¶1A parish treasurer, who has been the incumbent in that office, in the parish of Plaquemines, since June 16, 1900, seeks to continue in office, and to that end urges that his term of office has not expired; that the police jurors who elected his successor had not been elected and qualified; ■that the police jury was estopped.
¶2The judge of the district court rendered judgment ousting the relator, and in favor of a Mr. Savoie, who was elected his successor.-
¶3As above stated, relator was elected by the police jury in 1900.
¶4Under the law two years was the term of office. Act No. 121, p. 178, of 1898.
¶5It follows that his first term expired on June 16, 1902.
¶6It appears from the record that he was reelected for two years, viz., to June 16, 1904.
¶71-Ie held over, and on the 3d day of January, 1907, he was re-elected his own successor.
¶8At these elections it does not appear by the testimony that he was elected for any particular term of office — whether for two years, or over, or less, is not shown.
¶9Joseph Savoie was elected in 1908 as the successor of relator.
¶10The latter claimed that the office was va*657cant, and that he had the aright to hold the office until January 3, 1909. He refused to vacate the office to his said successor.
¶11Proceedings were sued out to oust him from office.
¶12The judge of the district court sustained the application of the new treasurer.
¶13An appeal was taken to this court. The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal, as this court did not have jurisdiction.
¶14The Court of Appeal maintained the judgment of the district court.
¶15From the. judgment of the Court of Appeal, an application for certiorari addressed to that court was filed.
¶16The matter is before us on the hearing of the writ nisi issued.
¶17The question before us for decision is whether the term of office expired every two years from the first election on the 10th of June, 1900.
¶18In our opinion, the term expired every two years. It was not within the authority of the police jury to extend the time by failing to elect an officer.
¶19Even according to defendant and appellant, his term of office expired on the 1st of last January, and since that time he has continued in office, although another treasurer has been elected to succeed him.
¶20If he were to succeed in his defense, and the matter of his successor were to come up again before the police jury, and a successor other than defendant were elected, it would not be possible to successfully maintain the contention that the term of office begins from the date the office is declared vacant.
¶21There is no reason to hold that one police jury can, by neglecting to elect at the required time, hold a treasurer an indefinite length of time. The statute fixing the term, the police jury cannot disregard the term fixed.
¶22Officers hold until their successors are qualified.
¶23Const. art. 172 (section 2608, Rev. St.), does not have the effect of extending the term. The election should be held at the end of the two years from the date of his election, if two years be the term.
¶24The defendant takes the further ground,, in order to continue in office, although his term has expired, that he had the right to> prove, when the case was tried in the district court, that the members of the police jury had not taken the oath of office and had not regularly qualified.
¶25This is a collateral attack made by the officer on the very body whose treasurer he is.
¶26He cannot thus be heard to challenge the authority under which he holds. State v. Brooks, 39 La. Ann. 820, 2 South. 498.
¶27The plea of estoppel has no merit.
¶28There were two grounds pleaded, each based on the attempt of the police jury to oust the defendant. The pleas were not fatally inconsistent, and gave no good ground for the plea of estoppel.
¶29The case was twice before us. On the appeal, decided some time since, we arrived at the conclusion that we had no jurisdiction, aijter we had examined thoroughly into the merits of the case. After that examination, we were convinced that defendant had no right to the office.
¶30As we had no jurisdiction, we did not hand down an opinion.
¶31On the present application, under our supervisory jurisdiction, we can think of no good reason to change our opinion.
¶32The judgment is affirmed.