¶1I concur.
¶2The majority opinion correctly assesses the record. It is void of evidence relevant to what, if anything, occurred to dissipate the taint from the first two improper, non-Mirandized statements. This vacuum is due in part, to a statement, in effect a concession, made by defense counsel in oral argument. Counsel stated he was not prepared to argue and no case law supported the theory that the confession in the vice principal’s office was tainted by the earlier statements. The court offered counsel more time to prepare an argument but counsel declined. The court concluded “All right, I will adopt your view of it .... ” Counsel’s conduct resulted in the trial court’s decision to admit the statement without proper evaluation. The concession- cut off the court’s inquiry into the continuing effect of the taint and relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof.
¶3Therefore, two errors require reversal. First, there is no evidence to support the trial court’s admission of the third confession. The trial court, in determining whether a Miranda taint had dissipated, should have evaluated whether the third confession was an independent act of free will (see In re Peter G. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 576, 583 [168 Cal.Rptr. 3]; cf. Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590 [45 L.Ed.2d 416, 95 S.Ct. 2254]; Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407]) in order to overcome a presumption the later confession is a product of the tainted confession (People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 547 [75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865, 43 A.L.R.3d 366]). Analysis as to whether the third confession was an independent act of free will and not the product of the tainted confession is similar to a consideration of voluntariness. Factors relevant to voluntariness are the minor’s age, mental state, education, intelligence, experience, and familiarity with the law. (In re Peter G., supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 583.) Other important factors are the location of the questioning, the form of the questions, and the coerciveness of the atmosphere in which questioning took place. (See United States v. Toral (9th Cir. 1976) 536 F.2d 893, 896.) Relevant, too, are the temporal proximity of the confession to the crime, any intervening circumstances, and the nature of the police misconduct. (See People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889 [135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872]; Brown v. Illinois, supra,422 U.S. 590.)
¶4Second, although there is a natural reluctance to find counsel’s “concession” was absolutely unjustified as a matter of tactics, on the face of *993this record, the concession was not in the best interest of his client, it falls short of vigorous representation and it most certainly resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.