129 Md. App. 51 - Diaz v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the language of the statute [11] speaks in the singular of an enhancement for a particular “offense” which implies a single criminal drama, not the enhancement of each of the individual scenes as set forth in the particular counts of the indictment. The notice of increased penalty also speaks of a singular enhancement for an “offense,” rather than multiple “offenses,” which implies the same. The language, therefore, is at least ambiguous as to whether the legislature contemplated not one but three enhancements in the same proceeding against a defendant. Ambiguous language may defeat a penalty enhancement, because “an enhanced penalty may not be imposed unless that is clearly the intent of the Legislature.” Gardner, 344 Md. at 647 , 689 A.2d 610 . Here, none has been expressed. Thus, this Court cannot affirm multiple enhancements.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 172 Md. App. 363 - Price v. State

2. “(a) More severe sentence. — Any person convicted of any offense under this subheading is, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized, by twice the fine otherwise authorized, or by both. (b) Second or subsequent offense defined. — For purposes of this section, an offense shall be considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to the conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted of any offense or offenses under this subheading or under any prior law of this State or any law of the United States or of any other state relating to the other controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 130 Md. App. 135 - Veney v. State

3. “possession of ... a firearm [with the manufacturer’s mark obliterated, removed, changed, or altered] is presumptive evidence that the defendant obliterated, removed, changed, or altered the identification mark or number. Do you understand presumptive evidence? That if you find that the defendant had possession of that firearm then it is presumptive, it is presumed true that the defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the identification mark or number.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 151 Md. App. 466 - Graham v. State