People v. Kor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “That statement assumes that Kor was falsely accusing Kaufman, ... it assumes that Kor's testimony — to the effect that he agreed to take the blame for Kaufman — was false. That statement is also susceptible of the interpretation that communications between attorney and client should not be regarded as privileged communications if the client, as a witness, is not telling the truth and is using the privilege as a shield to conceal the truth. Under that view of the relationship between attorney and client, the fundamental doctrine of privileged communications between attorney and client might become of no importance since the truth of the client's testimony could easily be brought into question.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Harrison v. State

2. “"The answers of Kor on such cross-examination were responsive to the questions, did not include volunteered information as to privileged communications, and were not voluntary disclosures of privileged communications. It cannot be said that Kor, by so answering such questions of Kaufman's counsel and the deputy district attorney, intended thereby to consent that his attorney might be examined as to communications made in confidence by Kor to his attorney. Such answers did not constitute a basis for a claim that Kor waived his right to object to his attorney testifying as to privileged communications." 129 Cal. App.2d at 445 , 277 P.2d at 100 . (emphasis added)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Harrison v. State

3. “Here the attorney was compelled to testify against his client under threat of punishment for contempt. Such procedure would have been justified only in case the defendant with knowledge of his rights had waived the privilege in open court or by his statements and conduct had furnished explicit and convincing evidence that he did not understand, desire or expect that his statements to his attorney would be kept in confidence. Defendant’s attorney should have chosen to go to jail and take his chances of release by a higher court. (Italics ours.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 75 Wash. 2d 1 - Dike v. Dike