Volume 123 — United States Reports

Held: 1, That the grant made by Georgia of the land in dispute, which was south of McNeil's line, though made whilst Georgia exercised the powers of government de facto over the territory there, was nevertheless void; 2, That tlxe confirmation by Florida of the grants made by Georgia,’ did not invalidate or disturb the grant of the land in dispute previously made by itself.

<p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a motion to dismiss an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court, remanding a cause to the state court from which it had been removed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an action to recover on twelve bonds, each for $1000 issued by the town of Dayton.

This was an action against a railroad company. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an action to recover on a policy of marine insurance. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>In equity. Decree for complainant. Respondent appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>In equity. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This ivas a proceeding in a state court of Iowa to relieve a national bank from an alleged excessive rate of taxation. The judgment below for the defendant ivas affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State on appeal. This writ of error ivas sued out to review that judgment of affirmance. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

In equity. To restrain alleged infringement of letters-patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: in a suit upon another of this series of drafts, that the set-off must be allowed. La Due v. Kasson Bank, 31 Minn. 33 . III. By the law which prevails in Minnesota these drafts were past due when Edison transferred them to plaintiff. A demand draft becomes due after the lapse of a reasonable time in which to present it for payment in the due course of business.

Held: no error. Assumpsit for internal revenue taxes. Plea, “ non-assumpsit, payment and set-off, with leave,, <fcc.” Yerdict and judgment for the defendant'..’ The United States excepted to the judge’s charge to. the jury, and sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiff in error. Mr. Thomas Hart, Jr., for defendant in error. Mr. William, Ward and Mr. George Ji.

In equity, in a state court in Ohio, to quiet title and to restrain waste. The answer set up title in respondent. Judgment for complainant, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State on appeal. The defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims. The case as stated by the court was as follows. This suit was brought by the appellant to recover from the United States the balance claimed to be 'due him on account of salary as consul of the United States at Tangier, in the Barbary States, from July 1, 1882, to June 30, 1886.

This was an appeal from a judgment in the Court of Claims in the claimant’s favor. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That the pleadings presented no question to give a Circuit Court jurisdiction in equity over the case.

In equity. Respondents demurred. The demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

The following is the case, as stated by the court. The plaintiff seeks judgment in this case against the United States for the sum of $15,678 as the value of certain horses and mules which he claims to have purchased for, and delivered to, the United States, at their special instance and request, on or about October 14, 1863. He also asks interest from that date, on said sum, at the rate of six per cent per annum, until his demand is paid.

Held: that the complainant is not entitled to the relief prayed for in his bill, and that the decree of foreclosure obtained by the corporation trustee, under the mortgage of which he is a cestui que trust, binds him. *234 This was a suit in equity brought by Morris Richter, the appellant, and the case made by the bill and its exhibits was in substance this: In 1864 the Portage Lake and Lake Superior Ship-Canal Company…

In equity, for infringement of letters-patent. Decree in favor of the complainant; 12 Fed. Rep. 721. From this decree an appeal was taken. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.</p> <p>Reissued letters-patent No. 4372, granted to Nelson W. Green, May 9th, 1871, ' for an “ Improvement in the method of constructing artesian wells,” the original patent, No. 73,425, having been granted to said Green, as invent- or, January 14th, 1868, on an application filed March 17th, 1866, are invalid, because the invention was in public use by others than Green more than two years prior to his application for the patent.</p> <p>The proper construction of § 7 of the act of March 3d, 1830, (5 Stat. 354,) is, that if, more than two years before the application for a patent, the invention covered by it was in public use, whether with or without the consent of the subsequent patentee, the patent was rendered invalid.</p>

The plaintiff below was a corporation organized under a statute of Michigan for the improvement of Manistee River, a stream wholly within that State. The present action was brought to collect from the defendant the amount of tolls levied for the use, in the years 1878, 1879, 1880, and 1881, of the river as improved.

