Thomas v. . Scutt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate · 4 district · 204 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 279 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Evidence to explain an ambiguity, establish a custom, or show the meaning of technical terms and the like, is not regarded as an exception to the general rule, because it does not contradict or vary the written instrument, hut simply places the court in the position of the parties when they made tne contract and enables it to appreciate the force of the words they used in inducing it to writing. It is received where doubt arises upon the face of the instrument as to its meaning, not to enable the court to hear what the parties said, hut to enable it to understand what they wrote, as they understood it at the time. Such evidence is, explanatory and must be consistent with the terms of the contract. Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40 , 62 Am. Dec. 130 ; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200 , 14 Am. Rep. 224 ; Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N. Y. 140 , 21 N. E. 105 , 3 L. R. A. 859 ; Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190 , 21 N. E. 160 , 4 L. R. A. 392 , 11 Am. St. Rep. 627 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shoninger Bros. v. Dormer Bros.

2. “Tbe real exceptions may be grouped in two classes, tbe first of wbicb includes those cases in wbicb parol evidence bas been received to show that that wbicb purports to be a written contract is in fact no contract at all. Tbus fraud, illegality, want of consideration, delivery upon an unperformed condition, and tbe like may be shown by parol, not to contradict or vary, but to destroy, a written instrument. Such proof does not recognize tbe contract as ever existing as a valid agreement, and is received, from tbe necessity of tbe case, to show that that wbicb appears to be is not, and never was a contract. . . . Tbe second class embraces those cases wbicb recognize tbe written instrument as existing and valid, but regard it as incomplete, either obviously, or at least possibly, and admit parol evidence, not to contradict or vary, but to complete, the entire agreement, of wbicb tbe writing is only a part.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cavanagh v. Iowa Beer Co.

3. “The second class embraces those eases which recognize the written instrument as existing and valid, but regard it as incomplete, either obviously, or at least possibly, and admit parol evidence, not to contradict or vary, but to complete * * *\ [T] his class * * * leaves the written contract unchanged, but treats it as a part of an entire oral agreement, the remainder of which was not reduced to writing. Two things however, are essential to bring a case within this class: (1) The writing must not appear, upon inspection, to be a complete contract, embracing all the particulars necessary to make a perfect agreement, and designed to express the whole arrangement between the parties, for in such a case it is conclusively presumed to embrace the entire contract. (2) The parol evidence must be consistent with, and not contradictory of, the written instrument. * * * * * * * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank