United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 23-2069
JENNIFER COTTO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated; JAMIE KIMBALL, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated; DAVID CUMMINGS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated; TODD MOTON, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated; and TRAVIS MORAN, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
STACY FOSTER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated; JONATHAN RILEY, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; and NICOLE WESTCOTT, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ANDREA J. CAMPBELL, Attorney General; TIMOTHY SHUGRUE, Berkshire
County District Attorney; THOMAS M. QUINN, III, Bristol County
District Attorney; ROBERT J. GALIBOIS, II, Cape and Islands
District Attorney; PAUL TUCKER, Essex County District Attorney;
ANTHONY GULLUNI, Hampden County District Attorney; MARIAN RYAN,
Middlesex County District Attorney; MICHAEL W. MORRISSEY,
Norfolk County District Attorney; DAVID E. SULLIVAN,
Northwestern District Attorney; TIMOTHY J. CRUZ, Plymouth County
District Attorney; KEVIN R. HAYDEN, Suffolk County District
Attorney; JOSEPH D. EARLY, JR, Worcester County District
Attorney; THOMAS G. AMBROSINO, Administrator of the Trial Court;
and JOHN MAWN, JR., Massachusetts State Police Interim
Superintendent,
Defendants, Appellants,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; BROCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, on
behalf of itself and all other police departments similarly
situated; FALL RIVER POLICE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and
all other police departments similarly situated; BOSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and all other police departments
similarly situated; SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of
itself and all other police departments similarly situated;
CHARLIE BAKER, Governor; DEBORAH B. GOLDBERG, Treasurer; EDWARD
DOLAN, Commissioner of Probation; and DANIEL BENNETT, Secretary
of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Rikelman, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Christine Fimognari, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Anne
Sterman and Katherine B. Dirks, Assistant Attorneys General, were
on brief, for appellants.
Daniel N. Marx, with whom William W. Fick, Luke Ryan, Fick &
Marx LLP, and Strehorn, Ryan & Hoose were on brief, for appellees.
January 21, 2025
RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. For almost a decade, two state
chemists in Massachusetts tampered with drug evidence and
falsified test results, undermining the reliability of forensic
evidence in tens of thousands of drug cases. After their egregious
misconduct was discovered, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court (SJC) vacated and dismissed with prejudice over 30,000
criminal cases tainted by their actions. Eventually, the SJC also
determined that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, affected individuals were entitled to the repayment
of most funds collected as a consequence of their now-vacated
convictions, but not to the automatic return of any forfeited
property seized in connection with those convictions. See
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 109 N.E.3d 459, 471-76 (Mass. 2018).
Instead, because of the different legal standards and procedures
necessary for a conviction as opposed to a forfeiture order, the
SJC held that individuals seeking return of their property would
need to file motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. See
id. at 475-76.
Plaintiffs in this case, dissatisfied with the SJC's
ruling on the forfeiture issue, request a federal court order that
would essentially require the automatic return of their forfeited
property. They also seek related relief, such as an accounting of
all forfeited property and additional procedural protections in
Rule 60(b) proceedings. The Commonwealth defendants moved to
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dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including that
plaintiff's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which
prohibits suits in federal court against a state by its own
citizens. The district court dismissed the complaint in part. It
held that it could not order the automatic return of plaintiffs'
forfeited property, but that plaintiffs' other claims could
proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh
Amendment, which permits suits against state officials in federal
court in certain circumstances. The Commonwealth defendants
appealed.
We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the
relief sought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' attempt to recover their
forfeited property focuses on a past alleged wrong, but the Ex
parte Young exception applies only when individuals seek
prospective relief against a state official's ongoing violation of
federal law. Because there is no ongoing violation to anchor
plaintiffs' various claims, there is no prospective or ancillary
relief to grant. Plaintiffs' claim for additional procedural
protections in state court also cannot proceed under Ex parte Young
because the state officials they sued lack the authority to enforce
or change those procedures. We therefore reverse the district
court's partial denial of the motion to dismiss and remand with
instructions to dismiss the case in full.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
This case arises from the criminal actions of two former
state forensic chemists, Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak, who
tampered with evidence, falsified drug results, and committed
perjury in state court drug cases beginning in about 2004. After
their misconduct was discovered a decade later, the SJC vacated
and dismissed with prejudice over 30,000 drug cases tainted by
their involvement.
