Volume 129 — United States Reports

Lr equity, for an accounting for infringement of letter ' patent. Decree awarding damages to the complainant. Respondents appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>Claim 3 of letters patent No. 223,338, granted to John M. Gorham, January 6th, 1880, for an. improvement in wash-board frames, namely, S'. .In combination with a wash-board; a’ protector located below the. crown-piece and between the side pieces of the wash-board frame, and constructed to fold down into or upon said wash-board even with or. béloiw the general plane of said wash-board frame, substantially as and for the purpose shown,” cannot, in view of the state of the art, and of the course of proceeding-in the Patent Office on .the application for the patent, be so construed as to cover a protector which does not have the yielding, -elastic or resilient function described in the specification.</p> <p>The defendant’s protector, constructed in accordance with letters patent No. 255,535,'granted to- Charles H. Williams, March 28th, 1882, and having no yielding or resilient function, and not being' pivoted, or folding down,- after the manner of the Gorham protector, does not infringe. claim 3.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KOSSUTH COUNTY, STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that this suit was an attempt to evade the discrimination between suits between citizens of the same State and citizens of different States, established by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction. *37 A constitution, or a statute, is construed to operate prospectively only, unless, on its face, the contrary intention is manifest beyond reasonable question.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE ‘’ClRCUÍT. COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE, ' DISTRICT OF MAINE. '</p> <p>-In equity for- an alleged ■ infringement of letters patent. The bill prayed, for a discovery, and an accounting^ and- the payment of all gains and profits discovered on the accounting, •and for injunctions, both interlocutory and final. The answer denied that the plaintiffs .invented- the patented improvement or that the alleged invention was patentable. . The final.decrei dismissed the bill, from which the plaintiffs appealed. The ease is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: (1.) The recitals in the record, as to the swearing of the jury, were^not to be regarded as an attempt to set out the oath actually administered, but rather as a statement of the fact that the jury had been sworn and acted under oath; (2.) The objection could not be considered, because it was not taken at the trial.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT ,0F THE UNITED STATES FOR' THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF XOWA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of tbe court.</p> <p>Teal v. Walker, 111 IT. S. 242; Nugent v. Riley, 1 Met. 117; S. O. 35 Am. Dec. 35,5; Wilson v. Shoenberger, 31 Penn. St. 295; Dow v. Cham-berlin, 5 McLean, 281; Bayley v. Bailey, 5 Gray, 505; .Lame v. Shear 's, 1 Wend. 433; Friedley v. Hamilton, 17 S. & K. 70; S. C. 17 Am. Déc. 638; Sha/w v. Erskine, 43 Maine, 371; Peugh v. Davis., 96 U. S, 332; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139 ; Shilldber -Y. Robinson, 97 H. S. 68; Conway v. Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218; Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. 126; Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden', 110; Oldham v. Halley, 2- J. J. Marsh. 113; Edrington v. Harper, -?) J. J. Marsh. 353; S. O. 20 Am. Dec. 145.</p> <p>Conway v.' Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218; Snavely v. Pickle, 29 Gratt. 27-, Sluts v. Desenburg, 28 Ohio St. 371; Flagg v. Mann, 14 Pick. 467Glover v. Payn, 19 Wend. 518; Slowey v. McMurray, 27 Missouri, 113; S. C. 72 Am. Dec. 251; Galt v. Jackson, 9 Georgia,- 151; Spence v. Steadman, 49. Georgia, 133;' West y. Hendrix, 28 Alabama, 226; Huffier v. Womack, 30 Texas, 332; Pitts v, Cable, 44 Illinois, 103 ; Magnusson v. Johnson, 13 Illinois, 156; Hicks v. Hicks, 5 Grill & Johns. 15; McHamia/ra v. Culver, 22 Kansas, 661; Budd v. "Piro Orden, 33 N. J. Eq. 143; Shaw v.\ Erskine, 43 Maine, 371; Treat v. .Stmcklcmd, 23 Maine, 234 ÍA7Z v.- Grant, 46 N. Y. 496; Penn. Co. y. Austin, 42 Penn. St. 257; Stevenson v. Thompson, 13 Illinois, 186; Carr y. Rising, 62 Illinois, 14; Saxton v. Hitchcock,- 47 Barb. • 220; Howland v. Blake, 97 IT. S. 624; Coyle v. Hams, 116 U’.:S. 108 ; Cadmam, v. Peter, 118 U. S. 73; Oorbit v. .Smith, 7 Iowa, 60; N 6y. 71 Am. Dec. 431; Cooper v. Skeel, 14 Iowa, 578; Gardner v. Weston, 18 Iowa, 533; Hyatt v., Cochran, -37 Iówa, 309; Sinclair y. IFaZ&er, 38 Iowa, 575; Zuver y. Lyons, 40' Iowa, 510; Woodworth v. Carman, 43 Iowa, 504; ICibby v. Harsh, 61 Iowa, 196; Knight v. McCord, 63 Iowa, 429.</p>

