125 Wash. 2d 876 - State v. Warner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

103 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 103 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Absolute inevitability of discovery is not required but simply a reasonable probability that evidence in question would have been discovered other than from the tainted source.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Rife · State v. Reyes

2. “Arguably, there was some compulsion here[,] in that ... Warner could have felt [that] cooperation (i.e., making confessions) would lead to more lenient treatment or avoid reprisals. This type of “compulsion” is not contemplated in Miranda , however.... When dealing with a person already incarcerated, “custodial” means more than just the normal restrictions on freedom incident to incarceration.... In [State v. Post, [ 118 Wash.2d 596 , 826 P.2d 172 (Wash.1992),] this court rejected the argument that an interview by a Department of Corrections psychologist was custodial where the [inmate being interviewed] was on work release, even though “Post was ‘required’ to submit to [this] evaluation in the sense that it was widely known that[,] if individuals did not cooperate during the interview process, it was a factor considered against them.” Post, ... 826 P.2d [at 181 n. 5], We held that [such] psychological pressure is not enough to establish “custody” for Miranda purposes. Post, ... 826 P.2d [at 180]. [Likewise, the] circumstances surrounding Mr. Warner’s disclosures [during sex offender therapy] cannot be considered “custodial” [for Miranda purposes].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Woods · Beaver v. State

3. “Even under the old negligence per se doctrine, a person can only borrow a statutory duty of care to show negligence if the harm that occurs is the type of harm that statute is designed to prevent and the person claiming it is in the class of persons the statute is designed to protect. Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wash.2d 916, 923 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). That is not the case here. The reporting statute [RCW 26.44.030] is designed to secure prompt protection and/or treatment for the victims of child abuse. The class of persons it is designed to protect is the victims, not the abusers. Thus, Warner cannot use the statute to establish negligence on the part of the State.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tyner v. Department of Social & Health Services · Tyner v. DSHS, Child Protective Serv.