Volume 122 — Maryland Reports

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In Equity (Peter, J.).</p> <p>The facts ax*e stated in the opinion of the Couxfl.</p> <p>The cause was argued before Boyd, O. J., Briscoe, Burke, Thomas, Pattison, Urner, Stockbridge and Constable, JJ.</p>

<p> Savings bank deposit-, deposit book; gifts inter vivos; delivery of book and order. </p> <p>A savings bank book is the voucher of the depositor, and the only evidence he has as evidence of his debt. p. 16</p> <p>The book is the instrument by which the money can be obtained, and its possession is some evidence of title in the person presenting it to the bank. p. 16</p> <p>The manual delivery of a savings bank deposit book to the donee by the donor, and the signing by the donor of a declaration in writing of his desire to vest the ownership of the account in the donee are sufficient to transfer title from the donor to the donee. ' pp. 15,17</p> <p>Where such donee gave the bank-book and order to a third party, whose sole authority was to have the account transferred to such donee’s name, his possession was not that of the donor, but was that of the donee as agent, and neither the death of the donor nor any act of the agent impairs the donee’s title to the account. p. 18</p>

). The facts are stated, in the opinion of the Court. The above is a plat of the lots and proposed improvements referred to in the Opinion of the Court.

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court Ho. 2 of Baltimore City (Gorter, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

). The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The following are the prayers that were offered by the plaintiff and defendant, and the action of the trial Court upon the same: Plaintiffs First Prayer — The Court instructs the jury if they find that Bertha Stevenson suffered from a diseased kidney, and that the defendant was a physician and surgeon and as such undertook to treat the said Bertha Stevenson, and entered upon said treatment, then the defendant was bound to…

<p>Landlord and tenant: nuisances; injuries to third parties; bursting water pipe; duty of plaintiff. Hypothetical question. Evidence: erroneous ruling; when no ground for reversal. Negligence: example of other people; no defence. Prayers: unsupported by evidence; several prayers; one exception only, where ruled on as one act.</p> <p>"Where injuries result to a third person from the faulty or defective condition of premises demised, or from their condition at the time of the demise, or because they contain a nuisance, even if this only becomes active by the tenants’ ordinary use of the premises, the landlord remains liable therefor, notwithstanding the lease. pp. 76-77</p> <p>Where a landlord is not bound to make repairs that become necessary during the possession of the tenant, yet if he assumes to do so, and neglects to perform the obligation, or if, in performing it, any injury is caused by want of skill or proper selection of his workmen,- the landlord is liable therefor. p. 77</p> <p>The fact that a landlord is liable for injuries resulting from the dangerous or defective condition of the premises, does not relieve a tenant from liability to third parties, for his own negligence in failing to take proper precaution to avoid injuries to them, resulting from the condition of the property in his possession and under his control. p. 77</p> <p>The reservation by a landlord of a right to enter upon the premises for the purpose of regulating and repairing the water meters and pipes, does not relieve the tenant from the consequences of his negligence in failing to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the property of third parties resulting from a breakage of the water pipes, etc. p. 77</p> <p>Where a tenant was in possession and control of an entire building, and, through the breakage of water pipes because of their freezing, the building was flooded and the water penetrated the building next door and injured the property of the plaintiff, it was held, that it was a question for the jury to say whether, under all the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the tenant was guilty of negligence in failing to turn the water off and drain the pipe; and in such a case the tenant could not escape liability for his own negligence (if such should be found by the jury) by showing that the landlord had neglected to supply the usual and proper appliance for turning off the water. p. 78</p> <p>In such a case the plaintiff had a right to show the condition of the pipe in question and what caused the injury. And evidence offered by the plaintiff to show whether there was a wheel on the valve to turn the water off, or a place for such wheel, was admissible. pp. 78-79</p> <p>In an action for damages for injury occasioned by a bursted water pipe, it was held, that the fact that the pipe could have frozen at some other point than at the point where it did freeze, had no bearing upon the issue, and evidence as to such possibility was irrelevant. p. 79</p> <p>The fact that a number of other people do not use proper care in turning off their water supply in severe weather does not tend to show that the defendants, in such a case, were not guilty of negligence. pp. 80-81</p> <p>Where to prove a fact, proper to be considered in a case, improper evidence is admitted, it is no ground for reversal, if the fact is proved independently by proper testimony. p. 79</p> <p>Hypothetical questions can not assume the existence of facts that have not been proved. p. 80</p> <p>The failure of other parties to use ordinary care can not lelieve defendants from the consequences of their own negligence in a similar case. pp. 80-81</p> <p>In an action brought for injury to the plaintiff’s goods caused by a bursting water pipe, which the defendants had neglected to turn off, it was' held, that there could be no objection to the prayer of the plaintiff, which failed to deduct from the amount of the plaintiff’s loss, “such damage as was caused by a lack of precaution on the part of the plaintiff to prevent further damage,” where there was no evidence in the case that there was any damage due to such failure on the part of the plaintiff, p. 81</p> <p>"Where a number of prayers for instructions to the jury are submitted to the trial court at the same time, the ruling of the Court upon them is a single act, and only one bill of exceptions should be taken. p. 81</p>

<p>Negligence: damages; burden of proof on plaintiff. Automobiles : person crossing in front of — . Prayers: withdrawing case from jury.</p> <p>A prayer withdrawing a case from the jury amounts to a demurrer to the evidence, and upon reviewing such a prayer, on appeal, the Court must consider all the evidence as applicable to the pleadings, in order to determine whether the ruling on the prayer was correct. p. 81</p> <p>In an action for damages for the injuries received because of the alleged negligence of the defendant, the essential element requisite for recovery is some act of negligence either of commission or omission on the part of the defendant or his servants; it is necessary that there be some evidence indicative of negligence in the circumstances surrounding the occurrence, either antecedent to or coincident with the happening of the accident. p. 89</p> <p>The extent of the duty of owners or operators of automobiles to the traveling public requires that ordinary care and caution be used, and the quantum of care required is to be estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation. p. 89</p> <p>If children on the public streets, unreasonably, intelligently and intentionally run into danger, they should take the risks, and children as well as adults should use the prudence and discretion which persons of their years ordinarily have; they can not be permitted with impunity to indulge in conduct which they know, or ought to know, to be careless. p. 90</p> <p>An operator and owner of an automobile was driving at a moderate rate of speed along a clear and unobstructed thoroughfare, when a boy five years and six months old, walking on the sidewalk, near the curb, and in the same direction as the automobile, suddenly ran out to cross the street, in the middle of the block, at a considerable distance from the regular crossing, and right in front of the car; not haying time to stop his car, the operator called out to the child, who, instead of continuing and possibly crossing in safety, started to come back, and was struck by the car; held, that there being no evidence adduced by the plaintiff to establish negligence on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. p. 90</p> <p>Ho matter to what extent or in what respect a party may be negligent, such negligence does not constitute a cause of action unless the negligence charged and the injuries sued for bear the relation of cause and effect. p. 90</p> <p>Actionable negligence is an act or omission of duty which is the approximate cause of an injury; and unless there be negligence, there can be no recovery. p. 90</p>