Held: that the debt thus incurred by B to A was not a debt-created by fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or while he was acting in a fiduciary capacity- within the exception provided for in Rev. Stat. § 5117. The word “fraud” as used in Rev. Stat. § 5117 means positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong, and not merely implied fraud, or fraud in law.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The court stated the case as follows: This is an appeal from a final order in the suit, in the court below, of Mayhew, die. v. West Virginia Oil mid Oil Lcmd Company, dkc., requiring the appellant Camden to pay the difference between the amount bid by him for certain real estate offered for sale, at public auction, under the decree in that suit, and the amount the same property brought on a resale had because of his refusal to comply with the terms of his bid.

<p>APPEAR PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OP OHIO.</p> <p>The case was stated by the court as follows:</p> <p>This suit involves the title to certain lands inherited by the plaintiff, and sold some years ago by his statutory guardian, the defendant Gleason, under authority conferred by proceedings instituted by him in the Probate Court of Defiance County, in the State of Ohio. The plaintiff attacks the order of sale as invalid, prays that the deeds executed to the purchaser be declared void, that an accounting in respect to rents and profits be had, and that such other relief be granted as may be proper. The court below- sustained demurrers to the bill, and dismissed the suit. ¥e aro, therefore, to inquire, upon this appeal, whether the bill discloses a cause of action entitling the appellant to relief in a court of equity.</p> <p>The case made by the bill is substantially as follows: The lands in controversy formerly belonged to John 0. Arrow-smith, who died in 1869; his wife, and the plaintiff, his only child and heir-at-law, surviving him. On the 15th of July, 1869, Gleason petitioned said Probate Court to be appointed guardian of the estate of the plaintiff, then but six years. of age. He applied to one Henry Hardy, a freeholder, to become surety upon his bond as guardian, in the penalty of $5000, which Hardy did, upon the express agreement that, before the bond was delivered, Gleason would procure another surety of equal responsibility. Gleason filed the bond in the Probate Court, without obtaining the signature of an additional surety. The bond contained no condition except that if Gleason “shall faithfully discharge all his duties as guardian, then the above obligation is to be void; otherwise, to remain in full force.” Upon its being filed, an order was made appointing Gleason guardian of the plaintiff’s estate, and letters of guardianship were issued to him.</p> <p>On the 22d of July, 1869, Gleason filed a petition in the Probate Court of Defiance County, representing that no personal estate of the ward had ever come to his possession or.. knowledge, and that there was no such estate dependent upon the settlement of:. the father’s estate, or upon the execution of • any trust; that his ward was the owner of the fee simple of certain tracts of lands in Defiance County, one being section ■^thirty-six in that county, containing 640 acres, less a small ' strip containing 6-&¶ acres used and occupied by the "Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Kailroad Company as way-ground, and .others, aggregating 400 acres; and, in addition, a tract of about seven acres in Paulding County; that the ward was, also, the owner of the fee simple, by virtue of tax titles, of certain other described tracts of lands in Defiance County, aggregating nearly one thousand acres, all of which, the petition alleged, were wild lands, yielding no income; that he had received no .rents whatever from any of the ward’s real estate; that its sale was necessary for the maintenance and education of the ward, who was indebted for boarding and lodging in the sum of $210; that there were no liens upon it, to his knowledge, and that the widow had a dower interest in said lands. The •prayer of the petition was that the infant and widow be made defendants;- that dower be set off to the latter; that the guardian be ordered to-sell the real estate for the purposes . above set forth-; and that petitioner have such other relief as was proper. The court ordered notice to be served upon the widow and infant of the hearing of the petition on the 10th .day óf August, 1869. Personal notice was given to the former, and the latter was. notified by a written copy being left at the residence of his mother.</p> <p>■ -The widow filed an answer in the Probate Court, waiving a > formal assignment of dower by metes and. bounds, and .asking such sum out of the proceeds of - salean lieu of do,wer, aá was just and-reasonable.</p> <p>On the 10th of August, 1869, the cause was heard, • the Probate Court deciding that the real estate named therein should be sold. Thereupon appraisers were appointed to report its fair cash value.- On the 17th of August, 1869, the Probate Court, without having taken any bond from the guardian, except the one above referred to, which was conditioned simply for the faithful discharge of his duties, made this order: “ It is, therefore, ordered by the court that the same [the report] be, and it is hereby, approved and confirmed; ■ and the said Edward H. Gleason having upon his appointment as such guardian given bond with reference to the value and sale of the said real estate of his said ward, which bond is now adjudged to be sufficient for the purposes hereof, therefore, the giving of additional bond is hereby dispensed with.” And on' the 10th day of November, 1869, the following order of sale was entered in said cause: “ Said guardian is ordered to proceed to sell said lands, or any parcel thereof, at private sale, but at not less than the appraised value thereof, and upon the following terms: One-third cash in. hand on the day of. sale, one-third in one year, and one-third in two years, with interest, payable annually, and the deferred payments to be secured by mortgage on the premises sold.”