¶1The principal issue in these consolidated appeals is whether the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated due to the State’s failure, while administering a breathalyzer test, to take an additional breath sample for their independent testing. We hold that neither the due process nor the equal protection doctrine requires that a defendant be provided with an additional breath sample so that an independent test may be performed by his own experts.
¶2In the first of these cases, the defendant Cornelius was arrested in Epping at approximately 2:45 a.m., on November 16, 1980, and was charged with a first-time offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a violation. RSA 262-A:62 (current version at RSA 265:82 I). The breathalyzer’test administered to him indicated a blood-alcohol level of .21 percent. Cornelius’ pretrial motion to suppress the test results was denied by the Superior Court (Temple, J.). The trial judge found Cornelius guilty, stating, however, that had the breathalyzer test result been suppressed, a reasonable doubt as to Cornelius’ guilt would have existed. The defendant appealed.
¶3In the second case, the defendant Jones was arrested in Tilton at approximately 2:00 a.m., on March 9, 1980, and charged with the same violation. A breathalyzer test administered to him showed a blood alcohol content of .20 percent. Jones’ motion in advance of trial to suppress the admission of the test result, because the State had failed to preserve an additional breath sample for his own analysis, was transferred without ruling to this court by the Laconia District Court (Huot, J.).
¶4Both breathalyzer tests were performed on Smith & Wesson Model 900 A instruments, which are currently in use throughout New Hampshire. The instrument measures blood-alcohol content by *927analyzing a known quantity of deep lung — alveolar—air. (For a more complete description of the test methodology, see State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 851-52, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (1960)). The test ampoule is destroyed in the course of the test.
¶5 Recently, in State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. 495, 363 A.2d 406 (1976), this court rejected the argument that when the State elects to administer a breath test under RSA 262-A:69-a (current version at RSA 265:84), the provisions of RSA 269-A:69-b (current version at RSA 265:86) impose a duty on the State to perform an additional test for the defendant’s personal use. The court also held that the procedures provided for in RSA 269-A:69-b (current version at RSA 265:86), and those used by the State in the statute’s implementation, did not violate due process. State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. at 496-97, 363 A.2d at 407-08. We find no merit to the additional argument made by the defendants in these cases that equal protection considerations compel a different result, and we conclude that because RSA 262-A:69-b (current version at RSA 265:86) permits a defendant to have an additional test performed by a person of his choosing, the provisions of RSA 262-A:69-a and -b (current versions at RSA 265:84 and :86) do not violate due process. State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. at 497, 363 A.2d at 408. Although the defendants suggest that this right is illusory due to the practical difficulties of making timely arrangements for such tests, the record in these cases fails to support such a finding.
¶6 The evidence before us indicates that since Shuttwas decided, advances in technology have occurred, making it possible for the State, at reasonable expense, to take and preserve an additional breath sample or its functional equivalent for the defendant’s later use, and for information of some value to be obtained from “used” ampoules. We are not prepared, however, to conclude that a statute and the procedures employed in its implementation, which passed constitutional muster in 1976, have because of these technological advances become constitutionally infirm in 1982. It is sufficient to emphasize that as technological advances occur, the use of which by law enforcement authorities will better enable the State to make more meaningful and real the rights guaranteed citizens under our constitutions, the dictates of basic fairness may require that the State avail itself of such technology. Accordingly, our order is
¶7No. 81-193, appeal dismissed;
¶8No. 81-252, remanded.
¶9concurring specially: I concur specially in the result reached by my Brothers Brock and Bois. I am not prepared to overrule Shutt at this time, although the concern over the use or potential abuse of breathalyzer evidence implied in the opinion of the dissenters is not without merit. I would overrule Shutt prospectively, however, as of February 1, 1983, because of the State’s good-faith reliance on it in the past in the important task of highway safety.
¶10Due process under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution is a flexible standard as are the remedies available to effectuate relief consistent with it. See Provencal v. Provencal, 122 N.H. 793, 797, 451 A.2d 374, 377 (1982); Wheeler v. State, 115 N.H. 347, 352, 341 A.2d 777, 781 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 (1976); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). The State has, of course, relied on Shutt in the past as a proper pronouncement by this court, and I see no reason to fault the State government for buying machines that we held unanimously just six years ago were in accord with due process protections. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727 (1966).
¶11This court has previously held thát opinions will sometimes be applied only prospectively “whenever it has thought justice to be better served by doing so.” Alexander v. Orford School Dist., 117 N.H. 641, 644, 377 A.2d 127, 130 (1977); see Madbury v. Durham, 108 N.H. 474, 467-80, 240 A.2d 760, 763-64 (1968). Recently, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the dilemma of what to do if it found — as it did — that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 gave bankruptcy judges too much jurisdiction in violation of article III of the United States Constitution. Utilizing the three-prong test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court said:
“It is plain that Congress’ broad grant of judicial power to non-Art. Ill bankruptcy judges presents an unprecedented question of interpretation of Art. III. It is equally plain that retroactive application would not further the operation of our holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act’s vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts. We hold, therefore, that our decision today shall apply only prospectively.
*929“The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. However, we stay our judgment until October 4, 1982. This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws.”
¶12Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2880 (1982) (plurality opinion) (footnote and parallel citations omitted).
¶13The Court on occasion has applied a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure prospectively, “denying the benefit of the new rule even to the parties before the Court.” United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2584 (1982) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1967), and Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966)). The Court, summarizing the history of its own application of the prospectivity/retroactivity distinction, observed that prospective enforcement of the newly announced rule seemed proper when the rule was “unanticipated.” United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. at 2587. Once the Court found the new rule was unexpected, “reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard and [the] effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule . . . have virtually compelled a finding of [prospectivity].” Id. (Citations omitted.)
¶14Thus, for any persons charged with the offense of driving while under the influence arising out of facts occurring on or after February 1, 1983, I would require that a second breath sample or its functional equivalent should be available.