Two individuals whose criminal convictions had been
vacated due to Dookhan's misconduct each raised a federal due
process claim in state court and asked for the return of fees,
victim-witness assessments, restitution, fines, and court costs
associated with their convictions, as well as any civilly forfeited
assets. See Martinez, 109 N.E.3d at 466-69. The SJC held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the
automatic return of most funds paid as a consequence of their
convictions, but not the forfeited assets that were seized under
a civil statute, section 47 of chapter 94C of the Massachusetts
General Laws ("State Act"). Id. at 471-76.
The SJC reasoned that the Due Process Clause did not
require the automatic return of forfeited assets because
plaintiffs' civil forfeiture judgments were not solely a
consequence of their invalidated drug convictions. Id. at 476.
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As the court explained, because "[t]he finding of probable cause
of nexus that sufficed to order forfeiture in the civil proceeding
did not depend on the finding in the criminal proceeding of
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of guilt," the issue of
relief from a civil forfeiture judgment must be "separately
litigated [by each impacted individual] . . . through a motion for
relief from judgment under [Rule] 60(b)." Id. The Martinez
plaintiffs did not file a petition for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court appealing that decision.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs here were criminal defendants in drug cases
impacted by the chemists' misconduct. They brought this case on
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals,
arguing primarily that defendants' continued withholding of
plaintiffs' forfeited property after the SJC vacated their
underlying drug convictions violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The original defendants
included the Massachusetts Attorney General, the eleven district
attorneys in the Commonwealth, the administrator of the state trial
court, and the interim superintendent of the state police, as well
as four local police departments as representatives of a broader
class of law enforcement agencies. Because the district court
dismissed the claims against the local police departments under
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658
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(1978), and plaintiffs have not cross-appealed,1 we focus our
discussion on the claims against the Commonwealth defendants.
In their complaint, plaintiffs seek a variety of
declaratory and injunctive relief. They request (i) a declaratory
judgment that class members are "entitled to the return of all
Forfeited Property that was taken from them in connection with
their vacated, wrongful convictions" and injunctions ordering
(ii) the "return of all Forfeited Property," (iii) notice to all
class members, (iv) "a full accounting of all Forfeited Property,"
and (v) the implementation of "an efficient, effective, and fair
process to return all Forfeited Property."
The Commonwealth defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint, arguing that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment (and also failed for other reasons). The
district court partially granted and partially denied the motion,
dismissing on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim for an
injunction ordering the return of their forfeited property but
allowing their other claims to proceed. Cotto v. Campbell, No.
18-CV-10354, 2023 WL 7496514, at *6-8 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2023).
In the remaining claims, plaintiffs sought "notification of [class
members'] rights to a more robust state procedure under the State
1 Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal on the district court's
partial grant of the motion to dismiss but are no longer seeking
interlocutory review.
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Act, or their rights to pursue relief under Rule 60(b)," "a full
accounting of all Forfeited Property," and "additional procedural
due process protections within a Rule 60(b) hearing."2 Id. at *8.
The Commonwealth defendants now appeal the partial
denial of their motion to dismiss. They correctly contend that we
have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review
the district court's order to the extent it denied dismissal on
Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. See Doe v. Shibinette, 16
F.4th 894, 899-900, 903-905 (1st Cir. 2021) (reviewing under
collateral order doctrine denial of motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds where state official argued district court erred
in concluding lawsuit fit within the Ex parte Young exception).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion
to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 903.
III. DISCUSSION
The Eleventh Amendment bars a state from being sued in
federal court by its own citizens, citizens of another state, or
2 The district court did not directly discuss whether
plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief survived its partial
dismissal order, although it did note that "the court is not barred
from entertaining Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges" for
"relief other than an order from this court directing the payment
of money from the state." Cotto, 2023 WL 7496514, at *8. Both
parties assume plaintiffs' claim for a declaratory judgment
survived the partial dismissal order and address the claim on
appeal, so we do as well. See infra Section III.B.3.
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citizens of a foreign nation. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1890). This bar applies to suits
against state agencies and departments, as well as to suits that
are nominally against state officials but where the state is "the
real, substantial party in interest" because the relief sought
"would operate against [the state]." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984) (first quoting Ford Motor
Co. v. Dep't of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); and then
quoting Hawaii v. Gordon,
373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam)).