<p> Negligence: when actionable. County roads: liability of Commissioners. </p> <p>A county may be made liable for an injury directly caused by its negligence in allowing defects to remain in a public road. p. 94</p> <p>A county road was somewhat narrower than the width required by law, and at one point a pile of brush, etc., had been allowed for a year to project some three or four feet upon the road; on a dark night, at that point, two teams driving in opposite directions at a moderate rate of speed came into collision, and from the injuries thus received one of the horses was killed; m an action for damages brought by the owner of the horse against the County Commissioners, it was held, that there having been no evidence in the case legally sufficient to connect the accident with the width of the road, or the pile of brush, or any other act of the County Commissioners, the latter were not liable. ' p. 95</p> <p>Actionable negligence is an act, or omission of duty, which is the proximate cause of an injury. p. 95</p>

<p> Removals: in criminal casesj when discretionary. Appeals from final orders only. </p> <p>In oases of presentment or indictment for offenses punishable by death, the right to removal is absolute, under section 8 of Article 4 of the Constitution, and such right is not dependent upon the judgment or discretion of the Court to which the suggestion for removal is made; and an order refusing to remove in such a case is an adjudication of a constitutional right from which,- according to the nature of the case, an immediate appeal will lie. p. 99</p> <p>In other cases of presentment or indictment, when the offense charged is not punishable by death, such right only exists when it satisfactorily appears to the Court to which the suggestion is made, in exercise of its discretion, that the suggestion is true, or that there is reasonable ground for the same. p. 99</p> <p>In such a case, an order refusing an application for a removal is not in the nature of a final order from which an immediate appeal will lie, but as in the case of like rulings on demurrers and other interlocutory judgments, no appeal lies therefrom until final judgment. p. 100</p> <p>And an appeal from such an order, prematurely taken before the final judgment, will be dismissed. p. 100</p> <p>When an appeal in such a case is properly before the Court on appeal for review, it will not consider the affidavits and other testimony offered in the case, to consider whether the Court of Appeals would have been satisfied that the accused could not have had a fair and impartial trial, etc., or whether there were reasonable grounds for the suggestion; but the Court of Appeals will consider merely whether in refusing to grant the application the Court below committed an abuse of the discretion conferred on it. p. 100</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dorchester County (Jones and Stanford, JJ.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Title to office: equity no jurisdiction to try — . Mandamus. Supervisors of Election.</p> <p>A bill was filed by one alleging himself to be a duly commissioned and qualified supervisor of elections for Worcester County to enjoin the Clerk of the Circuit Court from swearing in John H. Truitt, who had been appointed by the Governor in the place and stead of the petitioner, and to enjdin the said petitioner from taking the oath of office as supervisor, and from signing the official test book, etc. The bill alleged that the term of the petitioner had not expired, and that he had never resigned or been removed, and that notwithstanding such facts the Governor had issued to Truitt a paper purporting to be a commission, etc. Held, that a court of equity had no power to prevent the appointee from qualifying.</p> <p>p. 113</p> <p>A court of equity has no j urisdiction to try title to an office, or to determine the validity of an appointment made by the Executive Department. p. 112</p> <p>The writ of mandamus is an appropriate proceeding to determine questions of title to office. p. 112</p>

<p> Parent and child: contracts as to custody and care; advantage of child. </p> <p>In general, a parent can not by contract divest himself of his parental obligations, or submit them to the keeping of another, unless the agreement be for the benefit and best interest of the child. p. 118</p> <p>The grandfather of a child had agreed with its mother that if she would let the child live with him, he would care for and educate the child at his expense, and allow the mother a certain sum per week to represent the help, etc., that the child had been to her; after having kept the child under such conditions for some time, the grandfather ceased making such payments to the mother. TJpon a bill brought by the mother for specific performance of the contract, it was held, that as it appeared that the contract was for the advantage and welfare of the child, and since its enforcement would not be against either sound policy or good morals, the action of the lower Court in. overruling the defendant’s demurrer to the bill should be affirmed. p. 120</p>

<p>Insurance: cancellation; notice; agent.</p> <p>Where an insurance policy provides that notice of cancellation must he given by the insurer to the insured, such notice must he given to the insured himself or to someone duly authorized to receive it on his behalf. A broker or agent employed for the purpose of procuring insurance has no implied authority to cancel or to accept an operative notice of cancellation, p. 121</p> <p>The fact that the person, upon whom notice of cancellation of a policy was served, had possession of the policy at the time does not affect the question, when he was in possession of it for a distinct, definite purpose, wholly apart from any cancellation. p. 125</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Duffy, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>The cause was argued before Boyd, 0. J., Briscoe, Burke, Thomas, Pattison, Drner, Stockbridge and Constable, JJ.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Dawkins, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

). The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Briscoe, J., who presided, and Burke, Thomas, Urner, Stockbbidge and Constable, JJ.

