Volume 127 — Maryland Reports

<p> Sales in equity: ratification;, parties; purchase with knowledge of claims against property; purchaser estopped from objecting; interest. Adverse possession: no bar to specific performance of contract of sale. </p> <p>A purchaser can not be heard to object to completing a contract for the sale of property, upon the mere ground that title depends on adversary possession. pp. 9-10</p> <p>In proceedings for the ratification of a trustee’s sale, it is not necessary that all persons be made parties who by any remote possibility might have some claim against the property, p. 10</p> <p>The mere threat or possibility of a contest will not be sufficient to induce a court to refuse a specific performance of a contract of sale; to justify such refusal, the doubt must be a rational one, and one which would induce a prudent man to hesitate about the title. p. 11</p> <p>At a trustee’s sale the contract provided that the balance of the purchase money would become due upon a ratification of the sale by the court; there was considerable delay before the sale was in fact ratified; but as the delay did not appear to have been caused solely by the purchaser, it was: Held, that he should be charged with interest only from the day of ratification, and not from the day of sale. p. 11</p>

), to which Court the cause had .been removed from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (Heuisler, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Criminal law: bill of particulars, discretion of Court. Practice: address to jury; right of Court to correct erroneous statements of the law. Indictment for conspiracy: effect of .turning State’s evidence. Verdict', form of appeals; non-reversible error.</p> <p>While the jail record of a witness may be inquired into, or proved, in order to affect bis credibility, evidence of his being confined in jail, 10 years previously, on a conviction for drunkenness, is not material on a trial for election frauds. p. 39</p> <p>Action upon a demand for a bill of particulars, in criminal as well as in civil proceedings, is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the Court. pp. 31-32</p> <p>A count in an indictment had been divided into two paragraphs, and the first paragraph stated all the facts necessary in order to fully inform the traverser of the time, place, etc., of the occurrences of the acts with which he was charged. It was: Reid, that it was not necessary to repeat those parts in the subsequent paragraph of the count, where there was no room for doubt as to what was meant. pp. 32-33</p> <p>It is the right and may be the duty of a judge to express his dissent from unwarantable statements of law made by counsel in addressing the jury. ' pp. 33-34</p> <p>The mere fact of turning State’s evidence, and testifying in the case against others charged as co-conspirators, does not operate as a grant of immunity to a traverser indicted for conspiracy. pp. 33-34</p> <p>The ruling of a lower court should not be reversed on appeal, even though erroneous, if no injury or prejudice were caused thereby. p. 34</p> <p>In criminal trials, the form of the jury’s verdict may be “Guilty” merely, or “Guilty on” one or more counts, specifying which ones; or “Not Guilty” merely, or “Not Guilty on” one or more counts, in conjunction with the finding of guilty on others. p. 40</p> <p>During the course of a criminal prosecution where the Court, in the presence of the jury, made a statement as to the law bearing upon a question before them, no reversible error is presented if the Court subsequently informs the jury that his comments were advisory merely, and that the jury were the judges both of the law and of the facts. p, 40</p>

<p>Indictments: sufficiency; essential facts; statutory offenses. Liquor laws: Chapter 179 of the Acts of 1908.</p> <p>All the essential elements necessary to constitute the offense charged must be stated in the indictment. p. 43</p> <p>Where an indictment is framed under a section of a statute, it must charge the traverser with the statutory offense created and defined by that section. p. 43</p> <p>In order to be able to convict a traverser for the sale or giving away of liquor in violation of section 10 of Chapter 179 of the Acts of 1908, it must be alleged in the indictment that the liquor was sold or given away “at the traverser’s” place of business. p. 44</p>

<p>Blander: justification as to some charges only; criminal charges; good character and reputation. Privileged communications : express malice. Damages: feelings; evidence.</p> <p> Rebuttal: re-examination of witnesses; discretion of court. </p> <p>In an action of slander the defendant may justify as to one ■or more of the separate charges. p. 48</p> <p>A plea of justification can not be required to apply to words which the defendant denies having spoken. p. 48</p> <p>In an action of slander, the plaintiff may properly testify as to the effect upon his feelings of the defamatory words. p. 48</p> <p>In an action of slander, where the plaintiff has already testified to his innocence and good faith, in the matter concerning which the slanderous charge was made, it is not reversible error to exclude his further testimony negativing the imputation of -criminality. p. 49</p> <p>The ruling of the lower court upon the propriety of a question it was proposed to ask a witness, is not open to review on appeal, when the question does not appear from the record to have been answered. p. 49</p> <p>On the re-examination of a witness in rebuttal, it is within the discretion of the trial court, whether or not a subject upon which he had been examined in chief, should be reopened, p. 50</p> <p>In an action of slander, where the words charged impute -crime, and are sought to be justified by pleading and proof, the plaintiff should be allowed in rebuttal to prove his .good reputation with respect to the element of character affected by the defamation. p. 52</p> <p>Even where a statement may be privileged, it may be the basis for a recovery of damages in an action of slander, if defendant, in making it, was actuated by express malice. p. 53</p>

<p> Acts of the Legislature: passage; amendment. Presumptions: not to he impeached hy Journals alone.- Reading of title. </p> <p>The amendment of a bill, by striking out all after the words ' “A Bill,” and substituting or inserting in lieu thereof an entire new bill, is in accordance with universal legislative procedure, and is not in conflict with section 27 of Article 3 of the Constitution. p. 58</p> <p>When a bill is properly authenticated, it can not be impeached by the Journals alone, or by oral testimony that some provision of the Constitution was not observed in its passage. ■ p. 61</p> <p>There is no constitutional provision requiring the title of a bill to be endorsed upon the back of a bill; and where the original title of a bill was endorsed upon the back of a new bill, which by amendment had been substituted for the original bill, this is not sufficient to authorize the presumption that in the reading of the bill as it was in process of being passed by the Legislature, the proper title was not read. p. 60</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (Sober, C. J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are státed in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court for Washington County.</p>

<p> Building permits: character of buildingsj character of neighborhood. Mandamus: uses other than applied for. </p> <p> Fraud upon court. </p> <p>The authority to enact and enforce building regulations rests on the ground that it is a part of the police power. p. 90</p> <p>An application for a building permit, for the erection of a store building, for general business purposes, can not be legally refused, merely because there are no other stores in the block, and because the other buildings were fine and costly dwellings. p. 90</p> <p>To obtain by a mandámus a building permit, for the erection of store buildings for general business purposes, and afterwards use the building for a lawfully forbidden use, and one for which an earlier application had been properly refused, would be a fraud on the court that issued the mandamus, and should be promptly checked. . p. 93</p>