<p>In equity. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the burden was on the Government to produce so much of this further evidence as could be obtained, and that in its absence the United States had not made all the proof of which the nature of the case was susceptible, and which was apparently within their reach. ^n order to constitute the exemption of coal lands contemplated by the preemption act under the head of 11 known mines,” there must be ascertained coal…

Held: that the objection was not well taken, the equity suit being an exercise of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court ancillary to that which it had already acquired in the action at law, and which it might entertain according to the rule in Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 270 , and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 111 U. S. 505 .

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.</p> <p>The testimonio granted to Cerilo de Morant, September 22,1817, was full and particular, and both that and the testimonio to Quina, dated May 1, 1818, made complete titles under the Spanish laws.</p> <p>In Florida a sheriff's deed given in evidence without production of the judgment or execution, and read without objection, is sufficient evidence of sale by sheriff.</p> <p>The objection to the claimant’s title that no evidence was given of cultivation, as required by the Spanish grant, is not well founded, as the proof is conclusive that the grantees built houses and resided on the granted land shortly after the date of the-grants.</p> <p>Whatever may be the proper construction of the 8th article of the Treaty of 1819 with Spain as to the necessity of a survey prior to the date when the' obligation to recognize Spanish grants ceased in order to validate a Spanish grant, the act of June 22, 1860, 12 Stat. 85, under authority of which this suit was commenced, makes the date of the transfer of possession to the United States, viz., July, 1822, the point from which to . test the validity of the grants.</p> <p>The act of June 22, 1860, 12 Stat. 85, was passed to give relief to a large class of grantees of former Spanish governments, whose claims had been rejected by the different boards of commissioners, and by the courts, under the strict construction of the treaties required by prior laws.</p> <p>This case does not come within the proviso in § 3 of the act of June 22, 1860, excluding claims from the jurisdiction of the commission.</p> <p>There is no reason why a part owner of lands in Florida under a Spanish grant should not have the benefit of the proceedings authorized by the act of June 22, 1860, 12 Stat. 85.</p> <p>The failure to annex a sworn copy of the government surveys to a petition for confirmation of title filed under the act of Juno 22, 1860, 12 Stat. 85, is not a question of jurisdiction, but a matter relating merely to the form of procedure, which should be objected to when the pleadings are in fieri, and when the petitioners can apply for leave to amend. .</p> <p>The evidence in this case shows that the grants were genuine, and that the land was surveyed, mapped, and segregated from the public domain in the spring of 1818.</p> <p>In affirming the decree below this court merely confirms the validity of the grant, but does not give a decision which entitles the party to possession if the government has sold the lands in whole or in part, or if the surveyor general shall ascertain that they cannot be surveyed and located.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The percentage allowed to officers of the Navy under General Order No. 75 of May 23, 18(i(>, in lieu of all allowances except for mileage or travelling expenses, is to bo calculated on the amount statedly received by the officer as statutory pay at the time the order was in force, and is not to be increased by the additional compensation allowed by the act of March 3. 1883, 23 Stat. 473.</p>

Held: as we have seen, that the appraisement was vitiated by proof of a failure to open, examine, and appraise the packages designated by the collector, or to do what was an equivalent for such an examination. We are also of opinion, for the reasons before stated, that Mr. Bates Avas a competent Avitness to prove the extent and character of the examination Avhich he made of the goods in question.

This was an action against the collector of the port of Philadelphia, to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was a motion for a rule to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue. The motion for leave to move for the rule was filed on the 11th of October, 1887. On the 17th of October leave was granted, and also leave to file a brief in support of it. On the 10th of November this motion was filed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>It appearing that the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars, the writ of error is dismissed.</p>

Held: any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding.” This section is a reenactment of § 5 of the act of June 1, 1872, “to further the administration of justice” ( 17 Stat. 196 . c. 255), and was intended to assimilate the pleadings and the procedure in common law cases in the Federal courts to the-pleadings and procedure used in such cases in the courts of record of the State within which the Federal courts are held.

Held: that what AV. did in connection with the transactions was inconsistent with such claim; that B. had no such understanding; that the sales of wheat were lawful; and that AV. was not entitled to recover the money which B. had paid out.

