¶1Alleging that he is the ■father and only surviving parent of Prances Elizabeth Ryan, a young girl 13 years of age, relator charges that Edward Peter, residing .at Chalmette, in the parish of St. Bernard, illegally confines and detains her without right or authority, by force and against his will.
¶2He asks for a habeas corpus and for a judgment against Edward Peter ordering and ■commanding him to release Prances Elizabeth Ryan and surrender her to him.
¶3He represents that he demanded his child; that Peter refused his demand.
¶4We are not informed why it is that the application for a writ of habeas corpus'has not been made to the judge of the district ■court having jurisdiction.
¶5The issues of fact should be made up before that court, and a decision rendered both .as to law and fact, whenever it is possible for the local court to do so.
¶6If there is the least impossibility of any kind in this respect, we are not informed ■of it.
¶7On an application for this writ, this court held that it would not grant it if a hearing could be had before a court of the first instance, and no good reason is given why application was not made to that court.
¶8It is not alleged that there is anything making it urgent that the application be passed upon and decided by the Supreme Court.
¶9The following decision is clearly in point: State ex rel. Bauman v. Sheriff, 44 La. Ann. 1015, 11 South. 541.
¶10Applicant’s petition does not create the impression that there is necessity to adopt other than the usual steps in this instance.
¶11Undoubtedly the court said in another case under ordinary circumstances the application ■should be addressed to the court of original jurisdiction.
¶12“When the district judge is absent, the Supreme Court may issue habeas corpus.’ State ex rel. Condon v. Duson, 36 La. Ann. 855.
¶13Views very similar were expressed in State v. McColley, 115 La. 406, 39 South. 81.
¶14Again, the applicant has a right of appeal.
¶15The constitutional expression is that the Supreme Court “shall have appellate jurisdiction only” in all matters “relating to custody of children.” Article 85.
¶16In the cases of Prieto, 52 La. Ann. 631, 27 South. 153, 47 L. R. A. 656, and State ex rel. Lassere v. Michel, 105 La. 741, 30 South. 122, 54 L. R. A. 927, this court entertained jurisdiction on appeal under the above-cited clause of the Constitution.
¶17Generally no appeal lies from an adverse decision in a habeas corpus case. It falls within the original jurisdiction of the court, and is not subject to review.
¶18But in the present case the right of appeal is exceptional under a special clause of the Constitution before cited. The relator might appeal.
¶19The court decided in several of the cited cases, although there was no right of appeal, that the application should be made to the local court. This case is stronger against the applicant than the cited cases, as there is a right of appeal.
¶20Where there is a right of appeal, there should be no hesitation in referring the party to the court of original jurisdiction; for the complainant has the opportunity if he chooses to be heard on appeal in case of an adverse decision.
¶21The court held in one of the cited decisions that the applicant for a habeas corpus could not select the time and place for the hearing, nor could he select his own tribunal as between the court of original jurisdiction and the appellate court.
¶22See decisions cited supra.
¶23Lastly, the Constitution says that the Supreme Court has “original jurisdiction as *289may be necessary to enable it to determine questions of fact or it may remand the case.” Article 85.
¶24By direct implication it may decline to bold an original examination and examine into facts as a court of original jurisdiction and refer the matter to a court of original jurisdiction, particularly where persons have the right of appeal.
¶25Were this court to entertain original jurisdiction in all habeas corpus cases brought before it originally, it would be entirely overburdened with onerous labors. It is advisable to leave them, as far as possible, to be disposed of within the limits of their respective original jurisdiction.
¶26Relator's demand will be dismissed, without trenching upon whatever right the relator may have to the writ.
¶27It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that relator’s petition and demand are dismissed without prejudice.