¶1specially concurring.
¶2I concur in the majority’s opinion except for its application of Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.1986), and the conclusion that Greensides did not communicate a promise not to prosecute to Troy.
¶3As for Miller, the majority provides no reason why this Court should follow an opinion by the Third Circuit. It is generally recognized that decisions handed down by federal circuit Courts of Appeal are not precedent. Further troubling is the majority’s failure to distinguish between Millerand the instant case. Telling someone he is not a “criminal” arguably expresses the personal opinion of the speaker; telling someone certain conduct is not a crime is a factual representation of the law.
¶4Police officers’ misrepresentations of law usually lead to suppression of the challenged confession as involuntary. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE and JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1984). Moreover, a statement that certain conduct is not a crime carries with it an implied promise that the defendant will not be prosecuted for revealing that he or she has engaged in such conduct. As the majority acknowledges, “A confession, in order to be admissible, ... must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight....” State v. Troy, 124 Idaho at 214, 858 P.2d at 753 (1993) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)) (emphasis added). Better by far that police officers be cautioned that they do not have license to advise potential defendants as to the law (beyond routine Miranda warnings), much less dispense incorrect advice.
¶5Nonetheless, in light of the rest of the interrogation, particularly Greensides’ later disclosures that he had no control over the prosecutor’s actions, thereby implying that Troy could still be prosecuted, I concur in the majority view that Troy’s confession was given voluntarily.