127 Ill. 2d 146 - People v. Eckhardt’s Empirical Analysis
1989
Citation profile
20 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently December 2020
20 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Santobello v. New York · Eisenstadt v. Baird · 79 Ill. 2d 410 - People v. Bradley · 105 Ill. 2d 79 - People v. Gaines · 94 Ill. 2d 138 - People v. Boykin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"The next focus of inquiry is whether the denial of supervision to those who, pursuant to a plea agreement, have pled guilty to, or stipulated to facts supporting a charge or a finding of guilty of, a violation of section 11-503 (reckless driving) within the last five years is rationally related to the goal of highway safety. Reckless driving is a Class B misdemeanor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95½, par. 11-503(b).) Driving under the influence is a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense in addition to administrative penalties. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95½, par. 11-501(c).) The obvious focus of the prohibition of supervision found in section 5-6-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections is to preclude supervision not only to those who had previously been convicted of driving under the influence, but also to those who had been charged with that offense and plea bargained for the lesser offense of reckless driving. A person who has plea bargained to a charge of reckless driving is thus in a different position from a person who has entered a blind plea to a reckless driving charge. We find that section 5-6-1(d) is rationally related to the State's legitimate goal of promoting highway safety. In view of our analysis of the purpose of the statute, we find no equal protection violation." (Emphasis added.) Eckhardt, 127 Ill.2d at 152-53 , 129 Ill.Dec. 82 , 535 N.E.2d 847 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The provisions of paragraph (c) [which authorize an order of supervision] shall not apply to a defendant charged with violating Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance when the defendant has previously * * * * * * (3) pleaded guilty to or stipulated to the facts supporting a charge or a finding of guilty to a violation of Section 11-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [reckless driving] or a similar provision of a local ordinance or any similar law or ordinance of another state, and the plea or stipulation was the result of a plea agreement.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“"The thrust of this statute is to prevent repeat drunk driving offenders from driving and endangering the lives of motorists on Illinois highways. This is a legitimate goal that is well within the State's police powers." Eckhardt, 127 Ill.2d at 151-52 , 129 Ill.Dec. 82 , 535 N.E.2d 847 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.