Blake v. Texas Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The following is tendered as this Court’s best effort to harmonize in resume the implied obligation of the-Oklahoma lessee to further develop. (1) Where there is no unusual-, equity present and the lessee has. failed to drill additional wells for-so long a period of time that the-proof of number of years delay ir-rebuttably establishes the lessee’s lack of diligence, the Court may deem the covenant breached and Ahe-lease forfeited without considering-evidence on whether further development would have been profitable. (2) Where there is proof of such delay in terms of time, that under-the circumstances a prima facie,, though not irrebuttable, showing-is made of unreasonable delay, the-burden then shifts to the lessee to-come forward with evidence to establish that although the time of delay appeared unreasonable that he at all times conducted himself as an ordinary prudent operator and that profitable further development was unlikely. (3) Where the proof of delay in terms of time alone raises no presumption or prima facie case of unreasonable delay, the lessor must establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the lessee has failed to measure up to the standard of an ordinary prudent operator in the further development of the lease.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 150 F. Supp. 9 - Clayton v. Atlantic Refining Company

2. “likelihood of profitable production may be a factor in determining what a prudent operator would do in the particular circumstances, it is not conclusive of the prudence of his conduct. Even a prudent operator must excuse his unreasonable delay. What constitutes an unreasonable delay `depends in each case upon the circumstances rather than upon the precise time which has expired.' Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles, supra, [193 Okl. 308, 142 P.2d 969]; Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., supra [192 Okl. 359, 137 P.2d 934]. Thus, one year may be unreasonable in some circumstances, and ten years reasonable in others. Predominant in all these cases is a conscientious effort to arrive at a just and equitable adjustment of the conflict of the parties to the lease, having in mind the rights and duties imposed by their contract, express or implied. In the ultimate analysis, the question lies with the Chancellor, guided only by the cardinal principles that govern the mutual duty of fair play.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sparks v. Midstates Oil Corp.