Bill in equity by general creditors of John Knight against him, his wife, Stoughton A. Fletcher and Francis M. Churchman. After a hearing upon pleadings and proofs before the Circuit Judge and the District Judge, the bill was dismissed, and they signed the following certificate of division of opinion : “ The defendant John Knight was a merchant engaged in the railway-supply business at Indianapolis. He had been engaged in such business for several years prior to May 8, 1879.

Bill in equity by general creditors of Craft against him, Fletcher and Churchman.

<p>Error to The Supreme Court of The Territory of Utah.</p> <p>There being no assignment of errors in the transcript annexed to the writ of error, no specification of errors in the brief, no statement presenting the questions involved, no reference to pages in the argument, and generally a non-compliance with the provisions of the statute and the rules of this court in these respects, the case is dismissed for those causes.</p> <p>An assignment of errors on appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court of a Territory cannot be accepted in this court as the equivalent of the assignment required by the statute.</p>

Held: that the case did not arise under the National Banking Act, and that therefore no Federal . question was involved. *522 The case is stated in the

Held: being unable to extricate it, he was, without any fault on his part, but through the negligence and carelessness of defendant, struck, jammed, and run over by one of defendant’s cars, so injuring his left, leg as to necessitate its amputation and cause the loss-thereof.” The answer denied that the injury was caused by the negligence of the company, and insisted that it happened through the fault of the plaintiff…

In equity, in a state court of Iowa, to recover from the plaintiffs in error, defendants below, sums of money alleged to have been paid by defendant in error on lands in Iowa adjudged to be the property of the plaintiffs in error; and also to have the several amounts of the taxes decreed to be special liens on the lands. * Decrees r warding the relief asked for by the plaintiff below, to review which these writs of error were sued out.

Held: and the defendant for that reason was not liable, the subsequent adoption of the payments for the purpose of escaping liability to the county should be regarded as an adoption of the payment as between the defendant and plaintiff. “ If the plaintiff’s assignor had made the payments in the name of the defendant as his assumed agent, any act of the defendant indicating an intention to claim the benefit of the payments…

This was a suit to recover taxes paid under circumstances which are set forth in Stryker v. Goodnow, ante, 527. The cause was argued with Stryker v. Goodnow. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: and so stated in its opinion, that the question of prior adjudication of the issue by this court in I-Iomestead Valley v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall..153, was not raised before it by counsel for defendant, and therefore was not in the case; and it decided the case without considering that point.

This was an action to recover the amount of taxes paid on real estate in Iowa under circumstances similar in the main to those described in Stryker v. Goodnow, ante, 527. This cause was argued with that cause. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that this could not be construed into an admission of the liability of the respondents, or that a just cause of action existed against them.

Held: that A’s action in this respect was not conclusive on the defendant if it was shown that he had been deceived by the plaintiff, in not putting him in full possession of knowledge possessed by him, and necessary for the proper discharge of A’s duty.

Bill in Equity to .restrain alleged infringement of letters-patent, and for an accounting. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill; from which decree the complainants took this appeal. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that the staple-support or anvil is required to be stationary, and the slotted or recessed hammer or driver to be reciprocating. In the “Victor tool ” the anvil is movable and the hammer or driver is stationary. Bill in Equity to restrain alleged infringement of letters-patent, and for an accounting. Decree for complainants. Respondent appealed. Tlie case is stated in the

