Beatie v. City of New York’s Empirical Analysis
123 F.3d 707 · 1997
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 7 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently February 2021 · most notably Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. (1998), Pinto v. Allstate Insurance (2000)
15 federal appellate · 7 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center · Dandridge v. Williams · Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. · Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[L]egislative acts that do not interfere with fundamental rights or single out suspect classifications carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality and must be upheld if rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[I]t is very difficult to overcome the strong presumption of rationality that attaches to a statute. We will not strike down a law as irrational simply because it may not succeed in bringing about the result it seeks to accomplish, because the problem could have been better addressed in some other way, or because the statute’s classifications lack razor-sharp precision. Nor will a statute be overturned on the basis that no empirical evidence supports the assumptions underlying the legislative choice. To succeed on a claim such as this, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“We will not strike down a law as irrational simply because it may not succeed in bringing about the result it seeks to accomplish, Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50 , 86 S.Ct. 1254 , 16 L.Ed.2d 336 (1966), because the problem could have been better addressed in some other way, Mourning [v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,] 411 U.S. [356], 378, 93 S.Ct. 1652 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) ] or because the statute’s classifications lack razor-sharp precision, Dandridge [v. Williams,] 397 U.S. [471, 484-]485, 90 S.Ct. 1153 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) ]. Nor will a statute be overturned on the basis that no empirical evidence supports the assumptions underlying the legislative choice. Vance [v. Bradley], 440 U.S. [93], 110-11, 99 S.Ct. 939 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) ]. To succeed on a claim such as this, “those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” Id. at 111, 99 S.Ct. 939 . So long as they do not burden fundamental rights or single out suspect classifications, lawmakers are free to engage in “rational speculation unsupported by evidence.” Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 [.]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.