Lambrix v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]n prior litigation, Lambrix asserted that during the guilt phase of his first trial, his counsel told the trial judge to inform Lambrix that if Lambrix chose to testify in his own defense during the guilt phase, his counsel would withdraw and the court would not appoint new counsel for Lambrix. Thus, Lambrix contends that he' was denied his fundamental right to testify. The Elevefith Circuit rejected this claim .... [[Image here]] The Eleventh Circuit noted that there was no evidence at all regarding any .person who prevented Lambrix from testifying during the second trial, which occurred two months after his first trial ended in a hung jury. Moreover, to the extent that Lambrix’s counsel advised Lambrix against testifying in the first trial, this advice pertained only to Lam-brix’s testimony concerning the guilt phase (at the first trial only), where Lambrix sought to tell the jury his version of how the victims died. In other words, the claim that Lam-brix was prevented from testifying at trial has been litigated and denied. Even if Lambrix believed that he could not testify during the penalty phase at his second trial, this does not explain why he failed to present this claim in his initial postconviction motion. Lambrix clearly had the necessary knowledge pertaining to this claim, but failed to raise it at all, until his current attempt to resurrect this procedurally barred claim by pointing to a new witness he contends that he did not discover until now.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cary Michael Lambrix v. Julie L. Jones, etc.

2. “As this Court has recognized, “[i]t is the defendant’s burden to explain, with reference to specific facts about the crime and the items requested to be tested, how the DNA testing will exonerate the defendant of the crime or will mitigate the defendant’s sentence.” Scott v. State, 46 So.3d 529, 533 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Robinson v. State, 865 So.2d 1259, 1265 (Fla. 2004)). Lambrix has completely failed to explain how finding Smith’s hair on the murder weapon would help exonerate him or even cast Smith’s testimony into doubt. Smith was at the murder scene after the murders occurred. According to her trial testimony, Lam-brix was carrying the tire iron when he returned to the trailer alone and admitted to Smith that he killed both Bryant and Moore. Smith then helped to dispose of the bodies and the weapon. Thus, it would not be unexpected that her hairs could also be on the weapon, as she was present at the scene and helped to hide the weapon. As this Court has previously held, a trial court does not err in denying a motion for DNA testing where the defendant cannot show that there is a reasonable px-obability that the absence or presence of DNA at a crime scene would exonerate him or lessen his sentence. Scott, 46 So.3d at 533 . Accordingly, we deny this claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cary Michael Lambrix v. Julie L. Jones, etc.

3. “Permitting Lambrix to waive counsel now, especially when he specifically stated that he would like the opportunity for counsel if a death warrant is signed in the future, would only create delays at the point when a death warrant is signed,- as counsel would then need to be appointed and to have an opportunity to become familiar with the case. Further, the only purpose in allowing Lambrix to proceed pro se at this time would be to give him further ability to continue to file pleadings that to date have consistently lacked merit. At least with counsel to represent him, there will be the requirement that counsel has a good faith belief that the allegations are not completely devoid of merit. Thus, any right to self-representation Lambrix may have does not outweigh the risk of substantial interference with the administration of the death penalty presented in this case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. & SC14-567 Ronald Knight v. State of Florida & Ronald Knight v. Julie L. Jones, etc.