</p> <p>Within a few days after this order was made, Gleason reported to the Probate Court that he had sold to John Frederick Harmening, at private sale, and for .the sum of $1537.50, “ that being the full amount of the appraised value thereof,” the southeast quarter of said section thirtv:six, excluding the • small strip occupied by the railway company. The sale was approved, and the guardian directed to make a conveyance to the purchaser, reserving for the widow, in lieu of dower, .the sum of $400 out of the proceeds.</p> <p>The bill charges that on the 15th of February,'1873, more than three years after the said order of sale was entered, and without any new or further appraisement of plaintiff’s lands, though their value, as he was informed, had greatly advanced, and without any additional bond having been executed, Gleason, “for the .purpose of getting money into his hands for his own private gain, and without reference to the true interest of his ward,” and “willing to allow the said Harmening to get at a low and under-price the lands ” of the plaintiff, and “though there was no necessity whatever for said sale, as he, the said Gleason, and the said Harmening well knew,” solc[ to the latter at private sale, for the sum of $872.10, the east half of the southwest quarter of section thirty-six in Defiance County, containing eighty acres, and the tract of 7XW acres in Paulding County; which sale, being reported to the Probate Court, was by it wrongfully approved and a deed directed to be made and was made to the purchaser, the sum of $200 being reserved out of the proceeds, pursuant to the order of the court, for the dower interest of the widow. -</p> <p>The plaintiff also alleges that notwithstanding there was no necessity for any further sale or sacrifice of his estate of inheritance, Gleason, on the 4th day of December, 1874, although having in his hands, unexpended, large sums derived from the sale of the "Above premises, as well as considerable’ sums received from the?’ rele'ase of tax titles, all of which was known to Harmening, and without any new appraisement of the plaintiff’s lands, (though they had risen greatly in value,) and without giving an additional bond or obtaining a new order of sale, (“ for the purpose of getting money into his hands for his own private gain, without reference to the true interest of your orator in the premises, and willing that the said Har-mening should get the lands bought at a low and under-price, connived and colluded with him, the said Harmening, to sell the said lands hereinafter described in violation of his duties and the trust imposed on him, claiming to act on the said order of sale long since entered in said court, sold, Dec. 4,1874, to Harmening the following described lands, situated in Defiance County aforesaid, viz.: the north half of section thirty-six, in township four north of range three east, and the west half of the same section in the same township and range, containing . together four hundred acres, for the. sum of six thousand dollars, and reported the sale to the said court on the same day, and the same was, without proper examination, or opportunity for the friends of the said ward, your orator, or his relatives, to examine the same and advise the said court or the said Gleason in the premises, improperly, —illegally confirmed the said sale,- and ordered the said guardian to make, execute^ and deliver a deed, for the same to the said Harmening on his compliance with the terms of sale, and further ordered the said guardian to pay out of the proceeds of said sale the sum 'of fifteen hundred dollars as and for the dower" interest therein held *by .the said Mary Arrowsmith ”).</p> <p>The bill further charges that the order authorizing said sales to be made as well as the orders confirming them were illegal; that the sales made by Gleason were in violation .of his trust and in fraud óf his rights, “ as the said Harmening and the said Gleason well knew;” that he has never received from said Gleason or from any source, to his knowledge, any of the proceeds of such sales, nor to his knowledge, belief,' or information, have any part thereof been' applied for his benefit; and that the deeds, plaeed upon record by Harmening, so cloud his title to said lands that he cannot sell them or other-' wise enjoy the beneficial use of them.</p> <p>After averring that he has been a non-resident of Ohio since 1869 ; that Harmening enjoyed, up to his death, all the rents and profits of said lands; that his heirs at law, who are infants, and defendants herein, are in .possession of them, claiming to hold them under said pretended sales and deeds; and that Gleason has been for a long time hopelessly - insolvent, so that an action at law against him would be unavailing ; he prayed that a decree be rendered setting aside and vacating the order of sale in the Probate Court, and all proceedings therein affecting his title to the lands, and declaring the same, as well as the deeds executed by his pretended guardian, to be void and of no effect. He also prayed for the additional relief, specific and general, indicated in the beginning of this opinion.</p> <p>I, The appellant’s title, if he has any, is a legal title, for which he has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, —■ an action for possession, with which,' under the laws of Ohio, he may couple an action for mesne profits. Rev. Stat. Ohio, § 5019; McKinney v. McKinney, 8 Ohio St. 423.</p> <p>. If the proceedings in the Probate Court were such as to divest the legal title of appellant, and vest it in Harmening, he has no remedy, unless the proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction, or unless the orders were obtained by fraud, to which Harmening was a party. If the sales were void for want of jurisdiction, or for fraud in obtaining the orders, the remedy is equally adequate at law. Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 "Wall. 35 ; Blanchard v. Brown, 8 "Wall. 245; Or and Chute v. IVinegar, 15 "Wall. 373; Lewis v. Codes, 23 "Wall. 466 ; Ellis v. Davis, 109 H. S. 485 ; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568 ; Fassell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550; United States v. Wilson,-118 U. S. 86; Frost v. Spitley, 121 XT. S. 552.</p> <p>Instead of this complete remedy at law, he seeks inadequate relief in equity. Although he alleges that such order and deeds and entries “ cloud the title ” to the said lands so that he cannot effectually dispose of them, or otherwise make and beneficial use of them, he. disclaims any intention to make this a bill to quiet title, for he would be met by the objection that a Court of Equity cannot sustain such a bill, because the complainant, by his own-admission, is out of possession. 2 Story’s Eq. Jur. § 859 ; Bispham’s Principles of Equity, § 575; Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263; Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 402 ; United States v. Wilsop, 118 H. S. 86 ; Frost v. Spitley, 121 H. S. 552; Clark v. Hubbard, 8 Ohio, 382; Rhea v. Dick, 34 Ohio St. 420.</p> <p>Section 5779 of Ohio Revised Statutes provides, “That an action may be brought by a person in possession, by himself or tenant of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate or interest.” By necessary implication a person out of possession cannot maintain such an action.</p> <p>II. The Circuit. Court of the United States-has no power to grant the specific prayer of the bill, and set aside and vacate the orders of the Probate Court of "Defiance County, and declare the same to be void and of ho effect. Fouvergne v. ■Hew Orleans, 18'How. 470; Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174; Adams v. Preston, 22 How. 473 ; Case of Broderick’s Will, 21 "Wall. 503; Ellis v. Drnis, 109 IT. S. 485; Fussell v, Gregg, 113 IT. S. 550 ; Amory v. Amory, 3 Bissell, 266. The cases of Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 IT. S.10, as limited and explained in Ellis v. Davis, supra, and of Johnson v. Waters, 111 IT. S. 640, are not in conflict with these authorities.</p> <p>We do not deny the right of courts’ of general jurisdiction to set aside their own judgments and decrees on bills of review, for errors apparent on the record, or original bills in the nature of bills of review for fraud in obtaining the judgments or decrees,, where such bills are part of the recognized practice of the courts.</p> <p>Most of the cases cited by counsel for appellant are of this nature, and do not at all support the'theory that one court can entertain a bill to set aside the decree of another. Taylor v. Walker, 1 Ileiskell, 734: Neweomb v. Dewey, 27 Iowa, 381; Lloyd v. Kirkwood, 112 Illinois, 329 ; Kuchenbeiserv. Beokert, 41 Illinois, 172; Lloyd v. Malone, 23 Illinois, 43; Wright v. Miller, 1 Sandf. Ch. 103 ; Reynolds v. McGurry, 100 Illinois, 356; McKeever v. Ball, 71 Indiana, 398; Sheldon v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio,’484; S. C. 93 Am. Dec. 638; Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128.</p> <p>Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Circuit Court has the right to entertain a bill for setting aside the orders and sales of a Probate Court on the ground of fraud in obtaining such orders, are the- allegations of the bill in this case, taken in connection with the record which is annexed to and forms a part of it, sufficient to bring the case within such jurisdiction?’ 'Where there is a discrepancy between the allegations of the bill as to what the record discloses and the record itself, the latter must be taken as conclusive. 1 Dan-iell’s Ch. PL and Pr. (5th ed.), * 546.</p> <p>As to the allegations concerning Hardy’s agreement with Gleason, and his want of knowledge and consent to the filing of his bond without another surety, it is enough to say that the fraud, if there was any, was upon Hardy; that Harmen-ing was in no way connected with it; that the validity of the bond when filed in court was not affected thereby, and that Hardy could not escape his liability upon it. Bigeloiu v. Gomegys, 5 Ohio- St. 256; Dangler v. Baker, 35 -Ohio St. 673-677; Elliott v. Stevens, 10 Iowa, 418; Bloom, v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 130 ; S. G. 37 Am. Dec. 299; Glezen ¶: Hood, 2 Met. 490, 492; ~Davr v. United States, 16 Wall. 1; Keys v. Williamson, 31 Ohio St. 562, 563. It is nowhere alleged in the bill that Hardy is insolvent, or that the money could not be made out of him.</p> <p>There is absolutely, nothing in the allegations of the bill, thus far, that points to fraud upon the .part of Gleason, Harmening, or the court, in obtaining these orders or making this sale, and, on the contrary, everything is consistent with the utmost good faith on the part of all concerned. When examined closely, the allegations amount to little more than a charge that said orders, sales, confirmations, etc., were irregular in some respects and, in the opinion of counsel for appellant, erroneous.</p> <p>■ The necessity for the sales, and the sufficiency of the price were matters of fact which the court must pass upon before confirmation, and unless there is some specific allegation of corrupt action on his part, or fraudulent misrepresentations or concealement on the part of Gleason and Harmening, by which the court was imposed upon and induced to make unjust decisions in ignorance of what he ought to have known, his action must be held as final. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 H. S. 61.</p> <p>If this court should consider that it is its province to examine the proceedings of the Probate Court of Defiance County with a view to determining whether the sam.e were erroneous or hpt, we submit that in such investigation they, would be gov-éímed by the rules applicable to a similar proceeding on a bill of review, and would be limited in the investigations to errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Griggs v. Greer, 3 Gilman'(Illinois), 2; Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Pet. 6. .</p>