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.</p> <p>In April, 1853, E. made a deed to himself, as trustee, of land in Georgia, for the benefit of his wife and their children, during the life of the wife, and, after her death, of such children, which deed was recorded in May, 1853, in the office of the cleric of the Superior Court of the county in which E. resided. In May, 1870, E. mortgaged to IV. the trust land and other land. W. foreclosed the mortgage, and on a sale, in 1S7G, bid in the mortgaged lands, and obtained from the sheriff a deed of them and took possession of them. In 18'81, the beneficiaries under the trust deed brought a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States, against IV., to have the trust established. Among the defences set up by IV., he alleged that the trust deed was fabricated after the mortgage was made, and was antedated, and that he had no notice of the existence of the trust deed at or before the execution of the mortgage of May, 1870, or before the sheriff’s sale in 1870. The Circuit Court, without making any pi’cvious order for the trial of issues of fact by a jury, had a trial by jury of the two questions above mentioned. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on both questions. The defendant had bills of exceptions signed to the rejection of evidence and to the instructions to the jury. The suit in equity was heard by the same judge who presided at the jury trial. No motion was made for a new- trial. The decree was for the plaintiffs, on the same proofs which were before the jury. On appeal by the defendant, Held :</p> <p>(1) No previous order for a jury trial was necessary, nor any certificate to the chancellor of the findings;</p> <p>(2) The submission to the jury of the particular issues was not an unlawful exercise of the discretion of the Circuit Court;</p> <p>(3) The formal exceptions taken on, the jury trial will not be considered by this court;</p> <p>(I) The decree was correct, on the facts;</p> <p>(5) The voluntary settlement was authorized by the statute law of Georgia in force at the time it was made, it having been recorded within three months, and was good against IV., under such statute law, because of the notice of its existence, which he so had.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The value of the matter in dispute is to he determined by the amount due at the time of the judgment of the court helow, which is brought here for review, including interest up to the time of the judgment of the Appellate Court, if the appeal is from an Appellate Court, and the judgment which is taken to the Appellate Court bears interest.</p> <p>Findings of fact in the court helow are conclusive, and cannot be reexamined here.</p>

Motion by complainant below and appellant here, for an order-reversing the decree of the court below, and to remand the cause. The. motion was supported by a stipulation authorizing it. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), was an important United States Supreme Court case in which the 7–1 opinion written by John Marshall Harlan with a lone partial dissent by Stephen Johnson Field. The decision laid the foundation for the Supreme Court's later acceptance and defense during the Lochner era of Justice Field's theory of economic substantive due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>If the order to remand a case to a state court was made while the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, was in force, but the writ of error to review it was not brought until after the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, went into effect, this court cannot take jurisdiction on the writ.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OE MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>On an examination of the face of the record, in this case, it appears that the amount due the United States is less than the penalty of the hond, given by defendant in error for the faithful performance of his duties as an officer, viz.: $517.07, and possibly a small amount of interest ; and as the jurisdiction of this court in an action on such a bond depends upon the amount due for the breach of the condition, the court is without jurisdiction.</p> <p>The term “ revenue law,” when used in connection with the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, means a law imposing duties on imports or tonnage, or a law providing in terms for revenue; that is to say, a law which is directly traceable to the power granted to Congress by the constitution “ to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.”</p> <p>section 844 Rev. Stat., requiring the clerk of a court of the United States to pay into the Treasury any surplus of fees and emoluments which his return shows to exist over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him, is not a revenue law within the meaning of that clause of § 600 Rev. Stat. which provides for a writ of error without regard to the sum or value in dispute, “ upon any final judgment of' a Circuit Court ... in any civil action brought by the United States for the enforcement of any revenue law thereof.”</p>

Held: If the company did not pay the interest in money by the interest day, it was bound to exercise, by that day, its option to pay it in scrip, and, if it did not, it became liable to the bondholders to pay the interest in money; (2) No demand by a bondholder was necessary, in order to entitle him to the payment of the interest in money, on the failure of the company so to exercise such option.

Held: that ’the *703 limitations in the two subdivisions of the will were to be taken, in connection with each other, as a complete disposition, in the mind of the testator, of his estate giving to the widow an estate for life, with an estate over for life to the sisters contingent upon one or the other of them surviving the widow, and with the ultimate remainder to the charitable institutions.

