Pociask v. Moseley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent and the ascertainment of the reason or reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. In re; Succession of Boyter, 99-0761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128 , The rules of statutory [^construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Id.; Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 5 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766 . Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, interpretation of a law involves primarily a search for the legislature’s intent. La. Rev.Stat. § 1:4 (2004); La. Civ.Code art. 2; Lockett v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development, 03-1767, p. 3 (La.2/25/04), 869 So.2d 87, 90 . When a law is dear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. Civ.Code art. 9; Lockett , 03-1767 at p. 3, 869 So.2d at 90-91 ; Conerly v. State, 97-0871, p. 3-4 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 709, 710-11 . The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and placing a construction on the provision in question that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting it. Boyter, 99-0761 at p. 9, 756 So.2d at 1129 ; Stogner , 98-3044 at p. 5, 739 So.2d at 766 . The st”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 135 So. 3d 724 - Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet

2. “A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; ie. whether there is any genuine issue of material fact,- and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 11-1566, p. 7 (La.7/2/12), 94 So.3d 750, 755 ; Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726, pp. 3-4 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882-83 . The burden of proof remains with the movant; however, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mov-ant’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966(C)(2). Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Arnaud v. Dies

3. “The action for disavowal of paternity is subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day the husband learns or should have learned of the birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the husband lived separate and apart from the mother continuously during the three hundred days immediately preceding the birth of the child, this prescription does not commence to run until the husband is notified in writing that a party in interest has asserted that the husband is the father of the child.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 162 So. 3d 1270 - State v. Jim