United States v. Nardone’s Empirical Analysis
127 F.2d 521 · 1942
Citation profile
35 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 1990 · most notably United States v. Giordano (1974), United States v. Geaney (1969)
35 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Nardone v. United States · Ford v. United States · Nardone v. United States · Steele v. United States No. 2 · United States v. Cotter
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The question therefore comes down to this: whether a prosecution must show, not only that it has not used any information illicitly obtained, either as evidence, or as the means of procuring evidence; but that the information has not itself spurred the authorities to press an investigation which they might otherwise have dropped. We do not believe that the Supreme Court meant to involve the prosecution of crime in such a tenebrous and uncertain inquiry, or to make such a fetich of the statute [ 47 U.S.C. § 605 ] as so extreme an application of it would demand. On the last appeal the court made it abundantly clear that it did not contemplate a chase after will-o’the-wisps. ‘Tenuous claims’ are not ‘sufficient to justify the trial court’s indulgence of inquiry into the legitimacy of evidence.’ The ‘claims * * * must satisfy the trial court with their solidity.’ We are not ‘to subordinate the need for rigorous administration of justice to undue solicitude for potential and, it is to be hoped, abnormal disobedience of the law.’ [ 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307 .] Such expressions indicate no disposition towards the refinements inevitable in deciding how far the illicit information may have encouraged and sustained the pursuit. We hold that, having proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge that the [electronic surveillance and searches and seizures] did not, directly or indirectly, lead to the discovery of any of the evidence used upon the trial, * * *, the prosec”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[Wjhether a prosecution must show, not only that it has not used any information illicitly obtained, either as evidence, or as the means of procuring evidence; but that the information has not itself spurred the authorities to press an investigation which they might otherwise have dropped. 127 F.2d at 523 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.