In its landmark decision of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), however, the Supreme Court established a critical
exception to the bar on suits in federal court against state
officials. As applied by the Supreme Court, Ex parte Young permits
a federal court to prohibit a state official from enforcing state
law in a way that violates federal law. Edelman v. Jordan,
415
U.S. 651, 664 (1974). The Court justified this exception by
explaining that state laws that conflict with the federal
Constitution, for example, are "void" and cannot "impart to [the
official] any immunity," thereby permitting a lawsuit against a
state official enforcing such a state law. Green v. Mansour,
474
U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte
Young,
209 U.S. at 159-60); see also Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S.
265, 276-77 (1986) (same). Thus, under Ex parte Young, the
Eleventh Amendment permits federal courts to issue prospective
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relief that enjoins state officials from committing future
violations of federal law, but not retrospective relief that
"make[s] reparation for the past." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-65
(quoting Rothstein v. Wyman,
467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied,
411 U.S. 921 (1973)). Specifically, the Ex parte
Young exception applies if a plaintiff (1) "alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law" by a state official3 and (2) "seeks
relief properly characterized as prospective." Verizon Md., Inc.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md.,
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)
3 To be clear, the Ex parte Young exception can also apply
when plaintiffs bring what is known as a pre-enforcement challenge,
alleging an anticipated (as opposed to an ongoing) violation of
federal law, against state officials with the authority to prevent
those violations (e.g., by not enforcing the challenged laws).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. Labrador, 122 F.4th
825, 841-43 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that Ex parte Young applies
to pre-enforcement suit against state attorney general who has the
"authority to assist in the enforcement of [the allegedly
unconstitutional statute]"); Frank v. Lee,
84 F.4th 1119, 1132-33
(10th Cir. 2023) (holding that Ex parte Young applies to pre-enforcement suit against state officials who have "some connection
with the enforcement" of the statute at issue (quoting Hendrickson
v. AFSCME Council 18,
992 F.3d 950, 965 (10th Cir. 2021))). Ex
parte Young itself involved a pre-enforcement challenge. See
209
U.S. at 129, 146-48 (enjoining state official from enforcing state
statute based on anticipated violation of due process, in response
to lawsuits filed the day before the statute was to take effect).
Plaintiffs here did not file a pre-enforcement suit, so our
analysis focuses on whether any violation is ongoing, rather than
anticipated. And to the extent plaintiffs raise claims about
potential future due process violations that could arise during
the Rule 60(b) procedures in state court, plaintiffs cannot pursue
such claims against the Commonwealth defendants under Ex parte
Young because those defendants have no authority to enforce or
change those procedures. See infra Section III.C.
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(O'Connor, J., concurring)). Plaintiffs do not meet either
requirement.
Although plaintiffs attempt to characterize the
Commonwealth defendants' continued withholding of forfeited
property as an ongoing violation, the district court correctly
concluded that plaintiffs had alleged only a past wrong rather
than an ongoing one. And without an ongoing violation and future
misconduct to enjoin, there is no prospective relief or ancillary
relief for a federal court to grant. Finally, plaintiffs' request
for additional procedural protections in state court fails under
Ex parte Young because plaintiffs sued state officials who lack
the authority to enforce or change these procedures.4 Thus, we
conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the plaintiffs'
claims.
4 The parties dispute whether Ex parte Young contains an
additional and independent requirement that the relief sought does
not "operate against" the state as "the real, substantial party in
interest," see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, or whether Ex parte
Young is itself a carveout from the "general rule" that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits where the state is the real party in
interest, see
id. at 102. To the extent the parties identify any
tension in the precedent on this point, we do not need to resolve
their dispute in this case. Regardless of how the test is
formulated, Ex parte Young makes clear that a federal court cannot
order relief unless the state officials sued have "some connection
with the enforcement of the [allegedly unconstitutional] act," a
requirement that plaintiffs cannot meet here for their request for
additional procedural protections in Rule 60(b) hearings.
209
U.S. at 157. See infra Section III.C.
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A. Ongoing Violation of Federal Law
Because the Ex parte Young exception is intended to
balance Eleventh Amendment concerns with the supremacy of federal
law, it only applies in "cases in which a violation of federal law
by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal
law has been violated at one time or over a period of time in the
past." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277-78 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs
argue that they meet this standard, citing allegations from their
complaint that the Commonwealth defendants' "continued
withholding" of forfeited property after plaintiffs' convictions
were vacated is an "ongoing violation" of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiffs also contend that defendants' arguments to
the contrary are irrelevant because the application of Ex parte
Young does not include an analysis of the merits.