<p>In a contract by which the owner of a quarry on an island on the coast agrees to furnish and deliver at a public building in the interior the granite required for its construction, at specified prices, by the cubic foot, and to furnish all the labor, tools and materials necessary to cut, dress and box the granite at the quarry, the United States, under a stipulation to pay “ the full cost of the said labor, tools and materials, and insurance on the same,” are not bound to pay anything for insurance, unless effected by the other party; nor are they, under a stipulation to “ assume the risk of damage to cutting on said stone while being transported to the site of said building,” bound to pay any part of the expense of raising granite sunk by a peril of the sea with its cutting uninjured.</p>

This was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana, in a -criminal case, brought by George W. Farnsworth, who was proceeded against by an information in the Probate Court in and for Gallatin County, in that Territory,- for the crime of misdemeanor, in having, in violation of a statute, as a commercial traveller, offered for sale in that Territory merchandise to be delivered at a future time, without first having obtained a license.

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), was an important United States Supreme Court case involving the reputable practice of physicians and state laws in the late 19th century. It was a direct challenge to West Virginia having passed "the nation's first genuinely restrictive physician licensing law in the early 1880s."

was convicted in the Police Court of the District of Columbia, upon an information stating that he, in April, 1887, “ did engage in the business of a commercial agent, to wit, the business of offering for sale, as agent of Lyons, Conklin & Co., a firm doing business in the city of Baltimore, State of Maryland, certain goods, wares, and merchandise by sample, catalogue, and otherwise, without having first obtained a license to do so, contrary to and in violation of an act of…