<p>Appéal from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. (Dobler, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court,</p>

<p>Two appeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (Heuisler, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Orphans.’ Court of Baltimore City.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. (ITrner, O. J., and Worthington, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (Heuisler, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> .Fire insurance policies: inventories; “iron safe” clause; keeping of books. </p> <p>When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, ■courts have no right to make new contracts for the parties, or ignore those already made by them, simply to avoid ensuing hardship. p. 146</p> <p>An inventory is an itemized list or schedule of articles, usu.ally including a notation of their estimated values. p. 144</p> <p>A policy of fire insurance required the assured to take a complete inventory of the stock on hand at least once each calendar .year; and unless such an inventory had been taken within 12 months prior to the date of the policy, it was provided that one ■should be taken within 30 days of the issuance of the policy; the policy further required the keeping of a full and complete set of books, and also contained the “fireproof safe” clause. The appellant purchased the goods constituting the stock in trade in a certain store; and at the time of so doing made a •careful and detailed inventory giving his appraised valuations; this was made a short time before he assumed control, and before he took out the policy of insurance; the insured did not keep any books, nor did he .keep the inventory in a safe, as required by the policy; the fire totally destroyed the goods a month or so later.</p> <p>Held, that such an inventory was such a one as was required by the policy; and that the insured could not recover on the the•ory, that he had the right to make an inventory within 30 days •of the delivery of the policy. p. 144</p> <p>It was further: Held, that the failure to keep in a fireproof' safe suck inventory and the sets of books, as the policy required to be so kept, was a failure on the part of the appellant to do that which was proper for the protection not only of the insurer but of the insured. p. 147</p> <p>It was further: Held, that since the failure of the appellant to produce the books and records that the policy provided for, was chargeable to his own default in the performance of his' contractual duty, it was a bar to his recovery under the policy. p. 147</p> <p>The neglect of an insured to become familiar with the terms of the policy which he seeks to enforce, does not relieve him of the binding effect of its covenants, in the absence of any evidence impeaching its validity. p. 147</p>

<p>Leases: for longer term than 15 years; right to redeem; purpose of statute; collateral agreements in leases.</p> <p>In general, a lease of a building carries with it the land upon which the building stands. p. 156</p> <p>The redemption statutes, codified in Article 53, section 24-, and Article 21, section 93, relating to the right of redemption of leases, relate to buildings as well as to land. pp. 155-156</p> <p>Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. p. 158</p> <p>Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1914, affecting the right to redeem business leases, has no application to leases created before the Act went into effect. p. 159</p> <p>In such a case the right of redemption was in the nature of a contract, and the vested right can not be defeated by legislation subsequent to the lease. p. 159</p> <p>Where section 24 of Article 53 of the Code gives the right to redeem any lease for a longer period than 15 years, at any time after the expiration of five years from date of such lease, the time for redemption is to be reckoned from the date of the lease, and not from the commencement of the term. p. 160</p> <p>The right of redemption of leases to which the law applies, for a sum of money equal to the capitalization of the rent reserved at a rate not exceeding six per centum, is a statutory right, and in legal contemplation the lease must be read as if this right were incorporated in it, and as if the parties had contracted with regard to such provision. p. 160</p> <p>These rights of redemption were given for the benefit of the public, and not out of special consideration for the parties to the lease. p. 160</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. • (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. (Bond, T.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Wills: constructionj technical rules and intention; general and particular intent; testator’s right to divide his estate as he pleases; equality among relatives. </p> <p>In construing wills, if the court is satisfied that the technical rules, which have been applied.to particular expressions, will not carry out, but defeat, the intention of the testator, the rules must yield to such intention, and such construction given as will effectuate that intent. p. 175</p> <p>In the construction of wills, if there be apparent a general and a particular intent, the general intent, although first expressed, controls and overrules the particular intent, if there is any conflict between them. p. 175</p> <p>A clearly expressed intention in one portion of a will is not to yield to a doubtful construction in any other portion, p. 175-</p> <p>A testator may make division of his estate among his legatees equally or unequally, as he may see fit. p. 177</p> <p>As between individuals in the same degree of relationship, equality would mean equality of sharing, or of participation. p. 177</p> <p>The mere fact that a testator/ in dividing the remainder of his estate among certain legatees, adds an “s” to the last name of each, is not an indication that the division was to be made by families. p.377</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (Sopee, C. J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Statutes: construction; intent. Employers’ Liability Act: appeals; insurance carrier; jurisdiction; foreign corporations; doing business in State; courts having jurisdiction over. </p> <p>The cardinal rule in the construction of statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent, as expressed in the words of the statute; and for this purpose the whole Act must be construed together. p. 193</p> <p>The real intent, when ascertained, will always prevail over the literal sense of the language used. p. 193</p> <p>The object and purpose of Oh. 800 of the Acts of 1914 — the Employers’ Liability Act, sec. 56 of Art. 101, Bagby’s Code, Vol. Ill — was to provide a speedy and inexpensive method by which, in the case of injuries to employees, compensation might be made to them, or to those depending upon them, without delay of long litigation and at a minimum of cost; and to substitute a more nearly uniform scale of compensation in such cases than is attainable from the divergent estimates of juries, and to avoid tbe application of certain well established rules of law, which in some cases have seemed harsh in their operation. p. 192</p> <p>The insurance company, insuring against the claims of employees, according to the terms of the law, occupies the position of surety for the employer. . p. 194</p> <p>The words of section 56 of Article 101 of the Code, giving the right to hear appeals from the decisions of .the Commission, to the circuit courts, or law courts of Baltimore City, having jurisdiction over the place where the accident occurred, or over the person appealing from such decision, includes the insurance carrier, .as a party interested, to whom the right of appeal is given. p. 193</p> <p>For the purpose of an appeal from the finding of the Commission, the insurance carrier ca-n ony address itself to the Court- having jurisdiction in the county where the insurance was solicited .and obtained. p. 194</p> <p>The mere fact that the main office of the insurance carrier is located in a distant county does not vest the court of that county with concurrent jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. ' p. 194</p> <p>A foreign corporation that has complied with the statutes so as to enable it to do business in this State, is amenable to the process of any of the courts in the State. p. 192</p>