). This appeal arose from an action of slander brought against the defendant because of language used in the following letter which was dictated by the defendant to a hotel stenographer and sent to the plaintiff: “Baltimore, June 22, 1911. “Hdwin G. Moore — Sir: “In looking over your accounts (all of which are utterly useless, as nothing can be made out of the cost of running the place, you have mixed up your personal accounts with mine) ; and in cheque stubs, I notice you…

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore County.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County (Forsythe, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Written contracts: parol testimony; how figures in contract were reached. Sales of personal property: possession in vendee; title; conditional sales; chattel mortgages; bills of sale; recording of — . Üniform Sales Act: Code, Article 83, sections 22 and 39.</p> <p>Testimony explaining how a written contract was formed or arrived at, is not prohibited by the rule that written instruments are not to be varied, added to or explained by parol testimony. p. 181</p> <p>Where a contract upon which suit was based states the purchase price to have been a certain sum, testimony may be admitted to show that the actual purchase price was a larger sum, but that an article had been taken in exchange, at an agreed price, as part of the consideration, and that the written contract price was for the difference.' p. 181</p> <p>Section 43 of Article 21 of the Code, relating to sales or mortgages of personal property, has no application to conditional sales where the vendor parts with possession. p. 182</p> <p>Conditional sales where the contract provides that the title und ownership of the thing sold, although delivered to the purchaser, shall not vest in him, until the purchase price therefor is paid, are recognized, under the Uniform Sales Act, Article 83, sections 22 and 39 of the Code, and such contracts are neither unconscionable nor in contravention of public policy. p. 182</p> <p>Article 21, section 43 of the Code, relating to bills of sale or mortgages, where a vendor, mortgagor or donor of personal property remains in possession of the chattel, has no application to conditional sales, where the vendor parts with possession. p. 182</p>

<p>Pleading and practice in equity: hearing on hill and answer; replication not considered; equity of hill denied hy answer. Injunction: motion to dissolvej when hill may he retained.</p> <p>In a bill of complaint it was alleged that in proceedings to condemn property and widen ^certain streets of Orisfield the examiners, in their report showing the proposed estimates for damages and assessments for benefits to the property affected, either did not include that of the complainants until too late for the time of appeal from such finding, or if they did include the property of the complainants in time, it was so inadequately and improperly placed in the report that the complainants and their attorneys were unable to find it ; and because of such misfeasance, neglect and fraud, it was alleged that the complainants suffered great loss and injury and were unable to take their appeal under the law, and therefore an injunction was prayed for, together with a prayer for general relief: Held, that as the hearing was upon bill and answer, and as the answer denied the charge of fraud, and the exhibits filed with the bill completely answered and refuted the allegation that the property of the petitioners had been improperly or inadequately set out in the report referred to, there was no equity in the bill. p. 187</p> <p>When a plaintiff has his case set down for final hearing on bill and answer, he admits all the matters stated in the answer that are susceptible of proof by legitimate evidence. p. 187 In such a case, even though a replication has been filed, it is not to be considered; and the better procedure is to ask leave of the Court to withdraw the replication. p. 189</p> <p>In condemnation proceedings, although the damages allowed may be inadequate, yet if the parties had their day in Court, with an opportunity to right the wrong done them, and through their neglect forfeited their right, it is not considered a taking of property without due process of law, and presents no ground for equitable interposition. p. 188</p> <p>Where an injunction is merely ancillary to the relief prayed, and a motion to dissolve is granted, the plaintiff is entitled to have the bill retained, so as to proceed to a final hearing of the case. ' p. 189</p> <p>But where the injunction asked for is not ancillary, but is primary and the principal relief prayed, there is no reason for retaining the bill, if on final hearing upon bill and answer, or bill, answers and depositions, it appears to the Court that there is no ground for granting an injunction upon the merits; and in such a case the bill should be dismissed. p. 189</p>

<p> Streets: condemnation of land; damages and benefits; jurisdiction of Circuit Courts; motions in arrest of judgment; appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction. Appeals to Court of Appeals. </p> <p>Where a Circuit Court sits as an appellate court, under statutory authority, no appeal will lie from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals, unless expressly given by statute, excepting in cases where the Circuit Court has exceeded its jurisdiction. p. 193</p> <p>In cases properly before the Court of Appeals, a motion of arrest brings up the whole record. p. 193</p> <p>Excepting in cases properly before the Court of Appeals, the mere fact that, in proceedings below, a motion in arrest of judgment was interposed, does not empower the Court of Appeals to review all the rulings of the lower Court, irrespective of whether or not jurisdictional questions were presented. pp. 193-191</p> <p>Where a statute empowering a municipal corporation to widen streets and condemn property provided that certain examiners should “ascertain whether any, and what amount in value of damages would he caused thereby, for which the owner ought to be compensated, over and above the amount and value of benefits which will thereby accrue to the owner,” it does not imply that the amount assessable for benefits must be less than the amount allowed for damages. p. 194</p>

-). The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The following are the prayers in the case and the action of the trial Court on the same, except the instructions offered by the trial Court, which are set out in full in the opinion of the Court of Appeals: Plaintiff’s First Prayer. — The plaintiff, by his counsel, prays the Court to instruct the jury, that if they find from the evidence in the case that J. Start Whisner executed the will offered in evidence on the 7th…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Duffy, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

). The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The following are the prayers that were offered at the trial of the case, and the action of the Court below upon each: Plaintiff’s First Prayer. — The plaintiff prays the Court to instruct the jury that if they shall believe from the evidence that the Peninsula Produce Exchange delivered to the .New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Eailroad Company, at Marion Station, in Somerset,County, Maryland, one of its stations in said…

