State v. Cote’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 40 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2011 · most notably Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), Horton v. California (1990)
36 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Blockburger v. United States · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Roviaro v. United States · Benton v. Maryland
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"The constitutional requirement, that warrants describe with particularity the places that may be searched, was a response to the abuses authorized by the writs of assistance before the Revolution. See Boyd v. United States , 116 U.S. 616 , 624-25 [ 6 S.Ct. 524 , 528-29 , 29 L.Ed. 746 ] . . . (1886). The constitutional provisions do not, however, explain the degree of precision that is necessary to satisfy the requirement of particularity. Efforts at explanation customarily begin with the statement that `[i]t is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.' State v. Moreau , [ 113 N.H. 303 , at 308, 306 A.2d 764 , at 767, quoting Steele v. United States , 267 U.S. 498 , 503 [ 45 S.Ct. 414 , 416 , 69 L.Ed. 757 ] (1925)]. "In practice, this general standard has begotten two lines of cases. First, there are those in which language identifying one dwelling unit has been held to limit the permissible search to that unit alone. For example, in Keiningham v. United States , 287 F.2d 126 , 129 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the court of appeals held that a warrant to search a row house identified as 1106 18th Street was not authority to search the house at number 1108, even though the defendant had cut a door through the party wall and was occupying the latter house as well. Similarly, Commonwealth v. Hall , 366 Mass. 790 , 799-800 , 323 N.E.2d 319 , 325-26 (1975), held that the scope of a warrant's ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“The common feature of the cases in this second group is that the areas in question were not separate dwelling or commercial units. In such instances, the same person will very probably occupy both the premises as described in the warrant and the secondary areas in question. The privacy interests of others do not, therefore, demand a narrow construction of the warrant’s terms.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Champagne“"On the authority of these cases it is fair to say, then, that there are two complementary general rules for interpreting a warrant's description of the place to be searched. As between different dwelling or commercial units, the description is limiting language, but as between a given unit and its own appurtenant spaces or buildings the description is merely identifying."”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.