<p>Death from negligence: damages under Code, Article 67: pecuniary loss only; death of child; “due care”; primary and contributory: province of jury; el.ectric cars and motor trucks; duty of driver and motorman; speed of cars. Prayers: inconsistent with facts.</p> <p>Tlie rights and duties of the operators of electric cars and of motor trucks in their use of the streets are co-extensive and reciprocal. p. 200</p> <p>It is as much the duty of the motorman to exercise due care in running the cars over crossings, as it is the duty of a motor truck driver to act prudently in the management of the motor vehicle, as it draws near a point of possible danger. p. 200</p> <p>Where there is some evidence of negligence both on the part of the plaintiff and of the defendant, the question of primary and contributory negligence is properly left for the consideration of the jury. p. 201</p> <p>Prayers which are inappropiate to the proven facts are properly rejected. p. 203</p> <p>In an action for damages for the death of a child, who was killed by a collision between the electric car of the defendant corporation and the motor truck in which the child was riding, it was: Held, that the expression, “due care of the person accompanying” the child, was not rendered erroneous for vagueness by the fact that both the child’s grandfather and the chauffeur were in the motor truck with him, when one of the defendant’s prayers had been granted leaving to the jury the fact that the child was riding on the truck “in company with the chauffeur.” p. 204</p> <p>In an action of damages against a railway company for injuries caused by a collision by one of its cars, evidence of the high rate of speed of the car at the time is admissible. p. 205</p> <p>In an action for damages for injuries resulting in death, brought under Article 67 of the Oode, recovery is limited to the pecuniary losses sustained by the plaintiff as the result of such death. p. 205</p> <p>In an action of that character for the death of a child, evidence may be given that the parents had younger children, for whom the child that was killed used to assist in caring, p. 205</p>

<p>Trusts and trustees: no power to alter terms of trust; discretion and powers; when — are personal; substituted trustees; acceleration of time for appointment. Wills: interpretation; —from language used.</p> <p>Trustees have no power to alter the nature and object o£ the deed or will appointing them, or under which they derive their powers, nor to dispense with the exact performance of the conditions imposed upon them. p. 215</p> <p>The directions of a testator, when plain, unambiguous and in violation of no established principle of law, must of necessity prevail. ' p. 217</p> <p>In interpreting wills, the question of intent is to be sought from the language used by the testator; it is not a question of what the testator may have meant, but simply wdiat is the meaning of the words he used. p. 2.15</p> <p>Nor does any such power reside in a court of chancery, p. 215</p> <p>"Where power is given to an executor or trustee by reason of special confidence in the individual, or to be exercised only upon their personal judgment or discretion, no such power will pass to a substituted trustee. p. 214</p> <p>By his will, M. S. left his estate to his wife and certain other trustees in trust, with certain broad and discretionary powers, and further provided that upon the death of his wife, the other trustees were to assign and convey the trust estate to the Safe Deposit and Trust Company, for the purposes of the trust; it was also provided that in the event of the estate passing into the hands of the said Trust Company, the discretionary powers theretofore given to the trustees should be exercised by the President of the Trust Company alone: Held, that upon the resignation of the wife (the other trustee having died or refused to act), the property was to be conveyed to the Trust Company, and the discretionary powers referred to were to be exercised by its President, in the same manner as would have been the case upon the wife’s death. p. 214</p> <p>The creator of a trust has full power to provide for the appointment of a successor or successors in the trust, in case the original trustee refuses to act, dies or is removed. p. 212</p> <p>If the substitution of a new trustee is provided for in the will, either by naming the person to be substituted trustee, or by giving the power of appointment to another person, the substituted trustee, named in accordance to such provisions, takes under the will and derives the power to act from the testator. p. 212</p> <p>The discharge of the duties of a trustee with relation to the trust may be performed by such substituted trustee, even though such substitution was made at a different and earlier time from that which the testator or creator of the trust contemplated. p. 213</p> <p>The. acceleration of legacies under certain conditions has long received judicial sanction. The same principle may be applied to the administration of a trust. p. 213</p> <p>In general, and unless the intention of the testator appears clearly to be otherwise, where any of several trustees disclaim, the remaining trustees or trustee will not only take the entire legal estate, but also all the powers and authorities vested in the trustees as such, and which are requisite for the administration of the trust. pp. 213, 214</p> <p>Equity will never allow a trust to fail for lack of a trustee. p. 213</p> <p>Where a provision in a will leaving property in trust declared that in the discretion of the trustees, the portion of one of the cestuis que trustent should, under certain conditions be paid to him absolutely, it applies to the whole of such child’s portion, and not to any part less than the whole. pp. 216-217</p>

<p>Corporations: suits against; service of writs; officers, who are — ; attorneys generally not; effect of Acts of 1912, Chapter 424, Section 5. Pleading: process; reneivals; failure to serve; question of discontinuance.</p> <p>The attorney of a corporation is not an “officer” of the corporation, within the sense of the statute providing for service of writs upon corporations. p. 221</p> <p>Section 5 of Chapter 424 of the Acts of 1912, providing for the service of writs upon the attorney of a corporation, relates only to cases of violations of the provisions of that Act, and confers no general authority on such an attorney to accept service as upon an officer of the corporation. p. 221</p> <p>In general, when the plaintiff leaves a break in the proceedings, as by not continuing the process regularly from day to day, or from term to term, as he ought to do, the suit is discontinued, and the defendant is no longer bound to attend. p. 222</p> <p>But this rule should not be applied, where the plaintiff has a right to have a judicial determination as to whether or not he had succeeded in bringing the defendant into court, before ordering any writ. p. 224</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Article 3, section 40: Constitution; talcing of private property'; jury trial, may be given to both parties; appeals.. Condemnation of land: value; evidence; sales of similar lands; discretion of trial court. Prayers', mere abstractions of law. New trials: discretion of court.</p> <p>Section 40 of Article 3 of the Constitution of Maryland, prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation as agreed between the parties, or awarded by a jury, does not prohibit the enacting of laws conferring such right of a jury trial upon other, or all, parties to condemnation proceedings. pp. 235-236</p> <p>Under such section of the Constitution, the Legislature may confer the right to a jury trial upon the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, even in a case where the appeal was taken by the other party. pp. 237, 238</p> <p>The provision in section 179 of the Charter of Baltimore City (Chapter 123 of the Acts of 1898), to the effect that the “persons” appealing to the City Court from the amounts of assessments or damagess allowed in condemnation cases shall be secured in- the right of a jury trial,” applies as well to the City as to the landowner. p. 236</p> <p>In such proceedings, the City is entitled to a jury trial, even though the appeal was taken by the other party, pp. 237, 238</p> <p>Prayers that submit to the jury mere abstractions of law are erroneous and should be refused. p. 240</p> <p>In establishing the value of lands, the prices realized at sales of similar lands in the vicinity, made within a reasonable period of time theretofore, at voluntary and not forced sales, are admissible in. evidence. p. 241</p> <p>The determination of the degree of similarity that must exist, in order to admit such evidence, and the nearness in respect to time and place, must largely be left to the discretion of the trial judge. p. 241</p> <p>In determining the value of lands taken by condemnation proceedings for the opening of streets, etc., the possibility of a car line being constructed upon the street to be opened, is too speculative to be considered. p. 242</p> <p>In general, no appeal lies to the Court of Appeals from the refusal of the lower court to grant a new trial. p. 242</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (Durey, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.-</p>