<p> Common carriers: liability for safe delivery of freight; con- . tracts limiting time for filing of claims. Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act. </p> <p>A provision in a bill of lading that “claims for loss, damage or delay must be made in writing, etc.,” * * * “within four months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed,” and providing that unless claims are so made the carrier is not to be liable, is a reasonable and valid provision. p. 231</p> <p>But such a restriction as to the liability of the carrier is one that the carrier may waive, and in a suit against an initial carrier under the Carmack amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (34 Statutes at L. 584, Chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, page 1288), for partial loss of the market value of goods shipped over the lines of the defendant and connecting railroads, and alleged not to have been forwarded and delivered with reasonable dispatch, it was held, that an acknowledgment of notice of such a claim, made by the traffic manager of the initial carrier without any objection as to the time of such notice, was to be considered as a waiver of the restriction. p. 235</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. (In Equity.) (Harlan, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County. (In Equity.) (HEinDEBsoEr, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. (Brashears, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Decrees: striking out; after enrollment; fraud and surprise. Divorce proceedings: suppression of facts. </p> <p>Where process has been regularly served upon t.he defendant and he fails to appear and make defense, and a judgment is regularly entered against him, a strong case must be presented to justify the Court in striking out the judgment after the lapse of the term, or the enrollment of the decree; and the Court will not interfere with the judgment in such a case unless the facts produced clearly establish fraud, deceit, surprise or irregularity in obtaining the same, and show that the defendant has acted liona fide and with reasonable diligence in making the application. p. 272</p> <p>In general, after the enrollment cf a decree, in the absence of fraud, surprise or irregularity, an error in the decree will not be corrected, or a rehearing granted, upon a mere petition; the proper form of proceeding in such a case is by a bill of review, or an original bill for fraud; but the procedure may be by petition when the case was not heard on its merits, and where, it is alleged that the decree was entered by mistake or surprise, or under circumstances which satisfy the Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that the enrollment ought to be discharged and the decree set aside. p. 273</p> <p>The reasons for permitting the setting aside of a decree entered by mistake, surprise, etc., exist more strongly in divorce proceedings than in other cases. p. 273</p> <p>In divorce proceedings, which are often not contested, and where collusion may exist between the parties, the public has a peculiar interest which is in the care of the tribunal before which the proceedings are pending. pp. 273-274</p> <p>A decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii by default was obtained against a wife through surprise; a petition, filed 'after the decree was enrolled and after the term, alleged that the decree was obtained by the suppression and concealment of facts concerning a former ease and a decree between the parties, as to which the Court had no knowledge, and prayed that the case might be reopened and the decree set aside'. Held that, under the circumstances, it was proper that the relief be granted. p. 274</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Dueey, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the .Baltimore City Court. (Stump, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court. (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>The cause was argued, before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Burke, Tiiomas, Pattison, Urner, Stockbridge and Constable, JJ.</p>

<p> Justices of the Peace: appeals to City Courtj appeal to Court of Appeals; jurisdictional question only. </p> <p>No appeal lies to the Court of Appeals from tlie judgment of a Circuit Court on appeal from a judgment of tlie Justice of the Peace, if the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the judgment of such Justice of the Peace. p. 301</p> <p>A judgment upon a scire facias is a valid and binding judgment, and under section 86 of Article 5 of the Code providing for appeals from Justices of the Peace, an appeal from such a judgment will lie. p. 301</p> <p>Although the writ of scire facias is a judicial process, yet it partakes of the nature of an action, and a defendant may appear and plead to it in the same manner as to an action founded upon an original wilt, and the judgment thereon is considered as a new judgment, having all the attributes of the original on which the scire facias was founded. p. 301</p> <p>The bond, required by section 92 of Article 5 of the Code, in cases of appeals from the judgment of Justices of the Peace is for the purpose of staying execution, and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the appeal. p. 302</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County, in Equity (Henderson, J.).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County. (Keedy, J.)</p> <p>The facts aire stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal and writs of error. Circuit Courts: special jurisdiction; appeals. Roads: closing of — -; jurisdiction of County Commissioners; appeals.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals can not review the judgments of the Circuit Courts sitting as appellate tribunals, under statutory authority, when no express right of appeal is given, except in cases where such courts have exceeded their jurisdiction. p. 32Y</p> <p>In docketing an appeal to the Circuit Court of Harford County, from the decision of a Board of County Commissioners as to the closing of a road, the suit was docketed against the County- Commissioners, instead of against the “party or petitioners” who were successful, etc., as provided by statute (Code of 1912, Article 5, section 84); the Board of County Commissioners, when summoned, appeared by counsel and submitted to the jurisdiction; the Circuit Court, in such a case, having jurisdiction over the parties, and special statutory jurisdiction over the question, with the right to decide and render judgment without any review, the judgment was final. p. 329</p> <p>The fact that the cost of closing a road is to be paid by some parties other than the County Commissioners does not affect the right of appeal, given by the statute, to any “party to the proceedings or any taxpayer not a party.” p. 328</p> <p>A writ of error has no more extensive range, or greater effect, than an appeal; they being but different modes of obtaining a review of a judgment of a court of inferior jurisdiction by an appellate court. p. 327</p>

In Equity. (Stanford, J.) The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Burke, Tiioüuas, Battison, Urner, Stockbridge and Constable, JJ.

<p>Master and servant: dischargej insolence; provocation; question u for jury. Court and jury: province of — •. Prayers: rejection of all — .</p> <p>Although all the prayers' of both sides are rejected, a case may go to the jury without any instructions from the Court. The practice is not one that is commended. p. 396</p> <p>Questions of law are for the Court, while mixed questions of law and fact are for the jury, with proper instructions by the Court as to the law. p. 351</p> <p>It is only for breaches of an express or implied condition of a contract, that either of the parties may put an end to it. p. 350</p> <p>A servant employed, under a contract, for a definite term, may, for sufficient cause, be discharged before the expiration of the term. p. 350</p> <p>To afford legal justification for the discharge of a servant before the expiration of the term of his employment, his misconduct must be grave, or such as to be incompatible with the relation, pernicious in its influence, or injurious to the master’s business. .' p. 350</p> <p>In determining such questions, reference must be had to the business or employment in which it arose, and the relative social condition of the master and servant. p. 350</p> <p>Previous provocations by the master, will sometimes render excusable words which, apart from that element, would constitute good ground for dismissal. p. 351</p> <p>What constitutes good and sufficient cause for the discharge of a servant is a question of law, and where the facts are undisputed it is for the Court to say whether the discharge was justified. p. 351</p> <p>Insolence to the employer or a member of his family ■ is a valid reason for such discharge. p. 351</p> <p>In general, whether the words complained of, as an excuse for the discharge of a servant were so insolent as to be incompatible with the continuance of the relation of master and servant, and whether there was any provocation to excuse the remarks, are questions for the jury upon instructions from the Court. p. 354</p>

<p>Cross-appeals from Circuit Court Mo. 2 of Baltimore City. (Durey, J.)'</p>

<p>Crossrappeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (Duett, J.)</p> <p>The appeals were argued together (with the appeals in the preceding case) before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Burke, Thomas, Pattison, Urnbr, Stockbridge and Constable, JE-</p>

