and character, they could not be classified as ‘ manufactures of shells’ ” The finding of the jury is not in the usual form of a special verdict, but the jury make certain…

This was an action to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error.

This ivas a bill in equity to restrain an alleged infringement of letters-patent. Decree dismissing the bill, from which the complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>APPEAL from the circuit court op the united states for THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA, EASTERN DIVISION.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity to compel an accounting. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>