Volume 128 — Washington Reports

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Lindsley, J., entered June 12, 1923, upon findings, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered April 10, 1923, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action to recover an overpayment upon the purchase of logs.</p>

<p>Divorce (44) — Interlocutory Order — Conclusiveness—Right to Final Decree — Estoppel—Jurisdiction oe Court — Statutes. Where, after an interlocutory decree of divorce is entered, the parties filed a stipulation showing that they had compromised their differences and resumed marital relations, and asking that the action be dismissed, the court has jurisdiction to refuse to enter the final decree because of the compromise by stipulation.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Hall, J., entered April 7,1923, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Garnishment — Action on Bond — Discharge of Liability — Effect of Stipulation. A garnishment bond is not discharged or the sureties released by a stipulation that a car of apples in possession of the garnishee may be sold and the proceeds paid into court to abide the result, and that none of the parties waive any of their rights by joining therein.</p> <p>Appeal (452) — Review—Harmless Error — Trial De Novo. In an action tried to the court without a jury, error in admitting or excluding evidence is harmless if in any event the same result should have been reached.</p> <p>Garnishment — Action on Bond — Damages. Where plaintiff .in an action on a garnishment bond stipulated that apples in the hands of the garnishee be sold and the proceeds applied, and himself purchased part of the apples at less than their value, he can not base a claim for damages on the sale to himself.</p>

<p>Actions (23, 24) — • Insurance (122) — Indemnity Insurance — Joinder of Actions — Liability of Surety — Statutes—Construction. There is a direct cause of action on the bond by persons injured, entitling the plaintiff to join the insurance company with the carrier, under Rem. Comp. Stat., § 6391, requiring auto -stage companies to procure liability and property damage insurance or a surety bond for compensation for all persons recovering for personal injuries by reason of the carrier’s negligence; in view of Id., § 6384, providing that any person injured by the negligent act of such insured carriers in cities of the first class shall have a, direct cause of action against the principal and surety on the bond, and Id., § 296, providing that several causes of action may be united when they arise out of the same transaction and affect all the parties.</p> <p>Highways (59) — Negligent Use- — -Drivers of Motor Vehicles— Instructions. In an action for injuries sustained in an automobile collision, when a stage, operating in a dense fog, crashed into the rear of an automobile in advance, it is error to instruct that the stage driver must drive at such a rate of speed as to enable him to stop within the distance disclosed by his own headlights, where there was evidence that in places the fog was so dense that the white lights of the headlights were mirrored back to the driver who could see nothing.</p> <p>Evidence (200) — Opinion Evidence — Operation of Motor Vehicle. It is error to allow a witness to state his opinion as to whether an automobile driver with artificial legs was so maimed that he could not drive efficiently in an emergency.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered May 11,1923, in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for money had and received.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered June 20,1923, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for an injunction.</p>

<p>Appeal (108) — Preservation op Grounds. A receiver cannot assign error in the allowance of damages for the detention of a truck, where he offered no evidence on the subject.</p> <p>Sales (176) — Conditional Sales — Recording — Signature op Vendor. A conditional sales contract of a motor truck is not sufficiently signed by the vendor, as against creditors of the vendee, where the printed form, giving the name of the vendor at the foot had a blank line “by....................................vendor,” obviously left for some person to sign, which was not filled up.</p> <p>Same (176) — Lien Holders — Subsequent Creditors. An unpaid employee who worked from June 1 to August 13, is a “subsequent” creditor having priority over a defectively executed conditional bill of sale of a truck delivered April 14.</p> <p>Mechanics’ Liens (46) — Description op Property — Suppiciency. Under Rem. Comp. Stat., § 1149-1153, a lien notice for labor performed in a sawmill describing the sawmill and all its “logging equipment” is sufficient to cover an automobile truck used in hauling lumber; and an order in receivership proceedings describing the property as “hauling equipment” is not materially variant.</p>

, entered September 18, 1923, dismissing an appeal from an order of the department of labor and industries denying a claim for compensation under the workmen’s compensation act, tried to the court.

<p>Licenses (5) — Municipal Corporations (320, 325) — Regulation op Business' — Denial op License — Powers op City. A town has implied inherent authority, and by Rem. Comp. Stat., § 9175, subdiv. 10, express authority to license for regulation and revenue soft drink parlors; and thereunder may refuse a license to an applicant of bad reputation.</p>