125 Md. App. 77 - Herd v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In 1973, the Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee received testimony from the State’s Attorneys of various counties and Baltimore City that there was a need for a burglary offense of less severity than common law burglary or any of the then applicable statutory burglary-type crimes. The existence of such an offense, it was argued, would facilitate prosecutors in the handling of cases in which the felonious intent, a required element of common law burglary and all of the then statutory burglary offenses, of the intruder could not be clearly shown. Senate Bill 218 was drafted and submitted to the 1973 General Session with the intent of creating a criminal offense to comply with the State’s Attorneys’ wishes.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 164 Md. App. 95 - Marquardt v. State · 159 Md. App. 225 - Dabney v. State

2. “Each of those three escalated criminal proscriptions prohibits the breaking and entering of the dwelling of another. The actus reus of all three crimes is exactly the same. The only differences are in the mens rea. The differences among the three offenses involve only the existence of a particular specific intent or the absence of any such specific intent. [Burglary in the first degree] involves the specific intent to commit theft or a crime of violence in the burglarized dwelling. When that specific intent is present, the crime is a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years. [Burglary in the third degree], the next step down on the ladder of blameworthiness, involves the lesser required specific intent to commit any crime in the burglarized dwelling. When such lesser specific intent is present, the crime is still a felony but is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of only ten years. [Burglary in the fourth degree (a)], the final step down on the ladder of blameworthiness, does not require a specific intent to commit a crime of any sort in the burglarized dwelling or to do anything else for that matter. For that reason, the offense is only a misdemeanor subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of but three years. The absence of a specific intent is the only thing that distinguishes [fourth-degree burglary] from [third-degree burglary]. Without that distinction, the legislative scheme would be an absurdity.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 159 Md. App. 225 - Dabney v. State

3. “Maryland has traditionally placed upon a defendant, by the device of giving the State the benefit of a presumption to the contrary, the obligation to see that there is produced sufficient evidence to generate a jury question on such issues as intoxication, self-defense, and entrapment. We are persuaded that nothing in Mullaney v. Wilbur adversely affects in any way the status of presumptions in this limited function of requiring that there be produced sufficient evidence to generate a jury issue. The holding of Mullaney v. Wilbur was very careful to add a qualifying clause: We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State