Cote v. Palmer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In the situation before us we have, in the protective instinct of motherhood, one of the strongest incentives to the risk of life, the jury might reasonably conclude that there was imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the child and an instinctive reaction to that danger on the part of the mother; and, had the child actually come upon the track in the face of the approaching train, the mother would have barely failed to reach her before it would have been too late. That her sacrifice did not avail to stop the child before she reached the track, cannot be determined from the record; but even if that sacrifice in the ultimate proved unnecessary, that could not affect the decedent’s rights, for they were to be determined upon the facts as she might reasonably have believed them to be. [citations omitted] It is true that there must have been a moment when a calm observer would have seen that she could not reach the child in time to protect her and that unless she immediately stopped she would be struck by the train, but her conduct is to be judged, not in the light of cold reason, but in view of the aroused emotions which would animate a mother situated as was the decedent, and of the lack of opportunity for deliberation and exercise of a cool judgment, [citations omitted] We cannot hold that, as a matter of law, the decedent’s conduct was not that of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances, using those words in the sense we have stated....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wright v. International Harvester Co., Inc.

2. “any testimony she might give would naturally be subject to the infirmities incident to her youth. The trial court lacked such knowledge as to her qualification and credibility as a witness as would have resulted from her being called to the stand and it might well have seemed that under the circumstances the requested charge would have unfairly implied testimonial qualifications and abilities which she might not in fact possess.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Francis

3. ““ * * * The question in such case is, not what a careful person would do under ordinary circumstances, but what would he be likely to do, or might reasonably be expected to do in the presence of the existing peril, and is one of fact for the jury. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Franklin v. Lowe