<p>This was an action at law brought by the defendant in error against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Dakota, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant, by reason of its alleged negligence.</p> <p>The cojnplaint alleged that on October 31, 1881, the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant as a brakeman on duty as such in the yard at the city of Fargo, used for the purpose of switching cars to make, up trains, in which service a switch-engine was used; that at the time of the injury the engineer of the switch-engine was one Bassett, who, it was alleged, was a man of hasty and excitable disposition and ungoverned, violent, and hasty temper, “and was and had for a long time been, while in the employ of this defendant as engineer, accustomed to become unduly and dangerously excited and angry, and while under the influence of anger or excitement, and while in the performance of his duty as engineer, was and had been accustomed to act and conduct himself as engineer in a most reckless manner, causing great danger and peril to his fellow-servants, and especially to the brakemen on the train or cars attached to or moved by the engine on which he was engineer; ” and that in consequence thereof “ the said engineer was, at the time of the injury hereinafter referred to, and for a long time prior thereto had been, negligent, unskilful, unfit, and incompetent to act as engineer of said switch-engine, or of any engine or locomotive; of which facts the defendant had notice and knowledge, and by the use of ordinary diligence defendant would have discovered and learned that he was a negligent and an unfit, unskilful, and unsafe engineer. ' And this plaintiff had not notice or knowledge prior to the injury to him hereinafter referred to that the said engineer was for any reason or on any account an unfit or unsafe person to act as engineer.”</p> <p>It was further alleged that at the time of the injury the plaintiff “was required, in the performance of his duties as switch-brakeman, to set or fasten, or to loosen the brakes of the cars which were being switched or moved in the said yard, and he was at the time and place aforesaid required to perform the said duty on the cars of the defendant, which were being switched and moved by the engine in which the said Bassett was engineer, and in the moving of cars it was his duty as brakeman to give signals to the said engineer, and of the said engineer to obey such signals; that, at the time and place aforesaid, and while this plaintiff, in the performance of his duties as brakeman as aforesaid, was upon the top of the freight car (part of a train) being removed in the said yard by the engine in which the said Bassett was engineer, and while the said Bassett had control of and was managing said engine, this plaintiff, as it was his duty to do, gave the said engineer a signal to move and ‘ back ’ the cars attached to the said switch-engine the length of a certain number of cars indicated by the signal. And the plaintiff, as he was in duty required to be, was standing on the top of the rear car so being moved backward, and before said cars had been moved backward the distance which they were intended to be removed, and the distance which the signal, given by this plaintiff, required them to be removed, the said engineer unskilfully, negligently, recklessly,-and suddenly, and contrary to his duty, stopped and reversed the said switch-engine and the cars attached thereto, and thereby threw the plaintiff off the rear car where he was standing, and where it was his duty to stand, to the ground, and thereupon the said engineer suddenly, negligently, recklessly, and violently and unskilfully, then and there, and before the plaintiff had time to or could move out of the reach of the cars or off the track, moved and pushed the said engine and cars backward upon said track and on to and over the plaintiff, and thereby greatly injured the plaintiff, and crushed and broke both of his legs, so that it then and there became and was necessary to amputate them, and they were then and there, on account of said injuries, amputated,” etc.</p> <p>The answer of the defendant alleged “ that the said fall of the plaintiff and his said injuries resulting therefrom were solely caused either by the negligence of the plaintiff himself, or by that of some one or more of the other employes of the defendant engaged at work together with the plaintiff in the defendant’s, said yard at the time of the happening- of the said injuries, and not by any negligence or fault on the part of the defendant.”</p> <p>The cause was tried by a jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff of $20,000 and costs. An appeal was taken from the District Court to the Supreme Court of the Territory, where it was heard upon a record containing a statement on motion for a new trial, which it was stipulated might be treated as a bill of exceptions. It embodied all the evidence upon the trial, with the rulings of the court during its progress, and the charge of the court to the jury, with all the exceptions thereto noted. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. From that judgment the present writ of error was prosecuted.</p>

Action at law to recover an unpaid internal revenue tax. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error. 'The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Bill in Equity to foreclose a mortgage. A motion on behalf of the appellee was made to dismiss the appeal for reasons stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that knowledge of the destination and the consignee of the goods being thus brought to the notice of the cojnpany which carried the goods to their destination, it became its duty to deliver, or to instruct its agents to deliver, the property only to the consignee or his order; and that a delivery of the property to J. B. after such knowledge would not avail as a defence when sued for its value by a bank at the place…

This was an action in the nature of assumpsit upon a policy of insurance. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error.. The case is. stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the decree was a conclusive adjudication that C had no valid title or lien, and estopped him to set up, in defence to an action of ejectment by A, a tax title subsequent to the mortgage and prior to the suit for foreclosure. *748 This was an action at law, in the nature of ejectment, to recover possession of a tract of land, brought on July 5, 1SS3, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern…