124 W. Va. 153 - Hogsten v. Compensation Commissioner’s Empirical Analysis
1942
Citation profile
10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently May 1966
10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 123 W. Va. 516 - Lester v. State Compensation Commissioner · 119 W. Va. 581 - Wood Coal Co. v. State Compensation Commissioner · 121 W. Va. 60 - McDaniel v. State Compensation Commissioner
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““. . . Its [i] application is universal, and under it, in all cases, surviving dependents have collected the compensation accrued but unpaid at the claimant’s death. But under it, also, all compensation not ‘accrued’ at the time of the workman’s death became uncollectible by any person whatsoever. Lester v. Compensation Commissioner, 123 W. Va. 516 , 16 S. E. 2d 920 ; McDaniel v. Compensation Commissioner, 121 W. Va. 60 , 200 S. E. 47 ; Wood Coal Co. v. Compensation Commissioner, 119 W. Va. 581 , 195 S. E. 528 . No inequity in this rule is apparent where the workman’s death was itself caused by a subsequent compensable injury. In such case a larger compensation began at the moment the former award for partial disability terminated. There was in such case no loss, but rather an increase in benefits, by reason of the workman’s death; nor was there any duplication of compensation, for the partial award terminated when the death award began. And there was no hiatus between the two awards. “But if the workman’s death was from a non-compensable cause a very palpable injustice resulted under the practical workings of this statutory rule. The old award ceased at the time of his death and no new award was possible. The compensation to which he was entitled by reason of the first injury, if only partly paid or not paid at all, was can-celled as of the date of his death. The manifest unfairness of this phase of the statute was cured by paragraph (e), above quoted, and which originated i”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.