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125 Ala. 80

Shaw v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided November 15, 1899

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1899-11-15

Tried before the Hon. D. It. McMillan. The prosecution in this case was commenced by an affidavit made by one W. P. Gilbert, charging that Andrew J. Shaw “did unlawfully, maliciously or negligently destroy, throw down or break a fence or inclosure, and did fail to immediately repair or rebuild the same, the said fence being the property of affiant.” The facts of the case relating to the claims of the defendant and of the prosecutor Gilbert to the contiguous lands and the…

Relies on Winslow v. State · Karr v. State · Henderson v. State

Cited in Black's (1910)’s definition of “Probability”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1899-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently March 1991

9 state decisions

3018991900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1On Rehearing.

SHARPE, J.

¶2The return to the writ of certiorari granted in this cause brings up for review rulings of the trial court on certain charges requested by and refused to the defendant which rulings did not appear in the transcript when the appeal Avas first considered.

¶3For the refusal of charge 2 the judgment must be reversed. A probability of the defendant’s innocence is at least equivalent to a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Henderson v. State, 120 Ala. 360; 25 So. Rep. 236; Carr v. State, 106 Ala. 1; Winslow v. State, 76 Ala. 42.

¶4The remaining charges requested by the defendant were properly refused. They are bad for reasons given in the opinion heretofore rendered, where among other things it was held that under the facts disclosed the defendant’s property extended only to the boundary line established by the arbitration and that he had no easement or other property right in that part of the projected roadway which lay on Gilbert’s side of that line, and therefore no right to throw down Gilbert’s fence even though it stood Avithin six feet of the boundary line.

¶5The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.

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