<p>Cross appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. (Dueey, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Wills: constructionj power to purchase part of estate; time for exercise; reasonable time.</p> <p>In construing wills, the general intent of the testator must prevail over a particular intent. p. 273</p> <p>A testator’s estate consisted mainly of the capital stock of the corporation, under the name of which he and a brother had been carrying on a profitable business; the will, after making careful provisions for the division of his estate between his wife and children, and the survivors, etc., and, to his executors the power to sell, reinvest, etc., gave to a brother an option to purchase the testator’s stock in said corporation at its book-value, according to the last annual statement: Held, in view of all the facts of the case, the option was intended to be one to be exercised in a reasonable time, and that a reasonable time would be within a year from the grant of letters on the decedent’s estate. p. 275</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (Soper, C. J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Caroline County. (In Equity.) (Adkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Gifts: terms of trust; acceptance; cestui que trust no right to alteration of terms. </p> <p>Where an aunt and the father united in a voluntary gift to the daughter, and had stock placed in the daughter’s name, the income to he paid to the daughter but the stock delivered to the father, as trustee, to be held by him until his death, to all of which terms the daughter consented, there is no legal or equitable principle that enables the donee to abrogate the terms and limitations of the gift and receive the immediate delivery of the stock. p. 294</p> <p>One who accepts a voluntary benefaction, with the understanding and agreement that it shall be subject to the terms of a trust expressly declared and approved, can not be permitted to deny the efficacy of the trust, or to defeat the purpose for which the limitations were imposed. p. 294</p>

<p>Cross appeals from the Circuit Court for Howard County. (Thomas, C. J., and Forsyth, Jr., J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. (Duncan, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Husband and wife: alienation of affections; damages; suit against wife’s parents; burden of proof; to show malice; parents’ rights. Prayers: withdrawing case from jury. </p> <p>An action by a husband will lie against anyone who has wrongfully alienated the affections of his wife and deprived him of his conjugal rights. p. 316</p> <p>But in suits of that character against one of his wife’s parents, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was prompted by malice in what he had said or done, and the plaintiff must overcome the presumption that the actions complained of were due merely to what the defendant believed to be for the real good of his child and under the influence of natural affection for her. pp. 317-318</p> <p>In deciding this question of taking a case from the jury, the Court should first assume the truth of all the testimony given to the jury, tending to sustain the plaintiff’s right to recover, and of all inferences of fact fairly dedueible therefrom; and if, upon consideration of such evidence, it is found of sufficient probative force to enable an ordinary intelligent mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of the plaintiff’s right to recover, the evidence is properly submitted to the 'jury, by whom its weight and value is to be determined. p. 319</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. (In Equity.) (Beall, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Talbot County. (Constable, O. J., and Adkins and Hopper, JJ.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (Soper, C. J.)</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe Court.</p>

<p> Interest publicae ut finis sit litium. </p> <p>Wherever an issue exists in an action or proceeding, each of the parties should anticipate that the adversary will offer evidence to support his side of it, and should be prepared with counter-proof. Where hé has had such opportunity and does not avail himself of it, or though availing himself of it is unable to overcome the effect of the other side’s evidence, he can not obtain what, in effect, would be a new trial of the issue before another tribunal by charging that the judgment against him was procured by fraud. > '' p. 341</p> <p>Public policy demands that there should be an end of litigation. . • . • - p> 341</p>

<p>Telegraph Companies: mistakes in transmission of messages; liability; damages — loss of profits on goods sold. Pleading: variance; appeals; exceptions. Evidence: weight; province of jury.</p> <p>Before the passage of Chapter 110 of the Acts of 1914, notwithstanding the provisions of the Code, section 9 of Article 5, relating to the necessity for the raising below of questions as to prayers before the matter can be passed on by the Court of Appeals, yet if prayers referred to the pleadings, the Court was called upon to examine them, and if there was any variance between the pleadings and the proof, such reference in the prayers was deemed sufficient to permit the variance to be availed of on appeal. p. 352</p> <p>Under the Act of 1914, such a variance can not be taken advantage of by a mere reference in the prayers to the pleadings ; but in order to take advantage of such defect, the prayers should set out the point as to which it is claimed a variance exists by referring to that portion of the declaration which it is claimed is at variance with the evidence. pp. 352-353</p> <p>Where a manufacturer, without any fault of his own, but by the error of the Telegraph Company through which he transmits his message, is made to make an offer to furnish goods at a figure lower than he intended, and the offer is accepted, and the manufacture of the goods is begun before the mistake is discovered, then if the manufacture of the goods is such that it must be a “continuous process,” to stop the manufacture of which before the completion of the order, would cause a loss greater than would have been occasioned by a sale at the mistaken price quoted, the mere knowledge of the manufacturer, of the existence of the mistake, before the delivery of the goods, will not limit his right of recovery, against the Telegraph Company, to the mere cost of transmitting the message. p. 354</p> <p>The weight and correctness of evidence is for the jury, and not for the court. ' p. 354</p> <p>In general, where an offer for the sale of goods at a certain price is made by telegraph, and, by the mistake of the Telegraph Company in transmitting the message, a lower price is quoted than was intended, the measure of damages, if the goods, at such a lower price, were accepted by the vendee, and obliged to be delivered by the vendor, is the difference between the price named in the telegram, as delivered for transmission, and the price which the seller by the exercise of reasonable prudence and diligence could have obtained for the goods, and not the difference between the price as it was quoted to the Telegraph Company for transmission and the price as actually conveyed to the addressee through the Telegraph Company’s mistake. p. 357</p> <p>The difference between the prices named by the vendor, as he sent it for transmission, and the lower price telegraphed through error by the Telegraph Company, may be accepted as evidence of the damages actually sustained, in case the goods were delivered to the addressee before the sender discovers the mistake, if the sender could not reduce his loss by disposing of the goods in any other manner. p. 357</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. (Dob-lee,, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the-Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County. (In Equity.) (Harlan, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

Appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. (Gortee, J.) Augusta, Marx sued the estate of her father-in-law, for services, to him, in nursing him, and carring for his clothes for 559 weeks; the verdict and judgment being in favor of the plaintiff, for $1,000, the defendant, the executor, took this appeal.