Plaintiffs misunderstand the Ex parte Young doctrine.
We start with plaintiffs' second contention, that the Commonwealth
defendants lodge an impermissible merits argument by pointing out
that plaintiffs have not alleged an ongoing violation. That is
incorrect. The merits argument excluded from the Ex parte Young
analysis is whether the state officials' actions are, in fact,
"inconsistent with federal law." Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 646.
Thus, the merits question that is irrelevant in this appeal is
whether the Commonwealth defendants' continued withholding of
forfeited assets violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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By contrast, the question defendants ask us to analyze is, even
assuming their withholding does violate the Constitution, whether
any violation is ongoing.
We conclude that the district court's ruling on this
point was correct: There may be a continuing liability for a past
harm, but there is no ongoing violation here. The district court
explicitly rejected plaintiffs' argument that "Defendants' failure
to return their forfeited property is a continuing violation of
federal law," noting that "Plaintiffs' argument that repayment
would remedy a continuing wrong rather than a past one is
unpersuasive." Cotto, 2023 WL 7496514, at *6-7. As the court
explained, "[t]his sort of 'formal distinction' between
Defendants' [alleged] 'continuing obligation' to remedy their
legal violation and their 'ongoing liability' for a past injury is
'of the sort [the Supreme Court] rejected' in articulating its
retroactive relief test."
Id. at *7 (quoting Papasan,
478 U.S. at
280).5
Indeed, the Supreme Court has foreclosed plaintiffs'
argument. In both Edelman v. Jordan and Papasan v. Allain, it
held that state officials' continued withholding of past benefits,
even if wrongful, amounted to a past wrong and not an ongoing
5 We also note that plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the
district court's ruling that defendants' continued withholding of
their forfeited property did not qualify as an ongoing violation.
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violation for Ex parte Young purposes. In Edelman v. Jordan,
plaintiffs argued that state officials violated federal law in
calculating benefits under the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
(AABD) program and, citing Ex parte Young, requested an injunction
ordering defendants "to award . . . all AABD benefits wrongfully
withheld." 415 U.S. at 655-56. The Supreme Court concluded there
was no ongoing violation of federal law, explaining that
plaintiffs' claims were merely for "a monetary loss resulting from
[the state officials'] past breach of a legal duty."
Id. at 668;
see Papasan,
478 U.S. at 280-81 (similarly noting that the Edelman
plaintiffs' claims rested on "a not-yet-extinguished liability for
a past breach").
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the continued
withholding of funds owed is not an ongoing violation in Papasan
v. Allain. In Papasan, plaintiffs challenged funding disparities
between Chickasaw Cession schools and other Mississippi public
schools by bringing a breach of trust claim. 478 U.S. at 274. To
establish that a breach of trust occurred, plaintiffs first
contended that the federal government "created a perpetual [school
lands] trust, with the State as trustee for the benefit of the
public schools," when it granted land to the state and required it
to use income from that land to fund local public schools.
Id. at
271-73, 279. Plaintiffs then argued that Mississippi had a trust
obligation to provide Chickasaw Cession schools with appropriate
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trust income and sought related declaratory and injunctive relief.
Id. at 274-75, 279. To fit such a suit within the Ex parte Young
exception, plaintiffs claimed that the state's failure to make
appropriate trust income payments to the Chickasaw schools in the
past was an ongoing violation.
Id. at 279.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding no ongoing
violation and explaining that plaintiffs' claim in Papasan failed
for the same reason that the claim in Edelman did. Id. at 280-81
("The [plaintiffs'] characterization in [Edelman] of the legal
wrong as the continuing withholding of accrued benefits is very
similar to the petitioners' characterization of the legal wrong
here [in Papasan] as the breach of a continuing obligation to
comply with the trust obligations."). According to the Court,
plaintiffs merely identified past violations that amounted to
"accrued monetary liabilit[ies]," so their claim was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 281 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977)); see also Whalen v.
Mass. Trial Ct.,
397 F.3d 19, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding "no
continuing violation of federal law to enjoin" when laid-off
employee asked for restoration of pension and retirement credit
after reinstatement, because relief sought was designed to
compensate him for his termination, a past injury (quoting Green,
474 U.S. at 71)).
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Here, even if the Commonwealth defendants' continued
withholding of plaintiffs' forfeited property did violate federal
law, it would be a past violation, not an ongoing one. Just like
the continued withholding of previously owed payments in Edelman
and Papasan did not amount to ongoing violations, defendants'
continued withholding of forfeited property does not qualify as an
ongoing violation. Plaintiffs' claims rest on "the past actions
of the [Commonwealth]," either from the time of their forfeiture
proceedings or from the time their convictions were vacated, rather
than any current or future actions. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 282.
