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129 Ind. 478

Kedy v. Kramer

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided November 6, 1891

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1891-11-06

<p>Married Woman. — Liability of. — Note and Mortgage. — A married woman who buys property may execute a note and may, jointly with her husband, execute a mortgage to secure the purchase-money, and it is not material whether she purchases for herself alone or for herself and husband. If she acquires a beneficial ownership in the land purchased she receives a consideration for her contract, and is a principal and not a surety.</p>

Relies on Miller v. Shields · Young v. McFadden · Berridge v. Banks

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1891-11-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently April 1922

4 state decisions

201891190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Elliott, J. —

¶1The appellee sued upon a note and mortgage executed by William U. Kedy and Meda Kedy to Oliver Galvin, and by Galvin assigned to the appellee.

¶2The answers of the appellants were in confession and avoidance, and hence admitted the material allegation of the complaint that the note and mortgage were assigned to the appellee. As this allegation was admitted, the appellants can not successfully insist that there is a failure of evidence,, because none was offered to prove the assignment.

¶3A married woman who buys property may execute a note and may, jointly with her husband, execute a mortgage to secure the purchase-money, and it is not material whether she purchases for herself alone or for herself and her husband. Miller v. Shields, 124 Ind. 166; Berridge v. Banks, 125 Ind. 561; Young v. McFadden, 125 Ind. 254. If she acquires a beneficial ownership in the land purchased she receives a consideration for her contract, and is a principal,, not a surety. Such a contract as that of the purchase of land where there is one deed conveying to a wife and her husband jointly, can not be split into fragments to the prejudice of the vendor, but, as to him, all the purchasers are principals, and the promise to pay indivisible. Where the vendor conveys to the wife, naming her as sole grantee, it is even more clear that she can not be heard to aver that the consideration did not move to her.

¶4We have not examined the questions of appellate practice discussed by appellees’ counsel with care, but from such an examination as we have given them we are inclined to think, the points well made.

¶5Judgment affirmed.

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