Bey v. Morton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In each case [in which the Supreme Court considered a Massiah issue], those charged with Sixth Amendment violations were conducting, or working with others who were conducting, an investigation of crimes the defendant had been charged with committing. They were thus deliberately seeking to elicit information to be used in connection with the charges pending against the accused, the subject matter of the defendant's attorney-client relationship. In this line of cases, the Court struggled with the issue of whether there are any circumstances under which the state can deliberately undertalte to secure incriminating information from a represented defendant in the absence of counsel and can thereafter use in court the incriminating information it obtains. The answer that has evolved is that it can, only if there is not "elicitation” — only if the government does no more than listen. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 , 106 S.Ct. at 2629-30 . It cannot if the police or their informants question or otherwise encourage or facilitate the defendant’s discussion of the crime, and this is true even if the defendant initiates the discussion of the criminal conduct. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271-72 , 100 S.Ct. at 2187-88 . These strict rules are necessary in Massi- ah-type situations because the state has deliberately set out to secure information for use in a pending prosecution and because the accused, thinking he is communicating with a fellow inmate rather than a state investigator, is exercis”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 196 F. Supp. 2d 795 - United States v. Johnson

2. “[The corrections officer] was known by Bey to be an employee of the state, not a fellow inmate or confederate. While the circumstances were such that [the corrections officer] should have anticipated that Bey would converse freely with him, given [the corrections officer’s] status as a guard and the fact that he did little, if anything, to draw Bey out on the subject of his crimes, we question whether [the corrections officer] should have anticipated the confession which Bey volunteered. But even if we assume elicitation on [the corrections officer’s] part, the undisputed facts do not support the hypothesis that [the corrections officer] intended to elicit information for use against Bey. First, [the corrections officer] had no responsibility for eliciting or reporting infonnation for use in the prosecution of Bey’s case and was not working with anyone who had such responsibility. Second, and most importantly, [the corrections officer] did not behave like someone who intended to secure incriminating statements from Bey.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. American Samoa Government v. Uli

3. “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) ... was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Henderson v. Frank