<p> Criminal law: murder; evidence; experts; confession by traverser; admissibility; question for court; appeals. Counsel: right of accused. Motion for re-argument. New evidence. </p> <p>A doctor who has been shown to have the requisite technical training and who was present observing the conduct of the autopsy, is a competent witness to testify, in a trial for murder, as an expert as to the cause of death. p. 397</p> <p>In a trial for murder, it was offered to prove that a letter had been written from another city and addressed to the murdered woman at her home by her daughter, and should have been delivered to her, or to her home, at or about the time of the murder; but that this letter was missing when the premises were examined after the murder, although other mail that had been left by the carrier was found: Held, that such evidence was admissible, as tending to show one of the means by which the traverser might have learned the address of the daughter, which otherwise he would not have known; also as showing his movements and his motives; and under such circumstances secondary evidence of the contents, of the letter could be given. p. 398</p> <p>At the trial of a person accused of murder, his movements and declarations between the time of the commission of the crime and his arrest, are important, and evidence as to them is admissible. p. 399</p> <p>The burden of proof is on the State to show that a confession of crime has not been obtained by improper means, and that it is the voluntary act of the traverser, induced by no hope of favor or fear of harm. p. 399</p> <p>It is the fundamental duty of the Court in all cases to pass upon the admissibility of evidence. p. 400</p> <p>A mere confession of crime constitutes no crime; it is only evidence tending to show that a crime has been committed, and it may or may not be believed by the jury, or by the Court sitting as a jury, in any particular case; but the admissibility of a confession, as evidence to be submitted to the jury, is a question for the Court. p. 400</p> <p>The fact that a confession was made while the accused was in custody, and bound or handcuffed, does not of itself render the confession inadmissible. • p. 401</p> <p>It is the fight of one accused of crime to be represented by his own counsel, but the fact that one accused of crime makes a confession when unrepresented by counsel does not of itself affect the admissibility of such confession. p. 400</p> <p>In determining whether a confession of crime is admissible in evidence, it is not a question simply whether the traverser was or was not at the time mentally agitated, but whethei he was so far deprived of his sense of reason as not to be responsible for what he may have said or done. p. 402</p> <p>On appeal to the Court of Appeals, by the traverser in a criminal trial before the Court, sitting as a jury, as to the ruling of the trial Court on the admissibility of a confession in evidence, the question is not so much as to the admissibility vel non of the confession, as it is a question of the weight to be attached to it by the Court sitting as a jury. p. 404</p> <p>Although evidence offered, to show the circumstances under which a confession was made, may not be such as to render the confession inadmissible, yet the evidence may be offered as affecting the weight of the evidence. p. 408</p> <p>Eacts which at most could only form a basis for a motion for a new trial, if presented in time in the lower Court, can not form the basis of a motion for a re-argument in the Court of Appeals. pp. 409-410</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court. (Hablan, C. J.)-</p> <p>The facts are stated, in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Verdicts: correction by jury; direction of verdict by Court; issues from Orphans’ Court. Wills: caveat; capacity; delusions; evidence; relating to time of executing will; opinions of witnesses. ■Rebuttal: discretion of Court. Exceptions: including separate and distinct rulings.</p> <p>Ordinarily, a jury should not be permitted to amend its verdict after it has been recorded and the jury has been dismissed. p. 425</p> <p>In the trial of issues sent from an Orphans’ Court for trial before a jury, the jury rendered their verdict upon certain of the issues and dispersed without having passed upon a certain issue as to which, because of want of evidence, the Court had directed what verdict they should render; the jury was reconvened, only a Saturday and a Sunday intervening, and they not having been sworn in any other cause, and the verdict was taken upon that issue, as they had been directed to render it: Meld, that the action of the Court in recalling the “jury and in so taking their verdict on such issue was proper. p. 426</p> <p>A Court passes on the sufficiency of evidence, and where it directs a verdict based upon the want of legally sufficient evidence, the jury has no duty hut to obey. p. 427</p> <p>It is not the practice to enter judgment in the case of the trial of issues sent from an Orphans’ Court. p. 427</p> <p>The action of a trial Court in ruling upon objections to questions proposed to he asked, will not he reviewed on appeal, where the answers to the questions do not appear in the record. p. 423</p> <p>In the trial of issues as to the testamentary capacity of a testator, and a knowledge of the contents of the will, etc., evidence of what had been the situation of the children, etc., offered for the purpose of showing that they were entitled to compensation from the testator, is not admissible. p. 429</p> <p>Evidence that a testator was subject to delusions is not sufficient to affect his capacity, unless there he offered evidence tending to show that tho-will was the product of the delusions, p. 43 !</p> <p>The opinion of a witness is not admissible in evidence as that of an expert, where it is based in part upon the testimony that he heard, and partly upon evidence that he read, including the opinions and conclusions of other witnesses. p. 43"</p> <p>Whether evidence shall he admitted in rebuttal is a question to he left to a large extent to the discretion of the trial court. p. 435</p> <p>Evidence tending to show the capacity of-a testator may he shown by a competent witness, although the time of which such witness speaks does not include the actual time of the making of the will. pp. 434-435</p> <p>Evidence tending to show the incapacity of a testator must relate to the date of the making of the ■will. p. 435</p> <p>The practice of including in one exception several rulings on essentially distinct propositions of law is not one to he recommended. p. 435</p> <p>Eor counsel to make statements, in their argument before the jury, applicable to issues which are not before them, is confusing and improper. p. 437</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (Durey, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Banking institutions: Constitution. Article 3, section 39; liability of stockholders; special charters; decree of Court, fixing amount of liability; suit by receivers; appeals. Limitations. Pleading and. practice : pleas and demurrers.</p> <p>A provision in a special Act incorporating a banking and trust company, declaring that when tlie par value of any share has been all paid, the same shall thereupon become non-assessable and non-liable, for or on account of any purpose whatever, does not have the effect of exempting a stockholder from the obligations imposed by section 39 of Article 3 of the Constitution, providing that no charter for banking purposes shall be granted except upon the condition that the stockholders shall be liable to the amount of their respective stock for all the debts of the banking institution. ' p. 437</p> <p>Where a plea is a direct traverse of essential averments of the declaration, a demurrer to it is properly overruled. pp. 454-453</p> <p>AVhere the assets of an insolvent banking corporation are being administered by a court of equity, having jurisdiction over the property and parties, the Court has the authority to determine the propriety of passing an order directing the receivers to institute suits to enforce the statutory liability of the stockholders; and such order, so passed, is binding upon the stockholders until reversed, and is not one that may be called into question in any collateral proceeding. p. 458</p> <p>The Statute of Limitations begins to run against the liability of stockholders of a banking corporation only from the date of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, fixing the amount necessary to be paid by the stockholders in a suit against them for the benefit of all the corporation’s depositors and creditors. p. 459</p>

<p>Sales of lands: in equity; in different counties; jurisdiiction; appeals; section 87 of Article 16 of Code; co-tenants; undivided interests; title of purchaser.</p> <p>The extension of the jurisdiction given to courts of equity by section 87 of Article 16 of the Code, over equitable proceedings, where the lands in question lie partly in one county and partly in another, or partly in one county and partly in the City of Baltimore, applies not only to cases where there is but one tract of land with contiguous portions in different counties, but also to cases where there are several tracts in question, some in one couhty, etc., and some in another county or counties. • p. 464</p> <p>The purpose of the statute was to avoid a multiplicity of suits, with their costs and expenses. p. 464</p> <p>Where a Court has jurisdiction to decree the sale of property held by co-tenants, and to determine whether a sale should be made of an undivided interest, the only remedy from its decision is by appeal. p. 466</p> <p>Until such decision is reversed, on appeal, the decree is binding on the parties to the suit. p. 466</p> <p>The purchaser of such an undivided interest in property, under such a decree, acquires only the interest of the parties to the suit. p. 466</p>

<p>Landlords: injuries to licensees; implied invitation to visit premises.</p> <p>In general, the owner is liable to one who comes upon the property, by the owner’s invitation, and is injured by undisclosed and hazardous conditions of which the owner was aware,' and against which he did not afford protection. p. 469</p> <p>If the owner of property extends an invitation to inspect it to one who inquires concerning its rental, etc., as a home, the invitation will be presumed to include members of his family; and if a member of his family accompanies him when he inspects the property, it will be presumed that such membér came in response to such an invitation. p. 471</p> <p>And if such a member of the family, while on such visit of inspection, is injured because of the defective and dangerous condition of the property, the owner is liable therefor, p. 473</p> <p>The owner of certain property extended an invitation to inspect certain of the rooms to a party who inquired as to their rental for a home; when he came to make the inspection he was accompanied by one of his children; while going upon a porch which had been held out by the owner as being one of the advantages of the rooms, the porch, which had for a long time been in a decayed and rotten condition, fell, and the child was seriously injured: Held, that the child was present by the implied invitation of the owner of the property, and that for said injuries the owner of the property was responsible, p. 473</p> <p>While offers to pay money by way of a compromise are not admissible in evidence, the same rule does not apply to the admission of particular facts, unless made as a mere concession to indorse a compromise or unless made without prejudice. pp. 474-475</p> <p>When a portion of testimony of a competent witness, offered in evidence is admissible, it is error to reject the testimony as a whole. p. 475</p>

2 of Baltimore City. (Gorter, J.) The facts are stated, in the opinion of the Court. The cause was argued before Briscoe, J., presiding, and Burice, Thomas, Ureter, Stockbridge and Coetstable, JJ.

<p> Landlord and tenant: tenant holding over; receivers. </p> <p>In general, where real property is rented for a term of years, and, with the consent of the landlord, the tenant remains in possession at the expiration of the term, the law implies a subsequent tenancy from year to year. p. 484</p> <p>But the mere appointment of a receiver by a Court does not render him the assignee of a term under an unexpired lease; such a receiver stands in the position of an assignee, with respect to his right to adopt the lease and become liable on its' covenants; and the receiver may retain possession for a reasonable time, to determine whether he will adopt the lease or not. pp. 485-486</p> <p>A receiver is merely an arm of the Court, assisting in winding up the affairs of the estate and protecting the interests of the creditors. • p. 486</p> <p>If a receiver adopts the lease, he is bound to the payment of the rent as stipulated by it; but if a receiver holds over beyond the term, he is not, for that reason merely, to be considered a tenant from year to year, but is only a tenant at will. pTfp- p.486</p>

<p> Acts of Assembly: approval by the Governor; qualified approval for amount other than that named, in bill. </p> <p>Under section 17 of Article 2 of the Constitution, no bill can become a law without the Governor’s signature, If presented to him after the adjournment. p. 488</p> <p>Where the Governor, in approving a bill appropriating money, notes that he approves it for a definite and less sum than the sum named, and disapproves it as to the balance, it is not an approval of the bill as passed by the Legislature, p. 491</p> <p>After the adjournment of the Legislature a bill, appropriating $175.00, to be paid to a party named therein, was presented to the Governor, who approved the bill as to $125.00 and disapproved the bill as to $50.00; the party named in the bill was paid the $125.00, and filed a petition for a mandamus to compel the Comptroller to pay him the $50.00; on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the bill, it was: Held, that the demurrer was properly sustained. p. 492</p>

<p> Contracts: by mail; acceptance. Corporations: officers; powers; personal liability. </p> <p>A valid contract may be entered into by letter. But in order for an acceptance, by letter, of an offer made, to constitute a binding agreement, the acceptance must be definite, unconditional, and made within a reasonable time. pp. 500-501</p> <p>An officer of a corporation has, in general, no authority to make a contract binding personally upon the other officers of the corporation. p. 501</p>

<p> Corporations-, mortgages and deeds of trustj sales of property and reinvestment of proceeds. </p> <p>A deed of trust, securing the bonds of an industrial corporation, provided that it might, with the trustee’s consent, at any time, exchange for other property, or sell, or lease for any term, any part of the mortgaged property, free and clear, etc., provided the proceeds should, at the option of the corporation, be invested by it, either in the improvement of any part of the property, or in the purchase of other property, real or leasehold, suitable to promote the business, etc., or in the purchase of other securities, or property, real, leasehold or personal, which should he subject to all trusts, etc.; and if any of the property should he sold, whose proceeds, in the opinion of the corporation, it was not necessary to reinvest for the business,, the moneys therefrom should he paid to the trustee to he invested in a sinking fund. In pursuance of'a matured plan of concentration and economy, communicated in advance to the trustee, whose general assent was obtained, the corporation pro-, posed to sell certain plants and pieces of property which were unprofitable to operate, and with the proceeds to make substantial additions to its profitable plants, including new buildings, equipment, etc.; the improvements were undertaken and paid for out of funds provided by the company; the properties that were to be sold, being disposed of from time to time according as advantageous sales could be made, and the proceeds paid over to the trustee. When sufficient property had been sold, application was made to the trustee to permit the withdrawal and application of such proceeds held by it to reimburse the company for the costs of the improvement so made; upon a case stated, under the Equity Rules, Code, Article 36, sections 206-8, it was held, that under the circumstances, and in view of all the advantages to all interests resulting from the investment, objection to such use of the fund on the ground that all the property purchased .may not be of a strictly permanent character, was not sustainable. p. 510</p> <p>Held, further, that, under the circumstances and according to the terms of the mortgage, all that would be required was that there should be a direct and practical relation between the transactions that produce the funds, and those which provide the reinvestment. p. 513</p> <p>It is not necessary, in such cases, to subject the company to the loss and inconvenience of delaying the improvements until all the sales had been completed. p. 513</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Worcester County. (Pattison, O. J., Stanford and Jones, J-J.j</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Worcester County. (Jones and Stanford, JJ.)</p> <p>The faets are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

(In Equity.) (Petek, J.) The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The cause ivas submitted on briefs to Boyd> C. J., Bbiscoe, Bubke, Thomas, Pattisox, Hewer, Stockbridg® and Cox-stable, JJ.

<p>Pleadings: declaration; amendments; inconsistent. Recoupment; under general issue plea. Contracts: partly in parole; question for the jury,</p> <p>The plaintiffs brought suit upon a contract for the sale and delivery of 2,373 tons of coal at the value of $2,971.50, but bj7 leave of Court amended the declaration by inserting an additional count by which they sought to recover the sum of $2,422.20, an amount that had been agreed upon in settlement and compromise of the suit: Held, that the plaintiffs could not take inconsistent positions in the same suit, and that they were bound by their first election. in 548</p> <p>Where a contract sought to be enforced is partly in writing and partly in parole, it presents a question for the determination of the jury, upon proper instruction by the Court, p. 551</p> <p>In an action of assumpsit a defendant may, under the general issue, recoup for damages arising from the plaintiff’s failure to execute his contract, and may give evidence to show injury on which to found a claim for recoupment by way of defense. ' p. 553</p>

<p>Agency: authority of agent; rights of third parties; when question for jury; “buyers” of department stores.</p> <p>Where a suit is brought on the common counts in assumpsit to recover the contract price for goods claimed to have been sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, who pleads the general issue, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove an acceptance of the goods by the defendant, and that they had been shipped to the defendant in compliance with the terms of an order or agreement signed by the defendant or authorized by him. p. 558</p> <p>The mere fact that an employee is called “buyer”' clothes him with no power to bind the principal by acts wholly without the scope of his authority. p. 560</p> <p>The principle that a general authority to an agent can not be limited by private instructions, not known to third parties, can not be applicable to cases where no general authority is shown to exist. p. 560</p> <p>In general, the powers of an agent rest upon the authority conferred by the principal; and a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry as to what is his true authority. p. 560</p> <p>Eor a third person to be able to hold the principal by relying upon the apparent authority of an agent, such authority must have been actually apparent to such third person, who must have dealt with the agent in reliance thereon, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence. p. .561</p> <p>Unless the authority of an agent is conferred by a written instrument, the existence of agency, with the extent of the agent’s power, is a question of fact for the jury. p. 562</p> <p>But such facts cau only be shown by competent evidence, and the burden of proof is on him who assumes the affirmative. p. 560</p> <p>Where there is no evidence legally sufficient to sustain a finding of agency, the question should not be submitted to the consideration of the jury. p. 562</p>

<p>“ Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. (Heuisx.ee, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Railway coaches: disorderly conduct on; ejectment of passengers by conductor; liability of company. Evidence: weight and sufficiency; province of jury; appeals.</p> <p>Where one is rightly in a coach of a common carrier and comporting himself iñ a peaceful and orderly manner, it is actionable for the servants or agents of the carrier to eject him before the end of the journey to which he is entitled, where there is no interruption of the service. p. 578</p> <p>It is the duty of the conductor of a railway train promptly to quell quarrels between drunken and disorderly passengers, and it is for the conductor to determine whether their misconduct is such as to justify expulsion; but the company is liable if the conductor misunderstands and misjudges • the facts, and acts unwisely and imprudently. pp. 581-582</p> <p>On an appeal from the action of the trial Court in refusing to grant a prayer seeking to withdraw a case from the consideration of the jury, the Court of Appeals is not concerned with the contradictory testimony of the defendant; but only with the question as to whether the evidence, offered by the plaintiff, if true, -would be legally sufficient to support the averments of the action. pp. 578-579</p> <p>The weight and credibility of evidence is for the jury. p. 579</p>

<p>Three appeals in one record from the Baltimore City Court. (Hablan, C. J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Public service corporations: extension of service; prohibitive cost; rates; power of public service commission.</p> <p>A public service corporation can not be required to extend its plant into territory that it has not attempted to serve, when the probable revenue to be derivqji from such service is not sufficient to pay the interest on the cost of the extension and the maintenance of the service, and where such corporation, by reason of its inability to earn dividends and operating expenses, has not and can not raise the money for such purposes. p. 619 Section 42 of Chapter 180 of the Acts of 1910, although giving to the public service commission broad powers over water companies does not authorize it to require a water company to extend its plant into territory it has not attempted to serve, when the probable revenues would be insufficient to pay the cost oi the extension and maintenance. p. 619.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The two causes were argued together before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Burke, Thomas, Pattison, Henee, Stockbr-idüe and Constable, JJ.

