¶1delivered the opinion of the court.
¶2This suit was brought by appellee, C. H. Emery, to enforce specific performance of a contract for exchange of properties between himself and appellant, C. D. Taliaferro; and, incidentally, to set aside a deed to two lots in Quantico, subsequently conveyed by Taliaferro and wife to appellant, G. W. Wallace, that were included in the deal. The contract bears date May 17, 1917, and by its terms Emery agreed to convey ninety-two acres of land in Prince William county with a dwelling and store house thereon to Taliaferro in exchange for five acres of land near Bell Fair Mills, in Stafford county, similarly improved, and the two vacant lots in Quantico above referred to. By prearrangement, on the morning of May 17th, Taliaferro rode on horseback from his home to Emery’s, a distance' of about five miles, where the negotiation was carried on. Taliaferro in his answer denies the binding effect of the contract, a copy of which is exhibited with the bill and purports to have been signed by the parties and acknowledged before a justice. He avers that in the preliminary discussion of the stipulations of the proposed contract it developed that the parties could not agree, Emery demanding an even exchange of properties, while respondent insisted upon $1,000 boot; and so the trade was declared off. But later on'Emery plied Taliaferro" with whiskey, a supply of which he had on hand, to the point that he became intoxicated; and while he was in that condition and unconscious of what he was do*676ing, procured his signature and acknowledgment of the paper. The answer gives respondent’s view of the disparity in values of the two properties, and points out certain alleged defects of title to the mineral rights in the Emery property, and the existence of a lien of $300 thereon, the latter of which was subsequently discharged. Respondent insists that in the circumstances detailed a court of equity should not grant specific performance.
¶3By consent of parties the cause was referred to a master ' commissioner to ascertain and report the facts, returning the depositions with his report. The commissioner’s findings were adverse to Taliaferro, especially upon the controlling questions of his intoxication and insistence upon the provision that he should receive $1,000 in money by way of owelty of exchange. Whereupon, the circuit court passed the decree under review, overruling the exceptions and confirming the commissioner’s report, and setting aside the deed from Taliaferro and wife to Wallace conveying the two lots in Quantico, and decreeing specific performance of the contract of exchange.
¶4
¶5[2,'3] The law applicable to cases of this sort is concisely stated by Mr. Minor in his Institutes. After giving the ancient rule, he says: “But for more than a century this rigorous doctrine has been much relaxed, and it is agreed that drunkenness invalidates or renders voidable all contracts and transactions where (1) the drunkenness was brought about by the opposite party; (2) a fraudulent advantage was taken of it; (3) it deprived the party of his reason, and of an agreeing mind … The mere fact that one is drunk when he enters into a contract is no *679ground for setting it aside, at least in equity, unless under one or the other of the circumstances above stated; but, when a person’s habitual addiction to intoxication renders him extremely subject to imposition, such habits, though not carried to an excess constituting absolute incapacity, lay a ground for strict examination whether any instrument executed by him does not in itself, or in the attendant circumstances, contain evidence that advantage was taken of those habits.” 2 Minor’s Inst. (4th ed.), 644. And the author further declares, that when the drunkenness is brought about by the party obtaining the contract, the act is so flagrant a badge of fraud that it always renders the contract voidable, both at law and in equity; and that when a fraudulent advantage is taken of the drunkenness, this, too, is so direct a fraud as always to render the transaction voidable in all courts. This rule is well settled. 1 Elliott on Contracts, sec. 440, and cases cited in note; Miller v. Sterringer, 66 W. Va. 169, 66 S. E. 228, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 596.
¶6For these reasons we are of opinion to reverse the decree of the circuit court, and enter an order here dismissing the bill with costs.
¶7Reversed.