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← 126 F.3d 843 - Austin v. Bell

Austin v. Bell’s Empirical Analysis

126 F.3d 843 · 1997

Citation profile

112
cited by 112 later decisions
3
states following
February 2023
most recently cited

59 federal appellate · 1 district · 9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 112 later decisions — most recently February 2023 · most notably Coe v. Bell (1998), Byrd v. Collins (2000)

59 federal appellate · 1 district · 9 state decisions

8301997200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (§ 107 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Estelle v. McGuire · Lockett v. Ohio · United States v. Cronic · Lindh v. Murphy

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 112 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from possibility. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “strategic decision, but rather an abdication of advocacy.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We find the reasonable doubt instruction in this case is more like the acceptable language in Victor than the unacceptable language in Cage. The language of an “inability to let the mind rest easily” lends content to the phrase “moral certainty” similar to the “abiding conviction” language in Victor, increasing, if anything, the prosecutor’s burden of proof. It also does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that would lower the state’s burden of proof because it does not increase the measure of doubt beyond a “reasonable doubt.””
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.