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125 Ga. App. 831

189 S.E.2d 135

Tukes v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Decided March 17, 1972

Court of Appeals of Georgia · decided 1972-03-17

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(a) A person commits the offense of arson in the first degree when, by means of fire or explosive, he knowingly damages or knowingly causes, aids, abets, advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to damage: (1) Any dwelling house of another without his consent or in which another has a security interest ... whether it is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant; (2) Any building ... or other structure of another ... if such structure is designed for use as a dwelling, whether it is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant ____”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Crawford v. Government Employees Insurance

Relies on Harrell v. State · Rice v. State · Morgan v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1972-03-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently June 1991

8 state decisions

40197219801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Jordan, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Appellant was indicted for the offense of arson and convicted of criminal attempt to commit arson. Error is assigned on the overruling of her motion for new trial on the general grounds only. Held:

¶2 We affirm. The record discloses an overwhelming array of evidence to support the verdict of guilty. Her co-defendant testified that she furnished the money to buy the gas, that they went to the dwelling occupied by Willie Ray and others, and that "I throwed the gas and she throwed the match.” A city policeman testified that he went to the house in answer to a call, saw a blazing fire, and apprehended the defendant and her co-defendant as they ran from the scene. There was other corroborating and damaging evidence.

¶3 A person commits arson in the first degree when by means of fire or explosives he knowingly damages "any dwelling house of another without his consent. . .” Code Ann. § 26-1401. The record shows that one of the occupants of the house had deeded the property to the defendant. It is therefore contended that the defendant could not be guilty of arson or attempted arson since she was the legal owner of the premises. This contention is without merit. The offense is committed whether the dwelling house is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant and whether the premises are the property of the defendant or of another. Lawful occupancy by one in charge constitutes ownership as contemplated by the statute, and the question of legal title is not involved. Golding v. State, 30 Ga. App. 30 (2) *832 (116 SE 881). See also, Rice v. State, 16 Ga. App. 128 (3) (84 SE 609); Morgan v. State, 120 Ga. 499, 502 (48 SE 238); and Harrell v. State, 121 Ga. 607 (49 SE 703).

Submitted March 9, 1972 Decided March 17, 1972 Rehearing denied March 30, 1972. Casey Thigpen, for appellant. H. R. Thompson, District Attorney, for appellee.

¶4 Judgment affirmed.

Deen and Clark, JJ., concur.
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