Therefore, plaintiffs have not alleged an ongoing violation of
federal law and the Ex parte Young exception does not apply.
B. Prospective Relief
Our holding that there is no ongoing violation of federal
law also means that the relief plaintiffs seek is not prospective.
We have defined Ex parte Young's prospective relief requirement to
apply to relief that "serves directly to bring an end to a present
violation of federal law." Whalen, 397 F.3d at 29 (quoting
Papasan,
478 U.S. at 278). Because there is no such violation to
end here, there is also no prospective relief for a federal court
to grant. And because no prospective relief can be granted, the
Supreme Court's exception for ancillary relief, which supports the
implementation of "prospective relief already ordered by the
court," also cannot save plaintiffs' claims for notice and
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accounting relief. Green, 474 U.S. at 70-71 (quoting Quern v.
Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 349 (1979)). Finally, plaintiffs' request
for a declaratory judgment providing that they are entitled to the
return of their forfeited property is barred because it functions
as a "partial 'end run' around" the prospective relief requirement.
Id. at 73. Such a declaratory judgment would, in effect, amount
to an order by a federal court for retrospective relief. Id. We
discuss each of these points in more detail below.
1. No Ongoing Violation, so No Prospective Relief
Although Ex parte Young's prospective relief requirement
is sometimes framed as distinct from its ongoing violation
requirement, see Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 645, the two requirements
are closely related. As we described above, Ex parte Young permits
federal courts to issue prospective relief that requires state
officials "to conform [their] future conduct" to federal law, not
retrospective relief that only "make[s] reparation for the past."
Edelman,
415 U.S. at 664-65 (emphasis added). Without an ongoing
violation to curtail, there are no prospective injunctions for a
federal court to issue. See Green,
474 U.S. at 71 ("Because there
is no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin in this case,
an injunction is not available."). Thus, "[t]he pivotal question
[under Ex parte Young] is whether the relief 'serves directly to
bring an end to a present violation of federal law'" because a
court cannot issue injunctive relief, no matter how "prospective"
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it may appear, without such a violation. Whalen, 397 F.3d at 29
(emphasis added) (quoting Papasan,
478 U.S. at 278).
The district court characterized plaintiffs' requests
for notice, accounting, and procedural protections as "classic
examples of prospective injunctive relief" that "would not entail
payment from the state treasury, and . . . bear[] no resemblance
to a retroactive award of money." Cotto, 2023 WL 7496514, at *8.
The court correctly held that an injunction requiring the payment
of money from the state treasury would be impermissibly
retrospective. But any injunctions for notice and accounting
relief, as well as for additional procedural protections in state
court, would not serve to end an ongoing violation of federal law
because plaintiffs allege only a past wrong. See supra Section
III.A. Thus, these requested injunctions cannot qualify as
prospective relief.
2. Ancillary Relief
The Supreme Court also has upheld as consistent with the
Eleventh Amendment "ancillary relief" that operates as a
case-management device to assist the court with implementing
valid, prospective relief already ordered. In Quern v. Jordan, it
permitted lower courts to order notice relief "ancillary to" two
valid forms of prospective relief: a declaratory judgment finding
that current state regulations violated federal law by withholding
benefits, and an injunction barring state officials from future
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violations. See 440 U.S. at 336, 349; Edelman,
415 U.S. at 656
(precursor to Quern, describing relief sought). The Court
permitted the notice because it supported the relief already
granted by informing class members of existing state
administrative procedures that could determine their eligibility
for repayment; at the same time, the notice left the actual
determination of individual claims "entirely with the State."
Quern,
440 U.S. at 348.
Six years later, the Court granted certiorari in Green
to answer one of the exact questions posed in this case: If "there
is no ongoing violation of federal law," can federal courts still
"order the giving of notice of the sort approved in Quern v.
Jordan, . . . or issue a declaratory judgment that state officials
violated federal law in the past"?6 474 U.S. at 67. The Court
concluded that notice relief "is not the type of remedy designed
to prevent ongoing violations of federal law," so it is unavailable
when there is no prospective relief to which the notice can attach.