<p>Equitable relief: based on written instrument; production of the instrument or copyi</p> <p>To entitle a party to sustain a bill in equity, he must show an interest in the subject of the suit, or a right to the thing demanded and proper title to institute a suit concerning it, and such interest and right to sue must be fully shown by the bill itself, or the bill is demurrable. p. 633</p> <p>When the plaintiff’s equity rests upon a written instrument,referred to in the bill, the instrument itself, or a copy, must be filed in the proceeding, or its non-production accounted for to the satisfaction of the Court. p. 633</p>

<p>Eight-hour law for public works: Baltimore Qity. Municipal corporations’, mere agencies of the State; regulations need not be strictly uniform.</p> <p>Municipal corporations are simply agencies, of the State formed for the purpose of conducting the affairs of government, and, as such, are subject to the control of the legislature. p. 640</p> <p>A statute declaring that laborers upon public works for the City of Baltimore shall not work more than eight hours in any one day, is constitutional, and is not to he declared invalid merely because the restriction applies to Baltimore City alone. p. 641</p> <p>It is not the absolute right of either employer or employee to do work for the State in any way he may choose to adopt, without regard to the wishes of the State. p. 639</p> <p>The fact that the legislature applies regulations to one municipality and not to others does not present a case of unlawful discrimination. p. 641</p>

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore City.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Bonds of corporations: secured by deed of trust; when “issued”; held by trustees for specific purpose of retiring other obligations; liens; certificate of indebtedness. </p> <p>In general, certificates of indebtedness are not technical liens. p. 647</p> <p>But the question is immaterial, when bonds of a corporation, secured by a deed of trust, particularly referred to therein by their serial numbers, are specifically reserved for the particular purpose of retiring such certificates of indebtedness. p. 647</p> <p>While the term “issued,” as applied to corporate bonds, usually includes the idea of delivery, it may be used to indicate a date from which the obligation runs; and bonds of a corporation fully executed by its proper officers and delivered to the trustee named in the mortgage executed to secure the bonds, and dedicated in the hands of the trustee to a specific purpose (provided for in the mortgage), are “issued” in the sense that they are beyond the power of the issuing corporation to recall, or use them for any purpose other than those designated in the mortgage and to which the bonds are dedicated. p. 647</p>

<p>Bill of particulars: office of — ; when not demandable; accounts made part of declaration; accounts merely filed in the declaration not sufficient; extension of time to plead. Appeals: matters of law; no exception necessary</p> <p>An account filed with a declaration is not a part of it.* p. 652</p> <p>The office and effect of a bill of particulars is to inform the opposing party" of the precise nature and extent of the claim which the plaintiff intends to rely upon on each and every count of the narr., and to confine his evidence to the claim thus stated. p. 653</p> <p>Where a declaration in one or more of its counts sets /out the account upon which the plaintiff’s claim is based, it is a sufficient statement of a cause of action, and a bill of particulars is not demandable. p. 652</p> <p>Where the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars and to such an extension of the time to plead as the Court may think equitable for his preparation of the proper pleas, the refusal by the Court to require a bill of particulars and to grant a reasonable extension of the time for pleading, is reversible error, and one from which an appeal will lie. p. 654</p> <p>The filing of pleas takes a case out of the operation of the Baltimore Practice Act (Chapter 184 of the Acts of 1886, as amended by Chapter 173 of the Acts of 1894). p. 652</p> <p>While an appeal will not lie from interlocutory matters, an appeal will lie, under section 2 of Article 5 of the Code (1912), from all final judgments and determinations of a court of law. p. 651</p> <p>On appeals from final judgments the rulings of the Court upon matters of law may be reviewed without any special exception taken. pp. 651,652</p>

<p> Railroads: right to cross other roads; power of Public Service Commission; validity of charters a judicial question. </p> <p>The Public Service Commission Act does not take away the right of railroad companies to condemn such property or rights as are necessary for their construction. p. 658</p> <p>The question of whether the charter of a corporation is valid or not is one of a purely judicial nature, and is for the courts and not for the Public Service Commission to decide. p. 658</p> <p>Under its authority to build, a railroad company may cross other roads subject to the regulations made or to be made by statute; and an order of the Public Service Commission authorizing the construction of a road, by implication, authorizes it to cross other roads. p. 659</p> <p>Whether, in such a case, the crossing should be at grade or not is for the Public Service Commission to determine, p. 659</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. (Beall, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Criminal law: penal statutesj indictments; sufficiency. Police power: health regulations; licensing undertahers; classification. </p> <p>If an indictment sets out a statutory offense, in the language of the statute, it is sufficient. p. 679</p> <p>A demurrer to an indictment, under a statute which is a re-enactment of a law already declared unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals, should be sustained. p. 680</p> <p>Under the police power, the State has the right to protect the, health of the community by laws regulating the business of undertaking, provided the regulations are fair and just. p. 684</p> <p>The provisions of Chapter 160 of the Acts of 1902, requiring that applicants for licenses to act as undertakers, shall qualify by showing their knowledge of undertaking, of sanitation, of the preservation of the dead, and of disinfecting the bodies of deceased persons, apartments, clothing and bedding, bear a sufficient and reasonable relation to the public welfare and the preservation of the public health, and do not constitute a violation of any constitutional right. jo.686</p> <p>In the exercise of the police power, the Legislature may create different classes (in the regulation of business, etc.,), with burdens and duties varying with the respective classes. p. 684.</p> <p>The provisions of Chapter 444 of the Acts of 1910, regulating the business of undertaking, and declaring, among other tilings, that a license should suffice for all members of a co-partnership when issued in the firm name; that assistants and employees of undertakers should pay the same license fee and have the same</p> <p>business knowledge as the undertakers employing them, and that licenses should be issued to corporations upon application, without charge, was Held, of themselves, not to create such arbitiary or unreasonable classifications a? to render the Act uncon stitutional. p. 683</p> <p>The nature and extent of the qualifications that a State may impose upon persons engaged in special pursuits depends primarily upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity; if they are appropriate to the calling and profession and attainable-by reasonable application, no objection to their validity can be raised. p. CS-l</p> <p>Pleas must not be insensible or repugnant, nor ambiguous or doubtful, nor argumentative, nor in the alternative. p. 690 To an indictment for the violation of Chapter 160 of the Acts of 1902, regulating the business of undertaking, the traverser pleaded a special plea, alleging that he was a skilled embalmer, engaged only in embalming for a licensed undertaker, and that during all the time mentioned in the indictment he had done no other acts, and set out at length in the plea a full recital of what purported to be all the duties and custom's in the business of undertaking, and of the business of embalming : Held, that such pleas were bad and were demurrable. p. 690</p> <p>Such disposition of the case, upon the pleadings, was declared not to be a decision that the statute in question appfiied in terms to every employee or to all the various employees of an undertaker such as named in the special plea. p. 691</p> <p>Where a traverser had been tried and acquitted upon the charge of violating the law regulating the business of undertaking, in regard to one deceased person spoecially named in the indictment, he can not plead autrefois acquit to an indictment for violating the same law in regard to another deceased person specially named. p. 690</p>

<p> Roads-, liability of County Commissioners. </p>