127 Ill. 2d 174 - People v. Lindner’s Empirical Analysis
1989
Citation profile
97 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 101 later decisions — most recently March 2024 · most notably 223 Ill. 2d 569 - People v. Jones (2006), 144 Ill. 2d 381 - People v. Adams (1991)
97 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. · Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. · Mathews v. De Castro · 111 Ill. 2d 350 - Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. · 124 Ill. 2d 326 - People v. Orth
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 101 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“`legislative enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.'”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Because a vehicle was not involved in any way in the commission of the offenses for which defendant was convicted, the revocation of his license bears no relationship, much less a reasonable one, to the public interest we have identified. The same is true of the other offenses enumerated in section 6-205(b)(2). Moreover, the method used to further the public interest is not reasonable. Keeping off the roads drivers who have committed offenses not involving vehicles is not a reasonable means of ensuring that the roads are free of drivers who operate vehicles unsafely or illegally. To the contrary, the means chosen are arbitrary, not only because the offenses specified in section 6-205(b)(2) have no connection to motor vehicles, but also because the inclusion of those offenses and no others is arbitrary. That is, no reason suggests itself as to why the legislature chose the particular offenses enumerated in section 6-205(b)(3), as opposed to other offenses not involving a vehicle. For these reasons, we hold that the challenged provision is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the State's police power in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process and is therefore invalid.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he question of whether a legislative exercise of the police power meets the constitutional requirement of due process involves identifying the public interest that the statute is intended to protect, examining whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to that interest, and determining whether the method used to protect or further that interest is 'reasonable.'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.