Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 federal appellate · 21 district · 82 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 233 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The general purpose of a proviso, as is well known, is to except the clause covered by it from the general provisions of a statute, or from some provisions of it, or to qualify the operation of the statute in some particular. But it is often used in other senses. It is a common practice in legislative proceedings, on the consideration of bills, for parties desirous of securing amendments to them, to precede their proposed amendments with the term ‘provided,’ so as to declare that, notwithstanding existing provisions, the one thus expressed is to prevail, thus having no greater signification than would be attached to the conjunction ‘but’ or ‘and’ in the same place, and simply serving to separate or distinguish the different paragraphs or sentences. Several illustrations are given by counsel of the use of the term in this sense, showing, in such cases, where an amendment has been made, though the provision following often has no relation to what precedes it.” (p. 181, 9 S.Ct. p. 49)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles · Motorlines, Ltd. v. United States

2. ““And it was not thought that in the exercise of the merely governmental function of creating a charter and incorporating the Banking & Railroad Com-, pany the Legislature had in regard to this particular matter of rates surrendered the right to alter the maximum charges. The language used was regarded as a mere delegation of authority by the Legislature to the company to make those charges till the authority was altered or withdrawn. In other words, the language did not constitute a contract or agreement between the parties, the Legislature and the railroad company. In the case at bar * * » the rates are fixed under the provision of a statute which declares they shall be so fixed by agreement between the parties. * * * It may-very well be that the language used by a Legislature in conferring authority upon a company to fix certain charges for fare might not be regarded as amounting to a contract, when the same language used by the parties in fixing rates under a legislative authority and direction to agree upon them would be regarded as forming a-contract because the statute provided specially for that mode of determining them.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. City of Birmingham

3. ““If considered as a condition to the erfjoyment of the exclusive right designated, then the section only provides that, so long as the maximum rate specified is not exceeded, the company or its lessee shall have the exclusive right to carry passengfifs and merchandise over its roads. It contains no stipulation, nor is any iipplied, as to any future action of the Legislature.If the exclusive right remain undisturbed, there can be no just ground of complaint that other limitations than those expressed are placed upon the ■charges authorized. It would require much clearer language than this to justify us in holding that, notwithstanding any altered conditions of the country in the future, the Legislature had, in 1833, contracted that the company might, for all time, charge rates for transportation of persons and property over its line up to the limits there designated.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. City of Birmingham