¶1(specially concurring):
¶2I concur in the result but not in all that is said in the above opinion. In this jurisdiction there is no statutory authority for a bill of particulars in a criminal case and under the system of pleading prescribed by our Codes there is no place for it. Particularity to the point of absurdity in pleading in a criminal case is neither required nor tolerated. State v. Gondeiro, 82 Mont. 530, 535, 268 Pac. 507. Accordingly, I expressly concur in the overruling of all former holdings of this court to the contrary and in the holding of the majority herein that, under the law of this jurisdiction, no bill of particulars may be required or ordered in any criminal case.
¶3I am of the opinion that the law is as stated in State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 Pac. (2d) 1009, but that such ease is readily distinguishable from the instant case wherein the defendant Bosch admitted that when turning out to pass the vehicle ahead of him his automobile was then traveling at a rate of speed in excess of the maximum permitted by law. Aside from and exclusive of the testimony of the witness Hall, ample competent evidence was introduced to fully sustain the jury’s verdict and the judgment entered thereon and I find no reversible error in the record submitted on this appeal.
¶4(dissenting in part and concurring in the result):
¶5I do not agree that the witness Hall was sufficiently qualified as an expert to give his opinion as to the speed of the car when *590the brakes were applied. He was an automobile mechanic. His work consisted of cheeking and repairing automobiles. He never attended school dealing with the effect of skid marks on the speed of an automobile but did attend a braking school. When asked, “Did you learn to determine the speed of moving vehicles from skid marks left by those vehicles on the highway,” he answered, “My knowledge of that is strictly from the use of vehicles and the rules of the highway. ’ ’
¶6When asked his estimate of the speed of the car, he said, “It would be rather difficult to arrive at an exact figure. However, I would say this much, that in order to leave tracks like that, the car would have to go at an excessive rate of speed, or in my opinion, over 60 miles an hour. ’ ’
¶7I think the witness Hall was no better qualified to judge the speed of the car than the members of the jury. He admitted that he was indulging in guessAvork and I think as to him the rule applied in State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 Pac. (2d) 1009, has application. And see Nelson v. Hedin, 184 Iowa 657, 169 N. W. 37; Everart v. Fischer, 75 Or. 316, 145 Pac. 33, 147 Pac. 189; Wisniewski v. Weinstock, 130 N. J. L. 58, 31 A. (2d) 401; Bunton v. Hull, 51 N. M. 5, 177 Pac. (2d) 168, and Reall v. Deiriggi, 127 W. Va. 662, 34 S. E. (2d) 253.
¶8I believe, however, that defendant Avas not prejudiced by Hall’s testimony. The witness Benson, I think, Avas qualified to give an opinion and he had the car moving 72 miles per hour, and defendant admitted that he Avas going between 50 and 55 miles per hour in attempting to pass a vehicle and that was in excess of the legal limit at the time and place of the accident. Since Hall admitted he Avas guessing about speed, I cannot belieA^e that the jury gave much, if any, weight to his testimony.
¶9As to the balance of the opinion I concur in the result but not Avith all that is said in it. Defendant moved the court to Avithdraw from the jury’s consideration those paragraphs of the amended bill of particulars having to do with the speed of the car. It is defendant’s contention that there Avas no com*591petent evidence of the speed at which the car was moving and hence that all those charges set forth in the amended bill of particulars should have been withdrawn. Since there was competent evidence of speed, I think the court properly denied the motion. I see no reasonable excuse for copying so much of the transcript into the opinion. Nor is it necessary to overrule the long line of opinions of this court sanctioning the use of bills of particulars in criminal cases, but if that is done the new procedure should apply only to future eases and should not control this one.