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123 Ark. 68

Crabtree v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided March 20, 1916

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1916-03-20

R. Eaynie, Judge; The statute does not prohibit the sale of wild ducks. Kirby’s Digest § 3618. General words following specific terms ejusdem generis should be limited by reference to the specific words, and should be construed only with all other articles, things, etc., of like nature and quality, etc. 61 Ark. 502 ; 54 Ark. 611; 102 Id. 218; 101 Id. 596. The word “game” does not refer to “fowls.” The statute makes no exception of fowls.

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently March 1936

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ ‘It has never been supposed,’ says the Supreme Court of Illinois, ‘that the rule required the rejection of the general terms entirely, but only that they should be restricted to cases of the same kind as those expressly enumerated. On the contrary, it must yield to another equally salutary rule of construction, viz., that every part of a statute should, if possible, be upheld and given its appropriate force.’ Misch v. Russell, 136 Ill. 22, 25 .””

quoted by 1 later decision, including American Building & Loan Ass'n v. State

Relies on Foster v. Blount · Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad v. Adams

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

affirmed · Decided 1916-03-20

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Wood, J.

¶1Section 3618 of Kirby’s Digest provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, or company, 'to purchase, or have in possession for barter, exchange or sale, or to expose for barter, exchange or sale, or to sell’ any buck, doe, fawn, or any part thereof, or any wild turkey, pinnated grouse, commonly called prairie chicken, or any quail, sometimes called Virginia partridge, or any other kind of game, wild fowls, or birds whatsoever, within this State, except bear, rabbits, squirrels.”

¶2(1) Appellant was convicted of selling wild ducks under the above section, and he contended that the statute does not prohibit the sale of wild ducks, invoking the maxim of ejusdem generis. But that maxim, while applied' to effectuate the legislative intent’ is never allowed to defeat it. Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 687; State v. Broderick, 7 Mo. Ap. 19, 20.

¶3“It has never been supposed,” says the Supreme Court of Illinois, “that the rule required the rejection of the general terms entirely, but only that they should be restricted to oases of the same kind as those expressly enumerated. On the contrary, it must yield to another equally salutary rule of construction, viz: that every part of a statute should, if possible, be upheld and given its appropriate force.” Misch v. Russell, 136 Ill;. 22, 25.

¶4(2-3) The general words, “or any other kind of game, wild fowl, or birds, whatsoever’” following the particular kinds enumerated, were manifestly intended 'by the Legislature to include animals, fowls and birds of a wild nature that are fit and commonly hunted for use and food in addition to and different from those specified. Law Dictionary; English 'Stand. Diet.; Worcester’s Diet., verbum, “game.” The term “wild fowl” means any large eatable bird of a wild nature.

¶5(4) In Jonesboro. L. C. & E. Rd. Co. v. Adams, 117 Ark. 54, 174 S. W. 527-530, we said: “The law-makers contributed to the preservation of wild ducks,” by enacting a general statute, citing section 3618, Kirby’s Digest.

¶6While the exact question here presented was not before us in that ease, the language above used was a correct interpretation of the statute.

¶7The judgment is therefore affirmed.

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