Held: that the bond was in proper form, and that the motion-must be denied. MotioNS to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. E. Walker and Mr. W. 0. ■Goudy for the motions. Mr. Gordon E. Cole opposing. Me.-

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>’ Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Ejectment. Plea, the general issue and the statute of limitations. Yerdict for plaintiff and judgment on the verdict. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed December 4, 1880, by William ' W. Wade, a citizen of Massachusetts, against Henry B. Met-calf, a citizen of Rhode Island, and William McCleery, a citizen of Massachusetts, alleging that letters patent, numbered 228,233, granted to the plaintiff June 1, 1880, upon' his application filed July 26,. 1879, for improvements in machines for making buttons, bad been infringed by the defendants’ use of forty-eight machines embodying such improvements.

ORIGINAL. This was a petition for a writ of mandamus. The motion for leave to file the petition was presented October 22, 1888, and was granted that day and a rule to show cause issued, returnable on the 3d Monday of tie next November. The return was filed on the 26th of November, and argument was had on the 17th and 18th December^ The case is stated as follows by the court in its opinion.

Held: was not a quarantine law, nor an inspection law, but a law which interfered with interstate commerce, and therefore invalid. At the same time the court admitted unhesitatingly that a State may pass laws to prevent animals suffering from contagious or infectious diseases from entering within it.

Held: that the intent of a national hank,' after it was insolvent, to prefer a creditor, by a transfer of assets, in violation of § 5242 of the Revised Statutes, was a necessary conclusion; that, if any other verdict than one for the plaintiff, in a suit at law by the receiver of the bank to recover the value of the assets from the creditor, had been rendered by the jury, it would have been the duty of the court to set it…

<p>The crop ends of Bessemer steel rails are liable to a duty of 45 per cent ad valorem, as “ steel” under Schedule C of § 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by § 6 of the act of March 3, 1S83, c. 121, 22 Stat. 500, and are not liable to a duty of only 20 per cent ad valorem, as “ metal unwrought,” under the same schedule.</p> <p>Where, at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, on a trial before a jury, the defendant moves the court to direct a verdict for him, on the ground that the plaintiff has not shown sufficient facts to warrant a recovery, and the motion is denied, and the defendant excepts', the exception fails, if the defendant afterwards introduces evidence.</p> <p>Under the practice in New York, allegations in the complaint, that the plaintiff “ duly ” protested in writing against the exaction of duty, and “ duly” appealed to the Secretary of the Treasury, and that ninety days had not elapsed, at the commencement of the suit, since the decision'of the secretary, if not denied by the answer are to be taken as true, and 'are sufficient to prevent the defendant from taking the ground, at the trial, that the protest was premature, or that the plaintiff must give proof of an appeal, or of a decision thereon, or of its date.</p>

Held: (I) That the appellant’s intestate intended that the property in dispute should belong to the appellee, that he bought it for her, and that he promised her orally that he would make over the title to her *239 upon the consideration that she should take care of hiih'.during the remainder of his life, as she had done in the past; . • (2) That there had been sufficient part performance of this parol contract to take it…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The Court of Claims dismissed the claimant’s petition where-upon he took this appeal. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that a banker, having insurance in a company which was rendered utterly insolvent by the great Chicago fire of- 1871, by which the banker’s insured property was consumed with the rest, had a right to set up the amount of his insurance against money of the company in his hands, on deposit. - The insurance was not a debt due at the time of the insolvency;' it became due afterwards, when the banker had performed all…

Held: that the patentee was entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of equivalents, as applied to the .combination covered by the second claim. In the defendant’s burner, the regulation was made by a tubular valve on the outside of the perforations, instead of on the inside, as in the patent, but performing its work by being screwed up or down,,as in the patent.

APPEAR FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY’ OF ARIZONA. Tuts was a complaint, filed in a district court of the Territory of Arizona and county of Pima, by Frank Ely against the New Mexico and Arizona Railroad Company and several individuals, alleging that the “ plaintiff is the owner in fee of all that piece or parcel of land granted by the Mexican authorities to Leon Herreros on May 15,1825,” called the Rancho San José de Sonoita, situated in the Sonoita Yalley in the…

Held: “ From the proof in this case it is quite clear to me that Pattee was notv the first to conceive and embody in a. working machine the idea of a tongueless straddle-row cultivator. The first *300 machine shown in the proof which embodies this idea is that •patented by Isaac Constant,- in November, 1851.

The court stated the case as follows: The first assignment of error relates to the action of the Circuit Court in overruling a motion to dismiss this suit, as one not really and substantially involving a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction.

Held: at. the suit of other creditors, to embrace not simply the property owned by him when it was made, but all that he previously conveyed, sold and transferred to his mother, sisters' and brother.

<p>The report upon a Spanish or Mexican grant by the surveyor general of . New Mexico under the act of July 22, 1854, § 8, 10 Stat. 308, which required such report to be “laid before Congress for such action thereon as may be deemed just and proper, with a view to confirm bond, fide grants,” is no evidence of title or right to possession.</p> <p>In ejectment, the question whether the tract in dispute is within the boun-' .. daries of a grant of public land, is to be determined by the jury on the evidence, as explained by the court.</p> <p>When the description in the petition and grant of a Mexican grant differs from the description in the act of possession the former must prevail.</p> <p>If, from the description and words in the petition and writ of possession of a Mexican grant the jury cannot definitely locate the boundaries of the grant, they must find for the defendant. •</p> <p>Whether the Nolan title has any validity without confirmation by Congress, quaere.</p> <p>Whether the proviso in the act of July 1, 1870, 16 Stat. 646, that when the grants to Nolan to which it related “ are so confirmed, surveyed and patented, they shall be held and taken to be in full satisfaction of all further claims or demands against the United States',” was not intended to affect the entire claim of Nolan for any grant of lands in New Mexico, quaere.</p>

The court stated the case in its opinion as follows: Sarah Walworth, the appellant in the present case, and John J3. Walworth, who died pending the suit, said Sarah being now his executrix, with many other persons, are complainants in a bill in chancery, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, against Joseph L. Harris, John M. Parker, Z. T. Carlton, Sarah E. Bryan, and others.

<p>A judgment of tlio Supreme Court of the.District of Columbia, quashing a -. writ of certiorari, after a justice of the peace, in obedience to the writ, has 'returned.the record of his proceedings and judgment in alandlord and tenant process, is reviewable by this court on writ of error,_if the right to. the possession of the premises is worth more than $5000. "</p> <p>A judgment of a justice of the peace, which is subject to appeal, cannot be quashed by writ of certiorari, except for want of jurisdiction, appearing on the face of his record. • ></p> <p>Under the Landlord and Tenant Act of the District of Columbia, requiring a “ written complaint on oath of the person entitled to the possession of the premises to a justice of the peace,” the oath may be taken before a notary public outside of the District.</p> <p>Under the Landlord and Tenant Act of the District of Columbia, a complaint which alleges that the complainant is. entitled to the possession of the premises, and that they are detained-from him and held without right by the defendant, his' tenant at sufferance, and whose tenancy and estate therein have been determined by a thirty days’ notice in writing to quit, is sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIROUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>Lsr equity. Decree dismissing the bill; complainant appealed; The case is stated ih the opinion.</p> <p>Wellman v.- Howard Goal and Iron Works, 19 Fed. Bep. 51; Wood v. Hummer, 3 Mason' 308; Fislte v. Hills, 11 Bissell,- 294; Bank of St. Mary v. St. John, 25 Alabama, 566 ; Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90 : Bendey v. Townsend, 109 IT. S. 665; 667;' Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499; Mason v. Tiffcmy, 45 Illinois, 392; Boggett v. Bill, 108 Illinois, 560; Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156; Rose v. Mynatt, -7 Merger, 30; Maury v. Lewis, 10 Yerger, 115; McLaughlin v. Baniel, 8 Dana, (Ky.) 182, 184; Beatl/y v. Murphyj 3 A. K. Marsh, 472, 474.</p> <p>Goit v. Gold. Amalgamating Go., 119 IT. S. 343; Foster v. Goddard, 1 Black, 506; Carnead v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181; Simnis v. Guthrie, 9 Crancb, .19; Rubber Go. v. Goodyear, 9 -Wall. 788, 793; Bes Moines Gas Go. v. West, 50 Iowa, 16.; Terry v. Anderson, 95 IT. S. 628,' 636; Singer v. Carpenter, 125 Illinois, 117.</p>

At law, on a- contract. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in. the opinion-.

Held: That C’s remedy was in equity; (2) That he had not been guilty of such laches as would close the doors of a court of equity against him; (3) That the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a decree in complainant’s favor.

