In re Pease’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 5 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But the law will not let him escape in this way. The question raised by the statute is not his actual belief, but what he had reasonable cause to believe. In purchasing in the way and under the circumstances he did, the law told him that a fraud of some kind was intended on the. part of the seller, and he was put on inquiry to ascertain the true condition of Mendelson’s [the bankrupt vendor] business. This he did not do, nor did he make any attempt in that direction. Indeed, he contended himself with limiting his inquiries to the object Mendelson had in selling out, and to his future purposes. Something more was required than this information to repel the presumption of fraud which the law raised in the mere fact of a retail merchant selling out his entire stock of goods. If this sort of information could sustain the sale, the provision of the bankrupt law we are considering would be no protection to creditors, for any one in Mendelson’s situation, and with the purpose he had in view, would be likely to give the party with whom he was dealing a plausible reason for his conduct. The presumption of fraud arising from the unusual nature of the sale in this case can only be overcome by proof on the part of the buyer that he took the proper steps to find out the pecuniary condition of the seller. All reasonable means, pursued in good faith, must be used for this purpose. If Summerfield [the vendee] had employed any means at all directed to this end, he would have discovered the a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dokken v. Page

2. ““Tlie provisions of section <>7 of this act are contrasted with those of the former act * * * as more favorable in this respect. That act .avoided a conveyance made within four months ‘with a view to give a preference’ to a person ‘having reasonable cause to believe’ the bankrupt to be insolvent; and that the conveyance was being made in fraud of the act. The latter act avoids such conveyances by the bankrupt ‘with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them.’ A conveyance to one creditor of what would otherwise, under the provisions of the act, go to all would hinder and defraud the others and amounts to a preference, contrary to the purpose of the act, as much as if the word ‘preference’ had been used in this act as it was in the former. This provision of the latter act is more prohibitive than that of tlie former, for no reasonable cause of belief of insolvency and fraud, on tlie act, by the person receiving the preference, is necessary to avoid it. The purpose and intent of the bankrupt only is looked at and, if contrary to tlie act, is sufficient. The question seems to have been considered as if it arose at common law, or under statutes of fraudulent conveyances, where securing any creditor is allowable, and not as arising under a bankrupt law, where any intended preference among creditors is forbidden and avoided. Such a mortgage of the last available property within eight days of filing a voluntary petition and sc”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Walters v. Zimmerman