Jones v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[a]fter consideration of all circumstances required by Miller , the trial court may sentence Parker , despite his age, to 'life imprisonment.' " Id. at 999 (¶ 28). "However, if the trial court should determine, after consideration of all circumstances set forth in Miller , that Parker should be eligible for parole, the court shall enter a sentence of 'life imprisonment with eligibility for parole notwithstanding the present provisions of Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3(1)(h).' " Id. We affirmed Parker's conviction but vacated his sentence and "remand[ed] [the] case to the Circuit Court of Copiah County for a hearing to determine whether he should be sentenced to 'life imprisonment' or 'life imprisonment with eligibility for parole notwithstanding the present provisions of Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3(1)(h).' " Id. at 1000 (¶ 29). ¶ 14. In Jones , we explained: " Miller explicitly prohibits states from imposing a mandatory sentence of life without parole on juveniles. Thus, Miller rendered our present sentencing scheme unconstitutional if, and only if, the sentencing authority fails to take into account characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Joey Montrell Chandler v. State of Mississippi · Thomas v. State

2. “convince[s] the sentencing authority that Miller considerations”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thomas v. State · Jerrard T. Cook v. State of Mississippi

3. ““Although Miller did not impose a categorical ban on the punishment that the substantive law could impose, it explicitly foreclosed imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders. By prohibiting the imposition of a mandatory sentence, the new obligation prevents ‘a significant risk that a [juvenile] ... faces a punishment that the law cannot impose on him.’ [Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004).] “ ‘[Substantive rules ... include[ ] decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms.’ Id. at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-621 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)). Prior to Miller , everyone convicted of murder in Mississippi was sentenced to life imprisonment and was ineligible for parole. Following Miller , Mississippi’s current sentencing and parole statutes could not be followed in homicide cases involving juvenile defendants. Our sentencing scheme may be applied to juveniles only after applicable Miller characteristics and circumstances have been considered by the sentencing authority. As such,'Miller modified our substantive law by narrowing its application for juveniles.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 183 So. 3d 198 - Williams v. State