Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 124 So. 3d 1236 - State v. Williams

124 So. 3d 1236 - State v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

2013

Citation profile

16
cited by 16 later decisions
1
states following
February 2019
most recently cited

16 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · Kumho Tire Company, Ltd., et al. v. Patrick Carmichael, Etc., et al. · 448 So. 2d 676 - State v. Captville · 436 So. 2d 471 - State v. Sutton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[./‘Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial.” State v. Jacobs, 07-887, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 67 So.3d 535, 551 , wri t denied, 11-1753 (La.2/10/12), 80 So.3d 468 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 139 , 184 L.Ed.2d 67 (2012). We note that, whether the conviction is based on direct evidence or solely on circumstantial evidence, the review is the same under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. State v. Williams, 33,881 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/00), 768 So.2d 728 (citing, State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983)), writ denied, 00-99 (La.10/5/01), 798 So.2d 963 . Circumstantial evidence, is that where the main fact can be inferred, using reason and common experience, from proof-of collateral facts and circumstances. Id. Where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, in or-' der to convict, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to, prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La.R.S. 15:438. In State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 469 (La.1983) (citations omitted), the. supreme court discussed the use of circumstantial evidence, stating: Circumstantial.evidence involves, in addition, to the, .assertion of witnesses as to what they have observed, a process of reasoning, or inference by which a. .conclusion is drawn. Like all other evidence, it may be strong or weak; it may be so unconvincing as to be quite worthless, or it may be-.irresistible and overwhelming., There is still no man who would not accept”
    8 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may offer an opinion as to scientific, technical, or other expert testimony if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." La.Code Evid. art. 702. In State v. Allen, 41,548, pp. 11-13 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/15/06) , 942 So.2d 1244 , 1254-55, writ denied, 07-530 (La.12/7/07), 969 So.2d 619 , the second circuit addressed the admissibility and review of expert testimony, stating: In State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La.1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the test set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), regarding proper standards for the admissibility of expert testimony which requires the trial court to act in a gatekeeping function to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. State v. Chauvin, 02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 697 . To assist the trial courts in their preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and can properly be applied to the facts at issue, the Supreme Court suggested the following general observations are appropriate: 1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; 2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error; and 4) whether ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Here, the record indicates that Mr. Stelly testified about his education and experience. Notably, at the time of trial, Mr. Stelly had been working for the North Louisiana Criminalistics Laboratory since 1993, and he had been qualified as an expert approximately 100 times in the field of firearms identification. He also testified that, in addition to a bachelor’s degree in toxicology, he did twenty months of training when he was hired by the crime lab. The defense attorney questioned Mr. Stelly about the National Academy of Sciences report. Mr. Stelly testified that he has testified about a dozen times since the publication of the report and has been questioned about it on a majority of those occasions. Mr. Stelly also demonstrated that he was familiar with the published error rates for firearms and toolmark identification. We additionally note that, on direct and cross-examination, Mr. Stelly testified .as. to the science of firearms identification and its methodology, and how he applied it to the tested items in this case. Further, the defendant subjected Mr. Stelly to stringent cross-examination concerning the reliability of that testimony, including Mr. Stelly’s documentation protocol and whether he had accounted for weapons that may have similar manufacturing marks to the weapon tested herein.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.