Held: That there was no contract to carry the mails for four years-at fixed rates; (2) That the company might have refused to transport them at the •reduced rates; (3) That its failure to do so and the absence of a protest constituted an assent to the rates fixed by the reduction. The case was stated-thus by the court in its opinion. .

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.</p>

Held: that the.burden of proof was on the plaintiff, and that the latter judgment had not been successfully impeached.

Held: The execution of the act was suspended not merely until the further order of the same Congress which passed the joint resolution, but until the further order of the legislative body called, in Section 1, of Article 1, of the Constitution, “ a Congress of the United States ”; (2) Tile act did not vest in the beneficiaries a title to specific land, nor give them a vested right in the certificates which were to be…

The case as stated by tbe court was as follows: Plaintiff in error brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the “Western District of Tennessee against the Board of Commissioners of the Taxing District of the City of Brownsville, Tennessee, and the president, treasurer, secretary and financial agent of that board, upon certain interest coupons annexed to bonds issued by the city of Brownsville, July 1, 1870.

Held: ( 86 Fed. Rep. 149 ,) that “ no defence ■can bs made to a writ of mandamus issued upon a judgment by. default against a municipal corporation which might have ■ been made to the original suit upon the coupons,”, and “ there *501 fore where l inds issued without legislative authority were invalid, that the defendant corporation was bound by a judgment by default upon the coupons, and could not set up as a defence to…

Held: that the court was without jurisdiction. *506 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Sparrel Hill, Mr. Henry Graft and Mr. L. P, Cooper for plaintiffs in error. Mr. W. W. Rutledge and Mr. William M. Smith for defendants in error.

The case, as stated by the court in its opinion, was, as follows: ■ IRis was a suit by an assignee' in bankruptcy to set aside certain conveyances of the bankrupt, and of others under his direction, upon the ground that they were made to defraud his creditors. It was commenced in one of the courts of Tennes-' see.

Held: and advised their .purchase. Iiow the necessary means for-that purpose could be raised was then discussed between them, Kirpberly expressing a willingness to act upon the judgment of Arms, and furnish his portion of the money. Arms mentioned that he had a friend in Chicago by the name of Fairbank, 4 man of great wealth, whom he thought he-could interest -in the purchase- and induce to advance the money.

IN equity, to restrain an alleged infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill,' from which complainant appealed. The case fs stated in the.opinion.

<p>APPEAL EEOM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF INDIANA.</p> <p>In equity, to restrain an alleged infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The cáse is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the agreements between the parties of March 20, 1880, were so far consummated that neither party to this suit can insist upon superiority of lien as between themselves; that no case of misrep- - resentation of facts as distinguished from matters of opinion is made out to warrant declaring the agreements null and void; that the execution and delivery of his note by Dawson and the delivery of the cattle to him,…

IN equity. The bill was filed by the Attorney General of the United States to vacate letters patent for a tract of mineral land in Colorado. The case was reached on the calendar, October 12,1888, when Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury stated to the court, that the United States had no interest in the suit, and did not prosecute the appeal. Mr. Simon Sterne, on behalf of the appellees, then moved in open court to dismiss the appeal.

Held: and is not in conflict with § 3701 of the Revised Statutes of the United States exempting the obligations of the United States from taxation under State, municipal or local authority. This was an action brought by the defendant in error as treasurer of Harrison County, Ohio, against the plaintiff in error in the Court of Common Pleas for that county to recover the amount of a tax assessed against him. .

Held: The debtor could not go behind the agreement fixing the debt at $70,000, because there was no sufficient evidence to impeach it, on the ground that his signature was obtained by fraud or duress, or without his full knowledge of its provisions and consent to its terms; (2) The debtor was entitled to be credited only with the sums realized by the creditor from the sale of the personal property and piece of land, and…

This was an action on a policy of insurance upon a cargo of sugar shipped at Sagua in Cuba for New York. After verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, the defendant sued out this writ of error.

The case, as stated by the court in its opinion, was as follows: This ease comes from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama.

<p>APPEAL .PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.</p> <p>Bill in equity. Decree dismissing tbe bill, from which complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion. (1) To the first point stated in the opinion.

Held: that no case of infringement was made out. In equity, to restrain an alleged infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill without prejudice to the right of complainant to bring an action at law. Complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Samuel T. Smith for appellants. Mr. William P. S. Melvin for appellee.

Teespass quare clausum:. Yerdict for plaintiff, and judgment' on the Yerdict. Defendant .sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.