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← 126 Tex. 596 - Southland Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Cotten

Southland Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Cotten’s Empirical Analysis

1936

Citation profile

93
cited by 93 later decisions
2
states following
June 1995
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 88 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 93 later decisions — most recently June 1995 · most notably Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey (1952), Reinhart v. Young (1995)

3 federal appellate · 88 state decisions

3001936194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 93 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The court, after defining ‘proximate cause,’ gave in charge to the jury the. following definition of ‘solé proximáte cause’: ‘In this connection and in connection with all issues asking about “sole proximate cause”, you are in-' structed that "sole proximate cause” means the only proximate cause; and you are further instructed that there can be only one “solé proximate cause” in this case/ "To this charge appellant reserved the following exceptions: ‘Defendant objects to the explanatory matter given in connection with special issue No. 24, and subsequent issues, wherein the court instructs the jury that “sole proximate cause means the only proximate cause; and you are further instructed that there can be only one sole proximate cause in this case”, because said explanatory matter is in effect a general charge, which is highly improper in a case submitted upon special issues, and .because the same is highly prejudicial to-the defendant in that it advises the jury of the legal effect of their answers; and in effect deprives the defendant of an opportunity to have the jury pass on the issue relative to the deceased’s negligence without reference to whether there can be one or more proximate causes; further because the term “sole” proximate cause does not require a legal definition; the Court having heretofore defined proximate cause, and the word “sole” being a plain, old Anglo-Saxon word, not ambiguous or vague, and having no particular legal significance, it is highly prejudi”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"* * * that `proper lookout' and `ordinary care' as used in the special issues applying to the child mean such lookout as would have been kept, and such care as would have been exercised, by an ordinarily prudent person of like age, intelligence, experience and capacity under the same or similar circumstances. The objections were overruled and the requests for special definitions and instructions were rejected. The effect of the trial court's charge and its refusal to give the instructions and definitions requested by respondents was that the court instructed the jury with reference to the issues of contributory negligence to measure the conduct of the minor respondent by the same standard as that applied to the conduct of an adult. This, as shown by the authorities cited in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, does not conform to the well settled applicable principle, which is that a child of tender years is not bound to exercise for its own safety the care required of an adult, the standard by which to measure the child's conduct being that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, intelligence, experience and capacity under the same or similar circumstances."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““It is reversible error, in a cause in which the testimony tends to prove the injury resulted from a new independent cause, not to submit a definition of ‘proximate cause’ embodying that term, or a similar term, together with a definition of same. Phoenix Refining Co. v. Tips (Tex.Com.App.) [ 125 Tex. 69 ], 81 S.W.(2d) 60 ; Orange & N. W. R. Co. v. Luther Harris et al. (Tex.Sup.) [ 127 Tex. 13 ], 89 S.W.(2d) 973 not reported [in State report]; Dixie Motor Coach Corporation v. Galvan et ux. (Tex.Com.App.) 86 S.W.(2d) 633 ; Greer v. Thaman et al. (Tex.Com.App.) 55 S.W.(2d) 519 ; Blanch v. Villiva et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 22 S.W.(2d) 490 ; Thomas v. Goulette (Tex.Civ.App.) 12 S.W.(2d) 829 ; Robertson & Mueller v. Holden (Tex.Com.App.) 1 S.W.(2d) 570 .””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.