Id. at 71. Ultimately, both Quern and Green make clear that
federal courts can only grant relief that is not itself prospective
under Ex parte Young when that relief is "ancillary to the
6 This section discusses Green's holding regarding notice
relief. Section III.B.3 discusses Green's holding regarding
declaratory relief.
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prospective relief already ordered by the court." Green, 474 U.S.
at 70-71; Quern,
440 U.S. at 349.
Green is directly on point here. Although plaintiffs
argue that their requested injunctions for notice relief and a
full accounting of all forfeited property qualify as "ancillary
relief" that falls within the Ex parte Young exception, they are
incorrect. Just like in Green, there is no ongoing violation of
federal law to enjoin in this case, so no prospective relief is
available. See supra Section III.A-III.B.1. Because there is no
prospective relief for the notice or accounting relief to attach
to, "ancillary relief" is also not available. Both forms of relief
remain barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
3. "End Runs" Around the Prospective Relief Requirement
Plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment that they
"are entitled to the return of all Forfeited Property that was
taken from them in connection with their vacated, wrongful
convictions" also does not fall within the Ex parte Young
exception. Such a judgment would serve only as a "partial 'end
run' around" Edelman's prospective relief requirement. Green, 474
U.S. at 73.
As the Supreme Court held in Green, declaratory
judgments are barred as impermissible "end run[s]" around Ex parte
Young's prospective relief requirement when their only use would
consist of "be[ing] offered in state-court proceedings as res
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judicata on the issue of liability." Id. Issuing a declaratory
judgment in those circumstances would "have much the same effect
as [issuing] a full-fledged award of damages or restitution,"
retrospective remedies that are clearly "prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment."
Id. Such declaratory judgments, therefore,
are also barred as retrospective.
Again, Green's reasoning directly applies to this case.
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment to establish "res judicata
on the issue of liability" in their state court proceedings to
recover forfeited property. Id. They propose to use the
declaratory judgment to take the decision of whether to return the
property out of the state's hands, "leaving to the state courts
only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution
would be computed." Id.; see also Quern,
440 U.S. at 348
(approving notice about available state administrative procedures
because "whether or not the class member will receive retroactive
benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and
legislature, not with the federal court"). Thus, the declaratory
judgment would function as an impermissible "end run" around Ex
parte Young's prospective relief requirement by allowing a federal
court to, in effect, order retrospective relief: the return of
plaintiffs' forfeited property. As a result, plaintiffs'
requested declaratory judgment is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
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C. The "Some Connection" Requirement
The Commonwealth defendants present a final argument for
why the Ex parte Young exception does not apply, specific to
plaintiffs' request for additional procedural protections in state
court: Defendants do not have the authority to enforce or change
these procedures. We agree and find that plaintiffs' claim for
additional procedural protections fails on this ground too.
Under Ex parte Young, plaintiffs may only seek relief
from state officials with "some connection with the enforcement of
the [allegedly unconstitutional] act." 209 U.S. at 157.
Otherwise, plaintiffs would be "attempting to make the state a
party." See id.; see also Shibinette,
16 F.4th at 904-05
(permitting claims under Ex parte Young where the state official
sued has authority to grant the relief sought). Therefore, if an
injunction against the Commonwealth defendants could not bring
about the relief plaintiffs seek, the Ex parte Young exception
does not apply.
Plaintiffs' requested injunction to "implement an
efficient, effective, and fair process to return all Forfeited
Property to Class Members" runs afoul of this requirement.
Although the district court concluded that it could require
"additional procedural due process protections within a Rule 60(b)
hearing," the court did not address whether the Commonwealth
defendants enforce these procedures or have the authority to change
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them. Cotto, 2023 WL 7496514, at *8. And, as defendants explain,
they do not have the authority to alter state court procedures.7
Therefore, plaintiffs' request for an injunction requiring
additional procedural protections in state court is prohibited by
the Eleventh Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Like the SJC, we acknowledge the tremendous harm caused
by Farak and Dookhan's egregious misconduct. But the Eleventh
Amendment bars federal courts from providing the relief plaintiffs
seek here. For these reasons, we reverse the district court's
partial denial of the Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss
and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
complaint in full.
7 As a reminder, the Commonwealth defendants consist of the
Massachusetts Attorney General, the eleven district attorneys in
the Commonwealth, the administrator of the state trial court, and
the interim superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police.
These individuals cannot change state court procedures for
Rule 60(b) hearings; only the SJC can.
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