¶1specially concurring.
¶2While concurring in the majority’s decision to affirm, I write separately because I believe applying the definition of “landowner” in § 13-21-115(1), C.R.S.2004, to a landlord who reserves the power to prohibit animals requires further explanation.
¶3This, definition includes “a person legally responsible for the condition of real property or for the activities conducted or circumstances existing on real property.” The segments of the definition are to be read in the disjunctive and applied separately. Henderson v. Master Klean Janitorial, Inc., 70 P.3d 612 (Colo.App.2003).
¶4Here, the lease prohibited animals on the demised premises without written consent of landlord. In my view, such a provision would usually raise a jury question precluding summary judgment based on the Premises Liability' Act, because a reasonable jury could conclude that such a landlord thereby retained sufficient control to be “a person legally responsible” for damages caused by a tenant’s keeping an animal, which would constitute an activity conducted or a circumstance “existing on real property.” Cf. Henderson, supra(janitorial service could be sued under Premises Liability Act based on legal responsibility for condition of stairs on which invitee slipped and was injured).
¶5Such a landlord’s liability would depend on the legal status of the injured party and the appropriate standard of care, as determined by the relationship between the injured party and the landlord. See Henderson, supra.The standard of care question would require inquiry into the landlord’s knowledge concerning the animal, so long as the landlord retained the power to require that the tenant either remove the animal or vacate the premises. Cf. Sandoval v. Birx, 767 P.2d 759 (Colo.App.1988).
¶6Here, however, plaintiffs did not dispute that, before executing the lease, landlord had verbally agreed to allow tenants to keep the Rottweiler and landlord did not reserve any power to rescind this agreement. I agree with the majority that, even viewing the record in a manner most favorable to plaintiffs, at the time of this oral agreement landlord neither knew nor had any reason to know of the dog’s allegedly vicious propensities.
¶7Accordingly, by virtue of this verbal agreement, landlord ceased to be “a person legally responsible” for the dog, as a circumstance “existing on real property,” before he had any reason to be concerned over risks that the dog might pose to third parties on the premises. Therefore, I too, conclude that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of landlord.