(Gorter, J.) George Marx sued the estate of his deceased father for board he had furnished for 559 weeks; the verdict and judgment being in his favor for $885; the executor took this appeal.

<p> Mechanics’ lien: goods sold to contractor; when not agent of owners; when no lien for materials delivered; deficient notice. </p> <p>The owners of a lot of ground contracted with a builder to erect for them a building upon the lot; the builder contracted with R. & L. for all the stone to be used on the structure; a month after the last of the stone had been delivered, the owners took possession of the uncompleted building and finished the same, making use for that purpose of the unused stone left upon the premises; notice to claim a lien under the Mechanics’ Lien Law had been made upon the owners by the material man, within the time prescribed by the statute: Held, that there was an absolute sale and delivery of the stone to the contractor, and that regarding such purchase the contractor could not he considered as the agent of the owners. p. 392</p> <p>The fact that the owners took possession of the unfinished building and the unused stone did not change the relation of the parties, in so far as the Mechanics’ Lien Law was concerned. p. 392</p> <p>The material man’s right to compensation from the owners depended upon their perfecting their lien according to the mandate of the statute. p. 392</p> <p>A letter from the material man to' the owners, written sixty divs after the last delivery of the stone, notifying them that tie material man had furnished the stone, and requesting payment of the same, to which letter the owners never replied, did not bring the material man within the protection of the Mechanics’ Lien Law. p. 392</p> <p>The failure of the owners to reply to the letter did not amount to an implied promise to pay. p. 392</p> <p>The principle that where an account rendered by one party to another, with whom he has had relations, is retained by that party an unreasonable time, without his making any objection to its accuracy, the account may be considered as correct, has no application where the parties are strangers, in no contractual relation. pp. 392-393</p> <p>The principle that the notice, required under section 11 of Article 63 of the Code, is unnecessary where the owner is also the builder, as decided in former cases, has no application where an owner -becomes the builder, without having been the original purchaser of the materials, either directly or by agent, p. 393</p>

), to which County the case had been removed from Anne Arundel County. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

), to which county the case had been removed from the Circuit Court for Washington County. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Section 86 of Article 75: equitable defenses at law'. Contracts', signed unread. Fraud.</p> <p>A defense which is good at law can not be pleaded on equitable grounds. p. 413</p> <p>A party who, being able to read, deliberately signs a contract without reading, or scrutinizing it, can not escape liability under it, occasioned by his own carelessness, unless his signature to the contract was occasioned by fraud or duress. p. 416</p> <p>And if there is any evidence of any such fraud, etc., it is error not to submit it to the consideration of the jury. p. 418</p> <p>Before a court can grant a prayer withdrawing a case from the consideration of the jury, on the ground of want of evidence, it must assume the truth of all the evidence tending to sustain the claim, or defense, as the case may be, and all inferences of fact, fairly deducible from it, and this although such evidence be contradicted in every particular by the opposing evidence. p. 414</p>

<p>Fire insurance: subdivision of rislc; original insurer; when agent for other insurers; terms of policy. Waivers by agents. Notice of vacancy.</p> <p>An application was made to a company for fire insurance to a certain amount; the company, being unwilling to underwrite the whole risk, placed four-fifths of it with other companies, it issuing its policy for one-fifth of the amount desired, and distributing the balance in four equal amounts among four other companies; this was done without the knowledge of the assured and without any consultation with him; the agent of the original company, who had secured the business, redelivered the policies, collected the premiums and attended to the renewals; it was: Held, that under the circumstances such original insurance company was the agent for the others. p. 427</p> <p>Such agent of the original company had once received notice that the property insured was temporarily unoccupied, and had been authorized Jo waive the condition providing for the avoiding of liability while the property was left vacant, unless notice in advance had.been given: Held, that such agent had implied authority to accept notice of a vacancy, and that therefore such notice given to him was constructive notice to the original company, and therefore to the other companies. pp. 425-427</p> <p>An insurance company which, issues a policy and collects the premiums, with actual or imputed knowledge that warranties in it are contrary to the real facts, will not be permitted to defeat recovery by the assured, on the ground that the conditions stipulated for in the policy did not in fact exist. p. 424</p>

<p>injunctions: pleading; filing written instruments referred to v‘i:' in bill. Parties: non-joinder; demurrer. Laches.</p> <p>,, Under. General. Equity. Rule No. 4, np, order or process will be made or issued’ on any bill, etc., until each bill, etc,, together with all the exhibits referred to as parts thereof, be actually filed with the clerk. p. 432</p> <p>i Inhere a bill in equity is filed for the purppse of charging the lapds.of a decedent withfhe payment of'certain sums of money alleged to be distributable to his' children as legatees under his will, which is referred to in the bill, the will of the testator is a necessary part of the bill and should be'filed therewith, p. 432</p> <p>,. fThp non-joindep or. defense of the want of. necessary parties, when apparent on the face of a bill, may be availed of by demurrer to, the bill. p. 432</p> <p>Equity does not countenance laches or long delays, and will rpfuse.to interfere in favor of.a party, guilty of laches.’or unreasonably acquiescence in. the assertion of stale demands.' p.433</p>

<p>B. & O. R. R.: charter rights; tax exemptions; when not , wiaved. Corporations: irrepealahle contracts with State. Duty of State.</p> <p>The same degree of fair dealing which is enforced between individuals must be applicable when the parties are the State and a corporation having contractual relations with it. p. 449</p> <p>The special charter of the B. & O. R. R. Co., granted by the Act of 1826, constitutes a contract between the Railroad Company and the State, and the tax exemption conferred by section 18 of the charter is not one which it is within the power of the Legislature to modify or repeal, without the assent of the Railroad Company. p. 437</p> <p>To affect a charter given before the Constitution of 1851, there must be both the action of the Legislature and the assent of the corporation. pp. 444-445</p> <p>The acceptance by the B. & O. R. R. Co. of the rights contained in certain ordinances of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, amounting to police regulations of the laying of tracks and'switches, which acts were in themselves no new grant of power, but only the regulations by the City of the exercise of powers contained in the B. & O.’s original charter, is not such an acceptance of rights and privileges as to bring the B. & O. R. R. within the amendment of the State Constitutions of 1851 and 1867, by Chapter 195 of the Acts of 1890, now known as Article 3, section 48, and which provided in substance that every corporation accepting new rights, privileges or powers should be presumed to assent to the repeal of its exemptions from taxation. pp. 438-439</p> <p>In a mortgage executed by the Railroad Company, there was a covenant that the Railroad Company would discharge all “taxes and assessments, etc., lawfully imposed upon the railroad and other premises or property hereby mortgaged, etc.,” provided nothing contained in the section should require the Company to pay any such tax, etc., so long as the Railroad Company in good faith contests the validity thereof, so that the priority of the indenture should be fully preserved in respect to such property. It was: Held, this was no surrender of the Company’s right to exemption from taxation. p. 433</p> <p>The statutes relating to the taxation of mortgages have no application to mortgages executed by a railroad company to a trustee to secure bonds sold to investors. p. 43S</p> <p>The Constitutions of 1851 and 1867 do not deny to the State all power to enter into a contract with a corporation, irrepealable in its nature. p. 447</p> <p>As far as contractual obligations are concerned, the construction of the Washington Branch of the B. & O. R. R. under Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1830 and Chapter 175 of the Acts of 1832, was fully as much a contract between the State and the Railroad Company as was its original charter, and the limitations therein provided, as to the burdens to be imposed upon the corporation, are as amply protected as though contained in the original charter. p. 448</p> <p>Chapter 155 of the Acts of 1878 was an Act passed for the settlement of counter claims between the State and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, based upon a sufficient consideration, and contains all the elements of a contract requisite to bring it within the protection of Article 1, section 10, of the U. S. Constitution. pp. 445-448</p> <p>Such Act is an irrepealable contract, and is unaffected by Chapter 559 of the Acts of 1890, Chapter 120 of the Acts of 1896, or Chapter 712 of the Acts of 1906. p. 450</p> <p>The purchase by the B. & O. R. R. Co. of the shares of stock in its Washington Branch which were owned by the State was not an exercise of any new powers or franchise rights, and did not operate as a waiver or surrender of any tax exemptions. pp. 440-441</p>

<p>Husband and wife: creditor relation; property purchased with wife’s money; no promise of repayment; mortgage of property to secure debt of wife; repayment; Principal and surety.</p> <p>If, with, the knowledge and acquiescence of the wife, her money is used to purchase property and the title thereto is taken in the name of the husband, she can not claim as creditor of the husband, in the absence of an express promise of the husband at the time to repay to her. pp. 455-456</p> <p>When property is pledged or mortgaged by the owner to secure the debt of another person, such property occupies the position of a surety. p. 459</p> <p>The implied obligation of the principal to indemnify his surety springs up at the time the relation is entered into, and is consummated when the surety has paid the debt, but the principal can show that he has reimbursed his surety. p. 459</p> <p>Evidence is always admissible to show the equitable rights of the principal and surety toward each other, if material to the right to recover the amount paid by the surety; and as between the immediate parties, to show their true relation in fact, although different from that indicated by the instrument or their relative positions thereon.. p. 459</p> <p>, A wife, a beneficiary of a trust estate, permitted her husband to receive her income from her trustee, which was used to purchase real estate the title to which was taken in the husband’s name; subsequently money was borrowed by the wife from her trust estate, the loan being secured by a mortgage on the property, the husband continuing to receive the wife’s income. Upon a foreclosure of the mortgage, the excess was claimed by the wife, holding a judgment against the husband,</p> <p>and by the husband, alleging that the debt secured by the mortgage was the sole and separate debt of the wife, and that the property mortgaged was security only:</p> <p>Held: that if the husband, while receiving the wife’s income, proposed to treat the wife as his debtor, the circumstances demanded that he apply the income to the debt, or tell the wife he proposed to assert the rights of a surety if his property was sold. p. 460</p> <p>Held: that a court of equity, in the absence of clear and satisfactory proof, that the wife did not intend her income to be applied to the payment of the debt, will not permit a husband, as surety, to hold the wife responsible, as principal; but will be regarded as reimbursed where after the creation of the relation of principal and surety, the husband receives more of her money than that for which he became surety. p. 461</p>

<p>Attachment laws: “uncertain interests’ j spendthrift trusts.</p> <p>The property devised in trust for a devisee is not liable to attachment, and can not be reached by his creditors by any process either at law or equity, where by the plain terms of the will, the right to the enjoyment of the income in the hands of the trustee is to the exclusion of his creditors. p. 465</p> <p>While the language of the Code, section 10 of Article 9, provides that any kind of property or credits may be attached for a person’s debts, it does not apply to, or cover, a contingent or uncertain interest in a trust estate. p. 468</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (Dueey, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Two appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. (Dobles., J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Mortgages: payment; bill to compel release; burden of proof; mortgage notes; presumption as to; Code, Article 66, sec- ■ tion 25, not retroactive. Witnesses: competency; other party dead. Administrators: draty of — .</p> <p>The presumption of payment in favor of a mortgagor in possession for over 20 years is not conclusive. p. 497</p> <p>When relief is sought by a bill in equity to compel the release of a mortgage, on the ground of payment, an allegation of payment is insufficient, and must be supported by proof. p. 498</p> <p>On appeal from a decree refusing to direct the execution of a release of a mortgage, alleged to have been long overdue, etc., the cause was remanded, under section 38 of Article 5 of the Code, without reversing or affirming the decree, for further proceedings;- it being: Meld, that there was not sufficient evidence to justify action on the bill. p. 501</p> <p>Section 25 of Article 66 of the Code, providing that the recorded release of a mortgage shall cause it to be conclusively presumed that the notes secured thereby are paid, so far as any lien on the property is concerned, is not retroactive. p. 499</p> <p>The statute, section 3 of Article 35 of the Code, excluding the evidence of one party to a transaction, when the other party is dead, was passed to prevent injustice being done, and not to cause it. p. 501</p> <p>An administrator must see that the estate of his decedent is protected from unjust claims, but it is also his duty to aid in reaching a just conclusion as to them. ' p. 501</p>

<p>Patapsco River: jurisdiction over — ; loading dynamite. Baltimore City: enforcing statutes._ Police Department.</p> <p>The provisions in the Charter of Baltimore City, authorizing it to provide by ordinance for preserving the navigation of the Patapsco River and its tributaries; for establishing the limits beyond which piers, etc., may not be built; for cleaning and deepening the channels; for removing obstructions to navigation, etc.; for regulating the anchoring or moving of vessels; for regulating the use of wharves and piers, with penalties for the violation of the same, do not confer any power to regulate the loading of explosives in vessels stationed either within or beyond the city limits, excepting as to the location and movement of vessels receiving or discharging such cargoes. p. 504</p> <p>Inasmuch as the Police Department of the City of Baltimore is controlled by a commission appointed by the Governor of the State, and operating independently of the municipal government, the city is not liable for damages on account of the nonperformance of its police regulations, except in cases where its own conduct has produced the conditions which caused the injury. p. 505</p> <p>The exercise by the City of its authority to provide for the safety of persons or property, where its corporate or proprietary interests do not require such action, is a governmenatl function for the non-performance of which it can not be sued, unless such a right of action is given by statute. p. 507</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County. (Beam and Camamer, JJ.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Partnerships: individual liability; not for torts beyond scope of business; attorneys-at-law j investments for clients; fraud; proof.</p> <p>A plea not denying the partnership alleged in a declaration, admits the partnership only, and does not admit that the transaction sued on was within the partnership scope. p. 531</p> <p>The statute suspending the running of limitations when the plaintiff has been kept in ignorance of his cause of action by the defendant’s fraud, does not apply against a partner who has been guilty of no fraud or wrongdoing in the transaction. p. 532</p> <p>A member of a law firm, not engaged in the business of investing moneys for clients, is not responsible for the acts of a co-partner in making an investment, which does not appear on the firm books and of which he has no knowledge, pp. 534-535</p> <p>It was error to permit the plaintiff (who had brought suit for moneys lost by an attorney to whom she had entrusted them for investment) to testify what she thought was his law partner’s connection with the transaction. p. 535</p> <p>An attorney, with general authority to invest, who invested eight hundred dollars of his client’s money and seven hundred dollars of his own money in a loan, taking therefor one promissory note for fifteen hundred dollars secured by speculative stock, and receiving no compensation from his client for the investment, was not necessarily guilty of fraud for making an undisclosed arrangement with the borrower by which the attorney was to receive a percentage of any prospective enhancement in the value of the stock, when this undisclosed prospective profit could only have been received after repayment of his client’s money. pp. 537-538</p> <p>A client who, in such case, knew shortly after the loan was made, over six years before the institution of the suit, what the character of the security'was, and that the stock certificate was in the lawyer’s name, and who finally severed relations with her counsel nearly four years before the institution of the suit, and failed to make any inquiry as to the circumstances of the transaction, did not exercise the usual and ordinary diligence necessary to suspend the running of limitations where ignorance of the cause of action is relied on for such suspension. p. 538</p>

<p>Appeal from' Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (TIeuisler, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. In Equity. (Duncan, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas. (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In Equity. (Peter, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p> Workmen’s Compensation Act: appeals from commission; not confined to same evidence; oral evidence. Statutes: construction; intention. Constitutional law : jury trials; implies right to adduce evidence. </p> <p>In construing statutes, the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the words of the Act, must be ascertained and given effect. p. 575</p> <p>The language of the Act is its most natural expositor, and where the language is susceptible of a sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by any extraneous considerations. p. 575</p> <p>The construction must be liberal in favor of private right, and any construction which imputes an intention to deny valuable rights is to be avoided. p. 575</p> <p>Statutes are presumed to have been passed in full recognition of the constitutional rights of citizens. p. 575</p> <p>Trial by jury implies the right of either party to the cause to call witnesses to support his case. p. 576</p> <p>Chapter 800 of the Acts of 1914 — the Workmen’s Compensation Act — provides that the decision of the Commission shall be treated on appeal as prima facie correct, and that the burden of proof shall be on the party attacking it. p. 577</p> <p>An appeal from a judgment of the Commission to the courts, presents for determination questions of law and facts, p. 576</p> <p>No provision of the Act attempts to confine or limit the appeal to the testimony taken before the Commission. p. 576</p> <p>The Act secures to the party appealing the right to a trial by jury, and the right to have any question of fact involved in the case submitted to the jury. p. 577</p> <p>And on such an appeal the party attacking the decision of the commission may, under the statute, introduce any proper oral evidence. p. 577</p>

<p>Road Laws: Ellicott Gity; Ch. 836 of Acts of 1914; taxes collected for road repairs not retroactive; statutes, construction.</p> <p>The natural meaning of the words, “taxes levied and collected for road purposes,” in the connection in which they are used in Chapter 836 of the Acts of 1914, in the revised charter of Ellicott City, is the taxes to be expended in the maintenance and construction of the public roads; the language has reference to taxes levied for the future construction and maintenance of the roads. p. 583</p> <p>The provisions in the Act of 1914 relating to the division of the Howard County road taxes between County Commissioners of Howard County and the Commissioners of Ellicott City, do not relate to such taxes raised for the repair of roads that had been made before the Act went into effect. p. 584</p> <p>While the salary of the Road Superintendent is money expended for road purposes, the Commissioners of Ellicott City are not entitled to any part of it under the above provisions of the Act of 1914. pp. 582-583</p> <p>Statutes are not to be given a retroactive effect unless the words used are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be given them, or unless the intention of the Legislature could not be otherwise satisfied. p. 584</p>

<p>Wills: Construction; intention; ' children;” devises to a class; trusts, termination of — .</p> <p>What a testator meant to say must be gathered from what he did say in his will, as viewed from the standpoint he then occupied; and what the testator says in his will, considered in the light of established legal principles, must govern the interpretation of the will. pp. 588-589</p> <p>By his will, a testator bequeathed property in trust “for the use and benefit of all the children of” her brother H.; the duration of the trust was declared to be for the time “when there shall be no child of my said brother living and under 21 years of age,” at which time it was declared the trust should cease, and distribution be made, in accordance with the terms of the will:</p> <p>Held, .that this constituted a gift to a class of persons, and that the mere use of the word “all” preceding the word “children” did not change the legal effect of the rule applicable to such gifts. p. 589</p> <p>In general, in cases of a devise to a class, the members of the class are to be ascertained upon the death of the testator, since a will usually speaks from that day. p. 589,</p> <p>But where the distribution is, by the terms of the will, deferred to some time after the testator’s death, the gift will embrace, not only all the children or members of the class living at the death of the testator, but all those who may subsequently come into existence, and are living at the time designated for the distribution. pp. 589-590</p> <p>In this case it was: Held, that the trust had ended and that a distribution of the property should be made by. the trustee to the beneficiaries free and discharged of the trust. p. 592</p>

<p> Wills: Construction; next of ¡tin; husband. </p> <p>In general, an ultimate limitation in favor of next of kin or of heirs at law, does not include a husband, unless there be some manifestation of an intention on the part of the testator to include him. p. 597</p> <p>Where a testatrix, by her will, left her property to her husband during his life, and upon his death to her daughter (and only child), absolutely, if living at the time of the testator’s death, and in case the daughter should die before the testatrix’s husband, then to the daughter’s children or descendants, per stirpes and not per capita, and in default of any children or descendants, then to the daughter’s next of kin: Held, that by the correct interpretation of the will, the property was left to ■the husband for his life, and after his death, to the next of kin of the daughter, in esse at the time of the death of the life tenant, in case she did not survive him. p. 597</p>

<p>Prayers: withdrawing case from jury; no evidencej duty of Court. Brokers: when entitled to commissions.</p> <p>In passing upon the question whether a case should be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury, the court need only consider the plaintiff’s testimony, even though it should be in conflict with that of the defendant; it being assumed, on such questions, that the plaintiff’s evidence, tending to sustain his right to recover, is true. pp. 605-606</p> <p>The test to be applied in determining the legal sufficiency of such evidence is whether it is of sufficient probative force to enable an ordinary intelligent mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of the plaintiff’s right. p. 606</p> <p>A broker who fully discharges his duty and performs all that he undertakes to do, is entitled to recover for his services, without regard to the fact whether or not such services were beneficial or of value to his employer. p. 609</p>

<p>Stock: dividends; income or corpus?</p> <p>The reason for appropriating, to the corpus of a trust estate, the proportion of a stock dividend earned, though not distributed, by the corporation' during the life of the testator who established the trust, does not apply to the disposition of a dividend based on corporate profits earned after the trust had come into existence. p. 614</p> <p>When stock dividends are declared in a testator’s lifetime, the stock so acquired normally constitutes a part of the corpus of the estate passing under the will, the same as the original stock on account of which it was issued. pp. 614-615</p> <p>These principles do not apply to a stock dividend derived from earnings wholly realized after the testator’s death, p. 615</p> <p>Such a dividend could not have passed under the testator’s ownership, so as to have become an integral part of his assets, but has the essential and distinctive character of income from the trust estate so invested. p. 615</p> <p>A stock dividend from earnings, accrued and declared after the trust has become operative, is payable to the life tenant as income. p. 616</p> <p>It acquires that character from the time and circumstance of its origin, and not from the terms of the trust under which it is applied to its intended object. p. 616</p> <p>Though it may be directed to be appropriated to corpus purposes, it is received as income by the trustees. p. 616</p> <p>An income dividend is payable to the person entitled at the time it was declared. p. 615</p> <p>Where a testator, creating a trust, declares, in effect, that the whole income from the trust estate, no matter how or when derived, which accrues after a certain date, is to be given to the life tenants, an inquiry as to the original source of an income dividend is unnecessary. pp. 615-616</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. (Heuisler., J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Murder; insanity as defense; province of Court and jury. Confession: Held to be voluntary.</p> <p>Under the Code of 1912, Article 59, section 4, when any person indicted for crime shall allege insanity in his defense, the jury empaneled to try such person shall find by their verdict whether such person was, at the time of the commission of the offense, or still is insane, lunatic or otherwise. p. 627</p> <p>Where such a defense is distinctly presented, and the ease is not wholly devoid of evidence tending to sustain that theory, it is the constitutional right of the accused to have the jury determine whether or not he was, in law, criminally responsible for the crime for which he was being tried. p. 628</p> <p>The Court has no authority to decide as to the effect or sufficiency of evidence submitted to the jury on such an issue. p. 628</p> <p>No instruction can be given by the Court in a criminal ease, except in a merely advisory form. p. 628</p> <p>On appeal from a trial for a capital offense, the rule as to the time for reserving exceptions should not be so strictly construed, as in the case of appeals in civil cases. p. 630</p> <p>Where the evidence shows that a confession was not influenced by any promise, threat or inducement of any kind, it is admissible in evidence. p. 630</p> <p>The fact that prior to the confession, an officer asked the accused “why he didn’t tell the truth,” saying that “the truth would hurt no one,” and the fact that another officer spoke to the accused of his accountability hereafter, and said: “Why don’t you tell it right, you are lying all through?” did not amount to such an improper influence as to render the confession inadmissible. p. 630</p> <p>On an appeal from a conviction for a capital offense, a mor tion for the affirmance of the judgment on the ground that the brief for the appellant was not printed prior to the time when the ease was reached for argument, as provided by Rule 36 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals, will not be granted, where the Court thinks the ends of justice would not be subserved by the rigid enforcement of the rule. p. 630</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. (Dawkins, J.)</p> <p>. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Somerset County. (Stanford, J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City. (So-per, O. J.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Railway engineers: persons approaching track; contributory negligence; crossing tracks without looking. Evidence : erroneous ruling; when no cause for reversal.</p> <p>- A party in full possession of his faculties, who, for a distance of even 40 feet, has an unobstructed view of an approaching railroad engine, before he reached the place on the tracks where he was struck by the engine, and who if he had paused and looked before attempting to cross the tracks, would have avoided the accident, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of •law. p. 677</p> <p>When the engineer of a railroad engine sees a person approaching, a railroad crossing, he has the right to assume that he will stop in a place of safety, and not attempt to cross in front of the approaching engine. p. 679</p> <p>In such a case where there is no evidence that the engineer neglected any precautions to avoid the accident, after he discovered the dangerous position of such party, a prayer taking the case from the jury is properly granted. p. 680</p> <p>The ruling of a Court sustaining an objection to evidence, can not be reversible error, when the same is elsewhere admitted in the case with objection. , p. 680</p>

<p> Change of location of electric cables by order of city: cost. </p> <p>Under the terms of the lease between the City of Baltimore and the Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Company for the use of the City’s cable conduits, where a change of location of the cables is ordered by the City, from one duct to another, without the assent of the Electric Company, one-half of the expense is to be borne by that Company and one-half by the City: Held, that, under the true construction of the contract, that the one-half expense referred to includes the new or additional cable wire which was necessary to such shifting. p. 688</p>

<p>IAfe insurance: suicide clause; interest of beneficiary; confession by insured; motive for^ suicide; evidence of money losses and involved accounts.</p> <p>In the ease of ordinary life insurance, the beneficiary has a vested interest from the time the contract is entered into, unless the policy provides for a change of beneficiary by the insured. p. 693</p> <p>But where the rights of the beneficiary depend upon the will of the assured, the beneficiary can acquire no vested right under the policy before the death of the assured (unless the policy, while in the beneficiary’s favor, matures otherwise). p. 693</p> <p>Where the beneficiary has no vested interest, declarations of the insured made against his interest are admissible in evidence in a suit on the policy. p. 693</p> <p>An insurance policy contained a clause excepting the company from liability in case of the death of the insured by suicide; it also contained the provision that the consent of the beneficiary was not necessary for any assignment of the policy or change of beneficiary; the insured died as the result of poison that he confessed he had administered to himself, with suicidal intent: Held, that his confession was admissible in evidence in a suit upon the policy brought by the beneficiary. p. 694</p> <p>In such cases evidence of financial difficulty and irregularity in the affairs of the decedent are admissible, as bearing upon the question of motive. pp. 694-695</p>